

**DE STRIJD TEGEN APARTHEID.**  
**THE ROLE OF THE ANTI – APARTHEID**  
**ORGANISATIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS,**  
**1960-1995**

by

**GENEVIEVE LYNETTE KLEIN**

Submitted as partial requirement for the degree  
MAGISTER ARTIUM in HISTORY (Coursework)

in the

**Faculty of Humanities**  
**University of Pretoria**  
**Pretoria**  
**2001**

Supervisor: Prof. K.L. Harris  
Co-supervisor: Prof. J.S. Bergh

## PREFACE

In this mini-thesis, relations between the Netherlands and South Africa during the apartheid period will be considered. The starting point for the discussion comes from the fact that many people assume that the Netherlands played a leading role in the struggle against apartheid. However, on closer analysis it becomes clear that the Netherlands' government did not have a concrete South Africa policy. Moreover, various sources mention the Netherlands' anti-apartheid groups without assessing their actions thoroughly. This study will assess the role of anti-apartheid organisations in the freedom struggle.

Research for this mini-thesis was conducted both in the Netherlands and in South Africa, with the bulk of research being done in the Netherlands. In South Africa, the Central Archives were consulted, and in this way insight was gained into the reaction of the South African government to actions by the Netherlands' government. Early relations were also researched to get an idea of how relations changed with the introduction of apartheid. In the Netherlands, research began in Amsterdam at the South African Institute (SAI), where secondary sources were available. The Internationale Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG) was also consulted, which provided secondary sources as well as newspapers, pamphlets and archival documents relating to both the government and the anti-apartheid groups. The bulk of research was conducted at Nederlands Instituut voor Zuidelijk Afrika (NIZA), which was formed by some of the anti-apartheid groups at the end of apartheid. Here archival material pertaining to the anti-apartheid groups, magazines, newspapers and books were available, as well as government documents published during the apartheid period that were of interest to the anti-apartheid groups. Research was conducted in The Hague, at both the Rijksarchief and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, giving insight into the Netherlands' government's policy, views, actions and budgets.

This mini-thesis would not have been possible with the assistance of certain people and organisations. I would like to thank the University of Pretoria (UP) for giving me the opportunity to go to the Netherlands to conduct research and the Department of History at the Vrije Universiteit for guiding me as regards my research. I also appreciate the help provided by the people at the various institutes who assisted me in my research, in particular Kier Schuringa at NIZA. Finally, I would like to thank the Department of History and Cultural History at UP for their continual support, and in particular my supervisor, Prof. K.L. Harris, for her encouragement and guidance.

## ABBREVIATIONS

AABN- Anti-Apartheidsbeweging Nederland  
AC- Angola Comite  
ADB- Algemeen Diaconaal Bureau  
ANC- African National Congress  
ANCYL- African national Congress Youth League  
ARA- Algemeen Rijksarchief  
ARP- Anti-Revolutionaire Partij  
ASCOP- African Scholarship Program  
BOA- Boycot Outspan Aktie  
BP- British Petroleum  
BZ- Buitenlandse Zaken  
CAZA- Stichting Cultureel Alternatief Zuid Afrika  
CDA- Christen Democratisch Appel  
CEMBO- Catholic Medefinancierings Organisatie  
CI- Christian Institute  
CNV- Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond  
COSATU- Congress of South African Trade Unions  
CPN- Communistische Partij van Nederland  
CZA- Comite Zuid-Afrika  
D'66- Democraten 1966  
DAF-Defence and Aid Fund  
DAFN- Defence and Aid Fund Netherlands  
EC- European Community  
EPS- European Political Samenwerking  
EU- European Union  
FNV- Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging  
FREMILO- Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique  
GASA- Gay Association of South Africa  
GDR- General Diconale Raad  
GG- Goewerneur-Generaal, 1905-1977  
GPV- Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond  
ICCO-Interkerkelijke Coördinatie Commissie Ontwikkelingsprojecten  
IGA- International Gay Association  
IISG- Internationale Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis  
IMF-International Monetary Fund  
IZA- Het Nederlandse Instituut voor Zuidelijk Afrika  
KLM- Koninklijke Luchvaart-Maatschappij  
KVP- Katholieke Volkspartij  
KZA- Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika  
MKA- Medisch Komitee Africa  
MPLA- Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola  
NCO- Nationale Commissie Voorlichting en Buwustwording Ontwikkelingssamenwerking  
NGO- Non-Governmental Organisation  
NIZA- Nederlands Instituut voor Zuidelijk Afrika  
NOVIB- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Internationale Ontwikkelingssamenwerking

NP- National Party  
NVV- Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen  
NZAV- Nederlands Zuidafrikaanse Vereeniging  
NZAW- Nederlands Zuidafrikaanse Werkgemeenschap  
OAU- Organisation of African Unity  
OFS- Oranje Vrijstaat  
OKW- Sekretaris van Onderwys, Kuns en Wetenskap  
OSACI- Oecumenische Studie en Actiecentrum voor Investeringsen  
PAC- Pan Africanist Congress  
PAIGC- Partido Africano para a Independencia de Guine- Bissao e Cabo Verde  
PCR- Programme to Combat Racism  
PF- Patriotic Front  
PM- Prime Minister  
PM- Prime Minister or Minister President  
PPR- Politieke Partij Radikalen  
PSP- Pacifistiese Socialistiese Partij  
PvdA- Partij van de Arbeid  
RaRa- Revolutionaire Anti- Racistiese Aktie  
SAA- South African Airways  
SAB- Central Archives Depot  
SACP- South African Communist Party  
SACTU- South African Congress of Trade Unions  
SADCC- South African Development Co-ordinating Conference  
SADF- South African Defence Force  
SAI- South African Institute  
SAPET- South African Prisoners Education Trust  
SGP- Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij  
SOH- Stichting Oecumeniese Hulp  
SRB- Shipping Research Bureau  
SWAPO- South West Africa People's Organisation  
UDF- United Democratic Front  
UN- United Nations  
UOD- Sekretaris van Unie-Onderwys, 1911-1968  
USA- United States of America  
VKW- Stichting Vrouw-Kerk, Derde Wereld  
VOC- Verenigde Oost-Indiese Compagnie  
VVD- Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie  
WCC- World Council of Churches  
ZANU- Zimbabwe African National Union  
ZAPU- Zimbabwe African People's Union  
ZAR- Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek

## Contents

	page
Preface	i
Abbreviations	ii
1. Introduction	1
i. Early ties	2
ii. The role of non-governmental organisations	3
iii. The Netherlands' reaction to apartheid	5
2. Historiographical overview	9
i. Introduction	9
ii. The early apartheid period, 1948-1976	11
iii. The post-Soweto period, 1976-1990	14
iv. The post-apartheid period, 1990- 2000	21
v. Conclusion	30
3. The Netherlands' government's view	31
i. Reaction to apartheid	31
ii. Sharpeville – the first turning point	32
iii. The Den Uyl government- a more radical policy	34
iv. Few concrete steps during the 1980s	38
4. The anti-apartheid groups in the Netherlands	50
i. Introduction	50
ii. Origin of the anti-apartheid organisations	50
iii. Aims of the three main anti-apartheid organisations	55
5. Actions by the anti-apartheid groups within Africa	62
i. Introduction	62
ii. Relations with movements inside South Africa	63
iii. Relations with movements in Africa	66
iv. Financial and material support for the freedom movements	71

6. Actions by the anti-apartheid groups within the Netherlands	82
i. Introduction	82
ii. Boycott and sanction actions	82
iii. Actions to break all ties with South Africa	87
iv. Information activities	90
v. Activities aimed at the Netherlands' government	94
vi. Conclusion	99
7. Conclusion	101
Appendices:	
I. The system of coalition government as used in the Netherlands	104
II. Projects organised under the two stream policy	105
III. Donations by the Special Fund to Combat Racism	106
IV. Import-export figures as publicised by the anti-apartheid groups	107
8. Sources	108

## ILLUSTRATIONS

	after page
1. Photograph of the Sharpeville incident	32
2. 'Nederlandse regering wil geen boycot, wel praten'. A cartoon criticising the Netherlands' government policy	34
3. Picket line in support of the ANC	80
4. Mandela visits the Netherlands for the first time after his release on 16 June 1990	80
5. Bosgra meets Mandela	80
6. Demonstration supporting the oil campaign	84
7. The Netherlands' government votes on the issue of an oil boycott	84
8. KZA campaign to stop the sale of Kruger Rands	86

## 1. Introduction

In the early 1990s, during a visit to the Netherlands, Nelson Mandela specially thanked the Netherlands for the role they had played in helping to bring apartheid to an end, and more specifically for their support for the African National Congress (ANC).<sup>1</sup> However, on considering the actions of the Netherlands' government during the apartheid period, it is apparent that the government did not take major steps in helping to end apartheid. In actual fact, the Netherlands' government's policy is more often characterised by a lack of specific resolutions against apartheid with promised actions normally resulting in few concrete steps. This lack of action is seen in aspects such as the 'ton van Luns';<sup>2</sup> continued cultural relations through the Cultural Accord;<sup>3</sup> and in the two-stream policy of the R.F.M. Lubbers government.<sup>4</sup> The aim of this discussion is to look beyond the Netherlands' government, in order to ascertain why the Netherlands is regarded as having been so anti-apartheid.

The first section of the study will critically assess certain works written on the relations between the Netherlands and South Africa during the apartheid period. This will include studies on official relations, studies on relations with White South Africa as well as anti-apartheid literature. In the next section the Netherlands' government's reaction to apartheid will be briefly considered. This government policy has been the topic of numerous studies,<sup>5</sup> and for this reason it will only be outlined so as to highlight the government's lack of reaction which in turn led to the need for the non-governmental organisations. During the apartheid period there were various non-governmental anti-apartheid organisations in the Netherlands, with the first being formed in 1960. In his speech in the Netherlands, Mandela thanked by name three of these organisations- Werkgroep Kairos,

---

<sup>1</sup> D. Hellema & E. van den Bergh, 'Dialog of Boycot. De Nederlandse – Zuid Afrika-politiek na de Tweede Wereldoorlog', Het Instituut voor Zuidelijk Afrika (IZA) nr 2, November, 1995, p.12.

<sup>2</sup> The 'ton van Luns' was the first donation made by the Netherlands' government to the anti-apartheid struggle. They planned to give 100 000 guilders to the DAF, but due to disagreement it went to the UN. J. Luns was the Netherlands' Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of the donation.

<sup>3</sup> South Africa and the Netherlands entered into a Cultural Accord in 1953, which the Netherlands did not officially end until 1981.

<sup>4</sup> The Lubbers government's two-stream policy included increased international pressure on South Africa, community programmes inside South Africa and dialogue with the South African government. S. de Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto. Nederlands regeringsbeleid ten aanzien van apartheid, 1960-1977*. Amsterdam, 1999, pp.349-353; R. Rozenberg, *De bloedband Den-Haag-Pretoria. Het Nederlandse Zuid-Afrikabeleid sinds 1945*, Amsterdam, 1986, p.24; G.J. Schutte, *De roeping ten aanzien van het oude broedervolk. Nederland en Zuid Afrika, 1960-1990*, Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut (SAI) Reeks, no 1, Amsterdam, 1993, pp.25-28.

<sup>5</sup> De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*; Schutte, *De roeping ten aanzien van het oude broedervolk*.

the Anti-Apartheidsbeweging Nederland (AABN) and the Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika (KZA), for their open political, moral and material support. It was also these three organisations that the White South African government highlighted as dangerous organisations during the 1970s, even banning some of their pamphlets. The Netherlands was the only country to have three organisations on this South African list, and the National Party (NP) regarded the anti-apartheid groups in the Netherlands as the strongest in the world.<sup>6</sup> It is necessary to consider the origin, aims and actions of these groups in order to ascertain to what extent they determined the Netherlands' anti-apartheid actions. A detailed discussion of these three organisations will form the main focus of this study, making it clear that it was the non-governmental organisations, rather than the Netherlands' government, that contributed to the Netherlands becoming one of the top anti-apartheid countries in the West.

#### **i. Early ties**

Relations between the Netherlands and South Africa date back to 1652 when Jan van Riebeeck landed at the Cape in order to set up a refreshment post. The refreshment station was established by the Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), not the Netherlands' government, and was a temporary victualling point not a colony. However, with the institution of the first Vrijburghers already in 1657, the Cape developed into a Dutch colony with a permanent and expanding White population. The Cape remained in the hands of the Netherlands until 1795 when the British temporarily took control. It was returned to the Netherlands' government in 1803, and remained under Batavian rule until 1806 when the British finally colonised the Cape. Although the Dutch language continued to be spoken at the Cape and the Dutch culture remained, there was very little contact between the Netherlands and the Cape over the next few decades. It was not until 1880, with the outbreak of the First War of Independence in the interior of South Africa, that the links between the Netherlands and the Dutch speaking residents of South Africa, now called Boers, were re-established and developed. By this time the Boers had left the Cape and developed two independent republics- the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) and Oranje Vrijstaat (OFS).<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Nederlands Instituut Zuidelijk Afrika (NIZA), 10.1, Kairos, 31/5/1995; E, van den Bergh, 'Dialogo was geen dialoog, sancties bleven omstreden' in *Amandla*, November 1995, p.14.

Dutch sympathy for the Boers in the two wars of independence they fought against the British, one from 1880-1881 and the other 1899-1902, led to a spirit of nationalism in the Netherlands. Feelings of a 'blood bond' developed, so that at the start of the twentieth century, relations between the Boers and the Netherlands were stronger than they had been throughout the nineteenth century. This new found link laid the foundation for relations during the twentieth century, and influenced the Netherlands' South Africa policy during apartheid.<sup>8</sup>

## **ii. The role of non-governmental organisations**

By looking at the non-governmental anti-apartheid organisations in the Netherlands, it is possible to get a better idea of the general public view of apartheid. The importance of public opinion lies in the fact that relations between the Netherlands and South Africa have always been characterised by stronger private relations than official relations. Already during the nineteenth century it was individual organisations, rather than the government itself, that played the most important role. When looking at the Netherlands' relations with South Africa, or more particularly with the ZAR in the 1880s, it is interesting to note that here it was not the official Netherlands' government reaction to support the Boers in their struggle against the British. It was rather individuals that took the lead in supporting the Boer struggle and that put pressure on the Netherlands' government to take an official stand, but they constantly refused to do so. Although the government did sympathise with the Boers, they recognised their position as a small power, needing the support of Britain in their colonial experience in Asia. They recognised the danger in isolating themselves from the powerful countries, and so rather followed a middle path of neutrality.<sup>9</sup>

The political situation of the 1880s needs to be taken into consideration when assessing the Netherlands' position at this point. German unification had taken place in 1871, meaning that there was now a large country on the border of the Netherlands. Along with this, German Kaiser Wilhelm I and Otto von Bismarck were in favour of an expansionist policy, especially in the field of gaining colonies. Although Anglo-German rivalry would only

---

<sup>7</sup> H.J.van Aswegen, *History of South Africa to 1854*. Pretoria, 1990, pp.68, 74-78, 105, 158; A. Vandenbosch, *Dutch foreign policy since 1815. A study in small power politics*. The Hague, 1959, p.71.

<sup>8</sup> B.J.H. de Graaf, *De mythe van de stamverwantschap. Nederland en de Afrikaners, 1902-1930*. SAI Reeks 2, Amsterdam, 1993, pp.1, 3; M. Kuitenbrouwer, *The Netherlands and the rise of imperialism. Colonies and foreign policy, 1870-1902*. Oxford, 1991, pp.73-74, 190-192.

fully develop a few years later, the Netherlands would have seen the danger involved in estranging Britain at a time when they were the other major power. If the Netherlands did need protection from Germany, either in the colonial world or in Europe, the most likely country to get help from would be Britain. At this point Britain did still ‘rule the waves’.<sup>10</sup>

It can therefore be seen that, already in relations with the ZAR in the late nineteenth century, the Netherlands was very aware of its position as a small country. They knew that they could not stand alone, either economically or politically, and that they needed the support of the other European powers. The exact same views can be seen regarding the Netherlands’ government in the 1960s and after. They again did not want to take steps alone, and did not want to isolate themselves, this time from the European Community (EC). Once again it was therefore individuals, joined together in the non-governmental organisations, that took a specific stand. It was also these non-governmental organisations that would define the view the Netherlands held towards apartheid, and that would influence the view the rest of the world had of the Netherlands in this regard.

Links between the Netherlands’ non-government organisations and South Africa date back to 1881, when the Nederlandsch Zuid-Afrikaansche Vereeniging (NZAV) was formed. Its aim was to establish and increase contact with South African Afrikaners on a cultural and intellectual level, and it continued to do this into the apartheid period.<sup>11</sup> Aside from the cultural movements, church organisations also played a big role in keeping ties between South Africa and the Netherlands alive. It was only during the 1930s, and increasingly after this, that relations really developed between South Africa and the Netherlands on an official level. These were originally more in the field of trade, although educational and cultural agreements did develop later, most noticeably the relations with the University of Pretoria and the Cultural Accord of 1953.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> K.W. Grundy, “‘We’re against apartheid, but...’”: Dutch foreign policy towards South Africa.’ in *Studies in Race and Nations*, vol 5, no 3, 1973-1974, Colorado, pp.2-3; Kuitenbrouwer, *The Netherlands and the rise of imperialism*, pp.190-192; Vandenbosch, *Dutch foreign policy since 1815*, pp.71-75, 82-86.

<sup>10</sup> M. Perry, *Western civilization. A brief history*. Boston, 1993, pp.390, 422.

<sup>11</sup> NIZA, 19.4, S. de Boer, July 1994, pp.31-32.

<sup>12</sup> G. Klein, ‘Relations between the Netherlands and South Africa in the twentieth century’, BA(hons) dissertation, University of Pretoria (UP), 1999, pp.5-13; M. Kuitenbrouwer, *De ontdekking van de Derde Wereld. Beeldvorming en beleid in Nederland, 1950-1990*. Den Haag, 1994, p.213; G.J. Schutte, ‘Een eeuw Nederlandse aandacht voor Zuid Afrika’ in *Zicht op Zuid Afrika. Honderd jaar van Zuid-Afrika, 1881-1981*. NZAV, Amsterdam, 1981, p.1

The importance of unofficial relations in early links between the Netherlands and South Africa is thus apparent, and it remains so in the apartheid period. It is from the anti-apartheid organisations that the most intense and important criticism of apartheid comes. It is also these organisations that take concrete steps to help bring apartheid to an end, most noticeably in the form of direct support for the freedom struggle. It is also these organisations that attempted to push the Netherlands' government towards action, in the same way as the pro-Boer activists tried to push the then Netherlands' government towards action during the two ZAR wars of independence.

### **iii. The Netherlands' reaction to apartheid**

Studies of the Netherlands' relations with South Africa during the apartheid period present various reasons for the Netherlands taking the stand they did. The foremost reason is normally found in the Dutch feeling of kinship with the Afrikaner in South Africa.<sup>13</sup> These relations are often drawn back to 1652, with the arrival of Van Riebeeck in the Cape, and the setting up of a refreshment post by the VOC. However, this is not convincing given the lack of relations in the early nineteenth century. The Netherlands and the Afrikaner had hardly any contact from the period of the second British occupation of the Cape in 1806, until the First Anglo Boer War in 1880. Other reasons must therefore be sought to explain why the Netherlands paid so much attention to South Africa in the apartheid period.

The answer lies in the First and Second Anglo Boer Wars. These wars awakened feelings of kinship in the late nineteenth century, and gave the Netherlands hope for the extension of their culture into South Africa. Never before had the public really considered South Africa to be so much a part of the Netherlands as they did with the outbreak of the Anglo Boer Wars. It was only at this point that feelings of kinship were really established. According to Dutch historian, G.J. Schutte, the pro-Boer movement during the Anglo Boer War within the Netherlands was largely based on Dutch nationalism. This means that, rather than being influenced by liberal ideas of sovereignty and freedom, many people looked at the benefits a 'Nieuw Nederland' in the south would have for the Netherlands. This is obviously a generalisation, and some people did act out of sympathy and belief in liberalism. On the level of nationalism, Schutte looks at how the Netherlands was

---

<sup>13</sup> W.G. Hendricks, 'De betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Zuid Afrika, 1946-1961.' PhD.-verhandeling, Universiteit van Wes-Kaapland (UWK)1984, p.6; H.O. Terreblanche, *Nederland en die Afrikaner: gesprek oor apartheid. Die paginaruil tussen Trouw en Die Burger, 1963-1964.* Port Elizabeth, 1998, pp.1-2.

beginning to accept its position within the world as a small power. Although they were still a colonial power, they could no longer rely purely on their own strength to keep their possessions. This led to a growth of nationalism, as they wanted to maintain, preserve and develop their culture.<sup>14</sup>

It is in this climate that they realised the similarities they had with the Afrikaners in the ZAR. Boers, whom they had often previously regarded as ‘lazy’, ‘incompetent’ and ‘racist’, now held potential as distant kinsmen. They thus saw the possibility of strengthening and expanding their own culture, and in this way increasing their position in world politics. In this way imperialism and nationalism started to merge. Schutte considers this by looking at the benefits the Netherlands recognised in the link they could have with South Africa. They saw possibilities for increased trade and for immigration to South Africa if the Dutch character of the ZAR was emphasised. It was thus during the late nineteenth century that the idea of the ‘blood bond’ between the Netherlands and South Africa was firmly established. This was an idea that would not easily die out, and would be strengthened through the years by novels highlighting the heroism of the Boers. Together with this, goes the view of South Africa as the ‘Nieuw Nederland’. Although these ideas were never fully developed as a result of the Boer defeat in the 1899-1902 Anglo Boer War, the idea was still prevalent. Thus, it was not just a group of Afrikaners, with ties dating back to 1652, that controlled apartheid South Africa, but it was people of their culture, and of the ‘Nieuw Nederland’, dating back to the 1880s. The ties between the two countries were thus much more recent, and thus in a sense much stronger, than they would otherwise have been.<sup>15</sup>

This problem with the racial policy of the Afrikaners did however not only begin with apartheid. Already in the days of the first Anglo Boer War, the Netherlands regarded the Afrikaner’s racial policy as the only possible justification for the British annexation of the ZAR. It was only when they realised that the British racial policies were not much better than those of the Boers that the Netherlands no longer saw this as sufficient justification

---

<sup>14</sup> De Graaf, *De mythe van de stamverwantschap*, pp.4-5; Schutte, ‘Een eeuw Nederlandse aandacht voor Zuid Afrika’, pp.7-16; G.J. Schutte, *Nederland en de Afrikaners- Adhesie en Adversie*. Den Haag, 1986, p.37-34.

<sup>15</sup> De Graaf, *De mythe van de stamverwantschap*, pp.4-5; Schutte, ‘Een eeuw Nederlandse aandacht voor Zuid Afrika’, pp.7-16.

for Britain's actions.<sup>16</sup> It can therefore be seen why the apartheid situation in South Africa was regarded by the Netherlands as more important than just the domestic policy of another country. To them, it was the policy of a people of their own culture whom they had supported in their independence struggle and in their growing nationalism. It was thus a situation much closer to home, and one that had direct connections to the Netherlands.

This is obviously not the only reason why Netherlanders reacted against apartheid. Different anti-apartheid groups give different reasons for their specific actions, and found their starting points in different places. Aside from looking at this cultural link, it is also necessary to look at the Netherlands' view of the Third World; the loss of its own colonies; and its growing concern for human rights in the 1960s. One important reason for the Netherlands' concern about South Africa during the apartheid period, was the loss of its colonies in Indonesia, which should be considered in the same light as their position in the late nineteenth century. Once again the Netherlands was being faced with its diminishing position among the world powers. They faced numerous problems in Indonesia, and in particular New Guinea, and needed something to again increase their status internationally. Groups within the Netherlands were affected by decolonisation differently, with others seeing the Netherlands' colonial experience in Indonesia as so bad that they wanted to stop all other colonial problems. People growing up in the Netherlands during the decolonisation period felt the effects on the Indonesian people had been horrific. This awakened feelings of the importance of human rights, and a social obligation to protect suppressed people.<sup>17</sup>

Another major influence on the Netherlands' view was World War II. After experiencing the horrors of racial superiority and suppression during the occupation in World War II, the Dutch wanted to help prevent such an incident from ever taking place again. The laws passed by the South African government increasingly sounded like the Nuremberg laws passed by the Nazis. This awakened a desire within the Netherlands to protect the South African Blacks, and to help bring apartheid to an end.<sup>18</sup> The War, together with changes in the 1960s, led to an increased awareness in human rights, not only in the Netherlands but

---

<sup>16</sup> Schutte, 'Een eeuw Nederlandse aandacht voor Zuid Afrika', pp.25-26, 28-29.

<sup>17</sup> Kuitenbrouwer, *De ontdekking van de Derde Wereld*, pp.24-66, 209-213; Schutte, 'Een eeuw Nederlandse aandacht voor Zuid Afrika', pp.32-33.

<sup>18</sup> Schutte, 'Een eeuw Nederlandse aandacht voor Zuid Afrika', pp.32-33; J. Heldring, *Changes in Dutch Society and their implications for Netherland -South African relations*. Braamfontein, 1984, pp.7-8.

also across the Western world. The change in attitude in the 1960s brought about various things. Dutch political scientist, J. Heldring, identifies seven causes, with the most important being the influence of the war years; the role of mass media and television; increased education and personal prosperity; and finally democratisation and secularisation. This meant that the youth of the 1960s were prepared to question the actions of their leaders and were aware of the political situation they were living in, which also led to the break down of the hold of the church over society. This change is known as the 'Cultural Revolution', and had political repercussions in both domestic and foreign policy.<sup>19</sup> This also led to a greater interest being taken in Africa, and in particular in South Africa, where the apartheid system went against basic human rights.

The importance of considering the non-governmental reaction to apartheid can therefore be seen, along with the different reasons for taking part in the struggle against apartheid. In this study it will be seen how each organisation found a different reason for participating in the struggle and how this influenced the actions they organised and participated in.

---

<sup>19</sup> Heldring, *Changes in Dutch society*, pp.1-7.

## **2. Historiographical overview**

### **i. Introduction**

Relations between the Netherlands and South Africa have been the topic of numerous historical and other studies done over the years. It has drawn considerable interest due to the historic links between the two countries. The aim of this chapter is to outline and briefly comment on the main studies produced on relations between South Africa and the Netherlands during the apartheid period. Through this it will be evident how important and how close these relations were, and it will determine when books started being written on this period, and what point of view they tend to take. There are various aspects that need to be focused on, the main division being between governmental relations and relations of a non-official nature. At government level, there are both the Netherlands's relations with South Africa and the South African relations with the Netherlands. On the non-governmental level, there are the church groups, groups that remained loyal to White South Africa and various anti-apartheid groups. An important consideration here is whether the group sought solidarity with South Africa itself, or rather with the banned anti-apartheid movements. When reviewing the writings on these various relations it is more practical to approach them chronologically, than thematically. This is because the respective studies usually make mention of all the types of relations, as they are interrelated.

There are however three main categories of work that can be identified. The first, and the largest group to date, are those published in the Netherlands by the non-governmental movements concerned with South Africa. These books, rather than being scientifically researched, have been written for a particular purpose and with a certain agenda in mind. In this regard they form a source for writing history, rather than being history works themselves. Some of these studies are very detailed and accurate, offering insight into the workings of the specific movement, and for this reason are useful for the writing of a more objective study. The number of books published or produced in this category is too vast for all of them to be discussed, so only a few have been selected to represent the general ideas expressed. In order to present a cross-section of the publications, it was decided to select examples from the most influential organisations, the AABN, Boycot Outspan Actie (BOA), Comite Zuid Afrika (CZA), Defence and Aid Fund Netherlands (DAFN), Kairos, KZA NZAV. Thus the books chosen are not always necessarily those with the most

information, but rather those that represent the general viewpoint of the specific organisation and of this category of work.

The second identifiable category contains researched studies, with the majority of these only appearing in the late 1980s and 1990s and being written primarily by political scientists. The reason for them being written relatively late can only be speculated about. For many outside the anti-apartheid movement, the importance of the role played by the Netherlands in the apartheid period did not come to the fore until near the end of apartheid. Moreover, an objective study could not be done until a certain amount of perspective had been obtained on the movements, which was only possible once their respective aims had been achieved. The probable reason for books only starting to appear in the late 1980s is because the 1970s was the decade when the Dutch government played their biggest role in South African affairs. Some of the sources written in the 1980s were also written for the purpose of informing people of what they still could do to assist the anti-apartheid groups.

The archival situation also played a role in determining the study of these relations, as is still the case. By 1990 archival records could only be accessed up until 1970, which meant that only the first ten years of real anti-apartheid material was made available. Studies continue to be limited to the period up to the end of the 1970s, although other sources can be used, such as newspaper articles. The fact that most works published to date are still not done by historians, but rather by political scientists or are studies of a social manner, is also related to the recentness of the history as well as the archival restrictions. This fact needs to be taken into consideration when assessing these books.

The last category of books which can be identified focuses on international relations with South Africa that have sections dealing specifically with the Netherlands. By looking at the amount of attention the Netherlands is given in some of these books, the general importance of the Netherlands's position can be assessed. All three of these categories will be considered chronologically with a tripartite division being made so as to give greater insight into the development of Dutch opinion regarding South Africa. The first section will consider works written prior to the Soweto uprising of 1976, which will reflect the early reaction to apartheid; the second section will consider books in the late apartheid period during the era of increased criticism of apartheid; and the last section will consider

works written after the end of apartheid, which are then able to take a more objective standpoint.

## **ii. The early apartheid period, 1948-1976**

The first book to be considered is that of J.J. Buskes, a Dutch minister, published after his visit to South Africa in 1955.<sup>20</sup> Buskes's publication is one of the first pieces of work to be produced in the Netherlands that can be considered as anti-apartheid literature. His book does not focus on the relations between the Netherlands and South Africa as such, other than to state that he hopes that by informing people about South Africa he can convince people not to immigrate there.

Buskes starts by describing his visit to South Africa, and explains how he experienced apartheid and the separation between Black and White. He gives a brief overview of the development of race relations in South Africa, highlighting the role of the church throughout.<sup>21</sup> In this way he also focuses on connections with the Netherlands and describes the attitude of the Afrikaner towards both the British and the Dutch. He points out that the divisions within South Africa are not only being between Black and White, but also between English and Afrikaans.<sup>22</sup> Buskes then focuses on the growing resistance to apartheid within South Africa, considering resistance among both Whites and Blacks. He makes mention of the ANC, the Labour Party and the trade unions, and states that it is a pity that there is no real socialist party in South Africa.<sup>23</sup> He concludes his book by considering the future of South Africa, and focusing on the role of the Dutch living in South Africa and those planning on moving there. He feels it is impossible to remain outside of the political development, so Dutch people should either not immigrate to South Africa or should make their views known when in South Africa.<sup>24</sup>

Buskes' book is not overtly subjective as he does, to a certain extent include different views. The aim of his book is to inform the Dutch, especially those considering moving to South Africa, of the situation in South Africa. He also tries to inform the churches and outline what role they should already be playing in developing a more united South Africa.

---

<sup>20</sup> J.J. Buskes, *South Africa's apartheid policy- unacceptable*. sl, 1956.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.1-3, 6-9, 38- 61.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.29-35.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.96-136.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.151-156.

Buskes was to become one of the founders of the first anti-apartheid movement in the Netherlands- the CZA.

The book *Apartheid*, compiled by A. Nuis and brought out by the DAFN<sup>25</sup> in 1966, aims to inform the Dutch about apartheid, rather than give facts on the Dutch involvement in the anti-apartheid struggle.<sup>26</sup> The book highlights the way that this group interpreted and understood apartheid, with contributors from various political and religious groupings, and in general shows a fairly good understanding of apartheid. It is accepted that apartheid began before 1948,<sup>27</sup> and the differentiation between ‘Grand’ and ‘Petty’ apartheid is made.<sup>28</sup> This book defines the South African racial situation as ‘geen gelijkheid in kerk en staat’.<sup>29</sup> The idea that the Dutch would ‘accept apartheid better if they understood it better’, is rejected. Instead the Afrikaner is criticised for trying to use religion to justify apartheid. Apartheid is perceived as an attempt to improve the White privileged position at the expense of the Black, Indian and Coloured.<sup>30</sup>

M. Pos, a Dutch journalist, published *Wie was Dr Verwoerd*, in 1968, where she considers what different groups of people felt about H.F. Verwoerd.<sup>31</sup> The book begins by outlining the view of the average Dutch person regarding both apartheid and Verwoerd. She criticises those who judge South Africa but have never been to the country, points out that racism also occurs in the Netherlands, and says that apartheid is desired by both Whites and ‘non-Whites’.<sup>32</sup> In the following chapter Pos discusses the point of view of the Netherlands’ press, and after assessing various papers concludes that relations between the Netherlands and South Africa were friendly. When considering how the South African English press felt about Verwoerd, Pos found that most were positive about him,<sup>33</sup> and that immigrants from the Netherlands and Belgium reported that there was no opposition to Verwoerd inside the country, and that negative reports were just propaganda.<sup>34</sup> Pos continues to discuss the view of the Jewish people in South Africa, who are reported to be

---

<sup>25</sup> A branch of the International DAF, aimed at funding the lawyers who defended those fighting apartheid.

<sup>26</sup> A. Nuis (samesteller), *Apartheid, feiten en commentaren*. Amsterdam, 1966.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.10-11.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.26-31, 43-45.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p.18.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.155-168.

<sup>31</sup> H.F. Verwoerd was PM of South Africa from 1958-1966, when he was assassinated by D. Tsafendas; M. Pos, *Wie was Dr Verwoerd?* Utrecht, 1968.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.7-35.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.88-92.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.93-98.

content. Pos concludes that Verwoerd gave a moral basis to apartheid,<sup>35</sup> and that even Blacks, Asians and Coloureds liked him as he wanted peace, equality and freedom.<sup>36</sup>

Throughout Pos's book she only gives the view of those that did not criticise Verwoerd, and chooses pieces of writing that support this view. She speaks to homeland leaders, but not to leaders of the opposition. Unlike sources by the anti-apartheid movements, Pos's book gives the illusion of objective writing by giving the view of different groups of people, but it is still subjective. The book is interesting in that it gives the view of the group in the Netherlands who remained pro-White South Africa.

The leader of BOA,<sup>37</sup> E. du Plessis, wrote a book entitled *Outspan: Bouwstenen voor apartheid* in 1972.<sup>38</sup> This publication starts with a quote from a speech by B.J. Voster.<sup>39</sup> In this speech he said that every South African product bought added a stone to the wall of the continued existence of South Africa. Du Plessis uses this as the point of departure for a call for the boycott of South African products, and in particular Outspan fruit. It gives a brief outline of the conditions of the Black labour used to produce fruit in South Africa, mentioning both low wages and bad treatment. The view that boycotts will hurt Blacks more than Whites is disputed, and Du Plessis points out that it was ANC leader Albert Luthuli<sup>40</sup> who called for a boycott and who said that the people must suffer in order to bring apartheid to an end. In assessing this book it can again be seen that it forms part of the anti-apartheid struggle rather than literature on the struggle.

One of the first researched studies considering Netherlands-South African relations is the work of K.W. Grundy published in 1973-1974. This paper appears as an article published in the *Studies in Race and Nations* series.<sup>41</sup> The interesting fact about this publication is that Grundy is an American, where as most other works are written by either South Africans or the Dutch. Grundy focuses on the governmental relations between South

---

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.99-101.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.102-115.

<sup>37</sup> BOA was a Dutch anti-apartheid movement that focused on the Boycotting of South African products.

<sup>38</sup> E. Du Plessis, *Outspan: Bouwstenen voor apartheid*. (transl J. Voorhoeve) Boycot Outspan Actie (BOA), Rotterdam, 1972.

<sup>39</sup> B.J. Voster was Prime Minister of South Africa, 1966-1978.

<sup>40</sup> Chief Albert Luthuli was President-General of the ANC from 1952 and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961. He died in 1967 when he was hit by a train.

<sup>41</sup> Grundy, "'We're against apartheid, but...'"

Africa and the Netherlands, in the article entitled “‘We’re against apartheid, but...’”: Dutch policy towards South Africa’.

Grundy considers the reasons for the initial lack of reaction to apartheid by the Netherlands, emphasising cultural links and blood ties, although also mentioning economic and philosophical considerations. Unlike most other authors, Grundy does not see the period after the Second World War as a period of growing relations, but rather considers the relations strained from the start.<sup>42</sup> Grundy’s focus on economic considerations increases throughout the study, ending with the view that in the modern capitalist system the Netherlands’s actions could not really have been otherwise.<sup>43</sup> Grundy looks at the anti-apartheid movements very briefly, but focuses mainly on the official actions.<sup>44</sup> He mentions the J.M. Den Uyl government coming to power in 1973 in the Netherlands,<sup>45</sup> and sees this as a possible turning point in Dutch relations with South Africa. He also discusses the Christian Liberal philosophical view held by the Den Uyl government.<sup>46</sup>

Grundy is a political scientist, and therefore focuses on developments still taking place and does not analyse the past. As this article was completed before the end of the Den Uyl government ruling period, Grundy still expresses hope that the Den Uyl government will make progressive changes to their policy. He comments on moving the government position from one of ‘dialogue’ to one debating the effectiveness of isolation and morality of an armed struggle. Grundy’s article is useful considering that it was written while the debates were still taking place. It reflects the hope that was experienced within the Netherlands by anti-apartheid movements, and in a sense explains their later disappointment in the Den Uyl government. Grundy’s analysis of the Dutch position sheds light on the changing political position of the Netherlands.

### **iii. The post-Soweto period, 1976-1990**

The Soweto uprising of 1976 resulted in international outrage, and led to many countries becoming more anti-apartheid. The Netherlands was no exception, made more noticeable by the fact that the 1970s also saw the rise of non-governmental anti-apartheid

---

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.1-11.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.17-21, 28-30.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.21-23.

<sup>45</sup> See Appendix I for a list of the Netherlands’ governments during the apartheid period.

<sup>46</sup> Grundy, “‘We’re against apartheid, but...’”, pp.23-28.

organisations. The period 1976-1990 is therefore characterised by a general increase in support for the freedom movements and growing criticism of apartheid.

In 1981, the NZAV, one of the movements which remained loyal to White South Africa, brought out *Zicht op Zuid-Afrika*.<sup>47</sup> The book gives a general history of South Africa from 1881 until 1981. Unlike the books brought out by the anti-apartheid movements, this book does fall into the category of history writing. The interesting thing to note with this book is that apartheid is not ignored, but merely presented as a political policy.<sup>48</sup> This pro-White South African movement therefore just gives a non-critical view of apartheid as part of South African history.

The pamphlets produced by the anti-apartheid group Werkgroep Kairos present a clear outline of the groups' nature and aim. One such pamphlet is 'Kerk en bevrijdings-bewegingen' distributed in 1981.<sup>49</sup> This pamphlet considers the general position taken by churches in Europe, and more specifically in the Netherlands. It is pointed out that generalisations cannot be made as each church followed its own program. The World Council of Churches (WCC) and their Programme to Combat Racism (PCR) are discussed, along with the support given to this specific programme.<sup>50</sup> The pamphlet then considers the hurdles in the way of the programme - for instance the action 'geen kerkgeld voor geweld'. It is mentioned that it is difficult for the church to decide which actions and freedom movements should be supported, but that despite criticism in 1978, the WCC decided to continue with its PCR in 1980.<sup>51</sup> An ANC delegation visited Europe in 1980 to meet with church representatives and thank them for this support.<sup>52</sup>

One of the publications of the AABN published in 1983 is called 'Mandela, Mbeki, Mahlangu ... gevangenen van de apartheid vrij!'.<sup>53</sup> This pamphlet begins by looking at each of the three characters mentioned in the title, and discusses their positions politically.<sup>54</sup> The situation inside South Africa is then briefly outlined, and it is pointed out that actions for political prisoners should never be seen as separate from the freedom

---

<sup>47</sup> NZAV, *Zicht op Zuid-Afrika*. Amsterdam, 1981.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.24-26.

<sup>49</sup> Kairos, 'Kerk en bevrijdings-bewegingen'. Utrecht, 1981.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.61-62, 74.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.66, 79.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p.74.

<sup>53</sup> AABN, 'Mandela, Mbeki, Mahlangu...gevangenen van de apartheid vrij!' Amsterdam, 1983.

struggle. It argues that solidarity needs to be shown, as has been done by the AABN for many years.<sup>55</sup> The pamphlet then sets out how the AABN, together with various progressive individuals, have held picket lines, shown solidarity with political prisoners and sent petitions to the Netherlands's government. They have also invited various political prisoners to share their experiences with the organisation. Various specific actions by the AABN are then mentioned, including a 1977 petition under 'Vrijheid voor de Pretoria 12', an honorary doctorate for Govan Mbeki<sup>56</sup> and actions to try and prevent the execution of Solomon Mahlangu.<sup>57</sup> It can be seen that much information can be extracted from the pamphlet, but that the pamphlet itself is not objective. It is written with the prime aim of getting support for the AABN, as can also be seen in the fact that the AABN bank account number is provided for donations.

A study by J.W. Van der Meulen from 1983 is found in the book edited by S. Rozemond, *Het woord is aan Nederland. Thema's van buitenlands beleid in de jaren 1966-1983*.<sup>58</sup> Van der Meulen's chapter is entitled 'Nederland en die apartheid' and focuses on the actions taken by the Den Uyl government after 1973.<sup>59</sup> Although the steps taken by the government are still small and policy is still based on dialogue, it is during the early 1970s that the ANC and South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO)<sup>60</sup> start getting humanitarian support from the Netherlands government.<sup>61</sup> Van der Meulen points out that the support was short lived, as while some government members were still meeting with leaders of the struggle and wanting to increase donations, others decided to return to the policy of dialogue.<sup>62</sup> Van der Meulen is looking at these events shortly after they have taken place, and approaches them from a political position. The book only considers official foreign policy, and therefore no comment is made on other organisations and the role they played.

---

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.15-28.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p.29.

<sup>56</sup> Govan Mbeki was a leading member of the ANC who spent many years in prison on Robben Island along with Mandela.

<sup>57</sup> Solomon Mahlangu was a ANC freedom fighter sentenced to death by the South African government for the murder of two people during the armed struggle; AABN, 'Mandela, Mbeki, Mahlangu...', pp.30-31.

<sup>58</sup> J.W. Van der Meulen, 'Nederland en de apartheid' in S. Rozemond, *Het woord is aan Nederland. Thema's van buitenlandse beleid in de jaren 1966-1983*. S'Gravenhage, 1983.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p.87.

<sup>60</sup> SWAPO was the organisation fighting for independence in present-day Namibia.

<sup>61</sup> Van der Meulen, 'Nederland en die apartheid', pp.87-88, 95.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.95-96.

In 1984 the KZA published a pamphlet *Sancties tegen Zuid-Afrika. De mythes ontmaskerd*.<sup>63</sup> When comparing this to the pamphlet by the AABN it can be seen how the focus of the two groups differed, although some of their activities overlapped. In this pamphlet the KZA highlights the importance of foreign contact for South Africa. They identify three levels of contact - investment and technological information; trade; and loan facilities. It also points out that boycotts cannot replace the internal struggle.<sup>64</sup> The KZA pamphlet also considers the Netherlands's position with regard to the question of boycotts. Despite the United Nations (UN) and ANC call for boycotts, and many years of parliamentary discussion on the issue, the Netherlands' A.A.M. Van Agt government did not implement boycotts. Although the government was actually pro-boycott, they do not want to go it alone, and so only implemented voluntary measures. The pamphlet sets out import/export figures, showing how important these are for South Africa.<sup>65</sup>

Another study by a political scientist, Jerome Heldring, was published in 1984 entitled *Changes in Dutch society and their implications for the Netherlands-South African relations*.<sup>66</sup> Heldring is Dutch, and examines the changes that took place in Dutch society during the 1960s, commenting on the impact these had on relations with South Africa. According to his analysis, before the 1960s Dutch society was divided into various streams, which dictated what citizens voted, read and supported. The four main streams identified are the Catholic, Gereformerde, Hervormde and Liberal. Each stream had their own political party and this kept Dutch politics fairly stable over many decades.<sup>67</sup> However, during the 1960s these divisions started to disintegrate, and new decisions began influencing voting patterns and ideas. This was largely brought about by the new generation of voters who had different ideas to their parents, but Heldring highlights other influences as well.<sup>68</sup> These changes in political affiliation obviously affected the Netherlands's international relations. Heldring looks in particular at the effect these changes had on Netherlands-South African relations. He considers the change in public opinion regarding South Africa, and the way this influenced official policy.<sup>69</sup> This paper provides important background for the understanding of political developments in the

---

<sup>63</sup> KZA, *Sancties tegen Zuid Afrika. De Mythes ontmaskerd*. Amsterdam, 1984.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.17-19.

<sup>65</sup> KZA, *Sancties tegen Zuid Afrika*, pp.20-39.

<sup>66</sup> Heldring, *Changes in Dutch society*.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.1-3.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.4-6.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.6-11.

Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s, and for this reason provides valuable insight for the study of Netherlands-South African relations.

An interesting exception to the general periodisation for studies on these relations is *De betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid-Afrika, 1946-1961*.<sup>70</sup> This study was done by Wayne Hendricks, and was completed in 1984 for his doctorate degree at the University of the Western Cape. The reason for this study being completed earlier than others possibly lies in the fact that it focuses on the period between 1946 and 1961. It is thus the early years of apartheid that Hendricks is considering, and he focuses more on relations between the two countries than on the Netherlands's view of apartheid. Hendricks's study ends in 1961, looking at the Sharpeville incident as a turning point, and thus concludes when the anti-apartheid actions really begin.

Hendricks's study is however of importance, as it is one of the few studies to focus on the early years of apartheid, and in this way he shows how close the relations between South Africa and the Netherlands still were in the 1940s and 1950s. He looks at the relations during the Second World War, and the relations with the Jan Smuts government after the War.<sup>71</sup> He then focuses on the increasing link between the Netherlands and South Africa in the first years of apartheid, looking at the Cultural Accord, diplomatic relations and the Van Riebeeck Celebrations of 1952. He mentions economic considerations as one of the main reasons for close ties, but points out that the Netherlands did have some reservations about South Africa due to the political policy, and thus analyses the early Dutch views on apartheid. He considers these views against the light of continued relations until the middle 1950s.<sup>72</sup> Hendricks sees the start of the decline in the late 1950s largely as a result of the situation in the rest of Africa, and as a result of the Dutch-Indonesian problems. He ends his study by looking at the change in position taken in the UN as a result of the Sharpeville incident.<sup>73</sup> The influence of Hendricks's supervisor, GJ Schutte, is visible in some of the conclusions he draws. Hendricks's study covers an extensive period, providing information that is largely left out in later studies which prefer to focus on the period of greater Netherlands's involvement.

---

<sup>70</sup> Hendricks, 'Die betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Suid Afrika'.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.6-34.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.108-178.

Another doctoral thesis on this topic is the one completed by A. Meijer in political science.<sup>74</sup> Meijer's thesis, 'Voortrekkers of voordeeltrekkers ? Het Nederlandse beleid ten aanzien van Zuid-Afrika' considers Netherlands's policy from the Den Uyl government (1973) to the Lubbers government (1982). He draws the same conclusions that most do, in that although the Den Uyl government promised much, little comes of this due to the change in government again in 1977. Meijer interprets the period 1973-1982 as the most decisive years of Dutch anti-apartheid action.<sup>75</sup> As a political science study it does not consider non-governmental action against apartheid, nor does he look intensively at the actions taken under the two-stream policy of Lubbers.

Another example from the anti-apartheid groups is the book by R. Rozenburg, which considers the Dutch government's reaction to apartheid.<sup>76</sup> He is writing on behalf of the KZA and AABN, and focuses on the Dutch government's lack of action in the face of the public calling for criticism of apartheid. He concludes that the government policy was characterised by a lack of action, but fails to take into account the different views held within the government. Rozenburg begins the book by giving a summary of Dutch official policy from 1945 through to 1986.<sup>77</sup> He considers the different forms of resistance taken by the anti-apartheid movements, including the economic actions, such as the arms embargo,<sup>78</sup> oil boycott<sup>79</sup> and attempts to stop investment;<sup>80</sup> and the non-economic actions of trying to stop immigration and the Cultural Accord.<sup>81</sup> He then focuses on the situation in southern Africa, by not only looking at South Africa, but also at Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe.<sup>82</sup> The final chapter of the book outlines the attitudes of the various political parties within the Netherlands, with a view to possible future developments in the Netherlands's South African policy.<sup>83</sup>

---

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.200-239.

<sup>74</sup> A. Meijer, 'Voortrekkers of voordeeltrekkers ? Het Nederlandse beleid ten aanzien van Zuid-Afrika.', Leiden, sa.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.36-40.

<sup>76</sup> Rozenburg, *De bloedband Den-Haag-Pretoria*.

<sup>77</sup> Rozenburg, *De bloedband Den-Haag-Pretoria*, pp.12-36.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.47-56.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.57-74.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.75-110.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.112-126.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.141-147.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.149-161.

The viewpoint taken by Rozenburg in writing this book is obvious throughout. When discussing developments in Africa he uses the phrase ‘hulp aan slachtoffers’<sup>84</sup> as his chapter heading, and similarly when considering the political parties they are divided between those who are ‘vrienden van blank Zuid-Afrika’<sup>85</sup> and those who support ‘een democratisch Zuid-Afrika’.<sup>86</sup> The book is also full of anti-apartheid cartoons and anti-apartheid rhetoric. Thus, although this book provides important information, it cannot be considered as objective as this was clearly not the intention of the author.

M. van Klavern edited a book published in 1987 entitled *Nederland's aandeel in apartheid. Nieuwe feiten gegevens economische relaties Nederland-Zuid Afrika*.<sup>87</sup> As the title implies, it focuses on economic relations between the Netherlands and South Africa. The book comes to the conclusion that by 1986 the Netherlands's government was not doing much against apartheid, but that the important element of opposition in the Netherlands was rather the anti-apartheid movements.<sup>88</sup> Anti-apartheid movements had been in existence for twenty-five years in the Netherlands, and of these he highlights four: the AABN, KZA, Kairos and Federation Nederlandse Vak-beweging (FNV).<sup>89</sup> In briefly focusing on these organisations, Van Klaren mentions that the AABN held various meetings, and since 1980 gave financial and political support to the ANC, which by 1987 amounted to over a million guilders. He indicates that the KZA played a role in boycotts against South Africa and the dissemination of information. They also provided the ANC, SWAPO and others with material and political support. Kairos is regarded as being primarily connected to the church, and provided information on South African investment and worked actively with churches in South Africa. Finally, the FNV was responsible for giving financial support to Black trade unions inside South Africa.<sup>90</sup> Van Klaren's book focuses mainly on financial relations and investment in South Africa, and thus is of an economic rather than historical nature. It is however still of use, especially as a source, considering that it was written during the apartheid period.

---

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p.133.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p.149.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p.155.

<sup>87</sup> M. Van Klavern, *Nederland's aandeel in apartheid. Nieuwe feiten gegevens economische relaties Nederland-Zuid Afrika*. Den Haag, 1983.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, p.52.

<sup>89</sup> A Netherlands trade union organisation that gave support to Black trade union inside South Africa.

#### iv. The post-apartheid period, 1990- 2000

As already mentioned, it is only in the period after apartheid that relatively objective studies on relations during the apartheid period begin to emerge. The literature of this period is characterised by an increasing number of researched publications and no works are trying to call people to action against apartheid.

In 1991 C. Edelenbos published one of the first books to look at the activities of one of the freedom movements from outside the movement: *Defence and Aid Fund, 1965-1991. In goed vertrouwen*.<sup>91</sup> This publication traces the history of this movement, and comments on how it remained relatively unknown throughout the 26 years it was active. Edelenbos remarks on how it was banned in South Africa in 1965, and how it joined forces with the CZA in the Netherlands in 1968.<sup>92</sup> The aim of the Defence and Aid Fund (DAF) was to give money to those people inside South Africa who were in trouble with the government. Edelenbos outlines the founding of the DAF in 1956 by John Collins, and the role it played in paying for lawyers in the Rivonia Trials of 1963. He mentions other contacts inside South Africa, such as Father Trevor Huddleston. There were some connections with the Communist Party, especially in the British section of the DAF, but there was no official party link.<sup>93</sup> Edelenbos then looks at the donations made by the DAF, and points out that the DAFN was the main donator to DAF. He also discusses the main supporters of the latter organisation.<sup>94</sup> The book gives a non-critical overview of the history and activities of the DAF, both in the Netherlands and internationally. It is mainly just the relaying of the factual existence of the DAF, and does not compare the DAF to other anti-apartheid organisations, although brief mention is made of them.

When considering studies of Netherlands-South African relations, the work of GJ Schutte is indispensable, as he has written numerous books. The paper he first presented at the 14<sup>th</sup> Congress of the South African Historical Society in Potchefstroom in January 1993 needs to be considered when looking at apartheid relations. The paper was published in 1993 in expanded form as *De roeping ten aanzien van het oude broedevolk. Nederland en Zuid*

---

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.52-57.

<sup>91</sup> C. Edelenbos (ed.), *Defence and Aid Fund, 1965-1991. In goed vertrouwen*. sl. 1991.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.7, 14.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.21, 43-46.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.29-38.

*Afrika, 1960-1990* by the South Africa Institute (SAI) in the Netherlands.<sup>95</sup> The SAI in Amsterdam is an institute affiliated to the NZAV, which remained loyal to the White South African government throughout the apartheid period.

Like Hendricks, Schutte focuses on the Sharpeville incident as the turning point in relations between the Netherlands and South Africa. The major part of the paper focuses on the problems that occurred in the Netherlands's cabinet as a result of disagreement over how to react to apartheid, including a section on the 'ton van Luns'.<sup>96</sup> Despite the title suggesting a study of relations until 1990, more than half the paper deals with the 1960s. Schutte states in his introduction that the focus of this paper is on the official relations and government decisions, and thus there is very little mention of the anti-apartheid movements. He points out that his aim is to consider to what extent the Netherlands played a pioneering role in the fight against apartheid.<sup>97</sup> The paper is relatively short given the period covered, only 56 pages, and there is thus insufficient space for a detailed consideration of all the political developments in the Netherlands. Schutte comes to the conclusion that on an official level the Netherlands did not play a pioneering role, and that the actions by the Netherlands's government were often taken more seriously by the South Africans than the way in which they were intended. He regards the South Africans as more sensitive to criticism from the Netherlands, than to criticism from other countries.<sup>98</sup> Schutte's study does take a more conciliatory approach to relations between South Africa and the Netherlands, despite the fact that the paper was only published after the release of Mandela.

In *Operatie Vula. Zuidafrikanen en Nederlanders in de strijd tegen apartheid*, Conny Braam, leader of the AABN, discusses the role of the AABN in the ANC's Operation Vula during the 1980s.<sup>99</sup> Braam, and other Netherlanders, played a key role in this operation where ANC members were sent into South Africa under disguise and safe houses were set up in the Frontline States and inside South Africa. Braam's book differs from other books already discussed in this section in that it is not striving to be objective history writing, as she is writing about her own experience. In this way it is more of an autobiographical

---

<sup>95</sup> Schutte, *De roeping ten aanzien van het oude broedervolk*.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.11-32.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.5-6.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.51-56.

<sup>99</sup> C. Braam, *Operatie Vula. Zuidafrikanen en Nederlanders in de strijd tegen apartheid*. Amsterdam, 1993.

nature, focusing on seven years of her life. The book still provides valuable insight into the relationship between the AABN and the ANC. It also sheds light on the more direct role played by the Netherlands in the actual struggle within South Africa. For this reason it is an important work, and due to the clandestine nature of much of the project, and Braam's role as the coordinator in the Netherlands, she is in an ideal position to have written such a book. In many ways it must however be considered as a source of history rather than a historical study in itself.

Another work that focuses on the actions of the Netherlands during the apartheid period is C. van Lakerveld's *Nederland tegen apartheid*.<sup>100</sup> Lakerveld mentions the various anti-apartheid movements, and considers some of their actions. The book does however not look at these aspects in much detail, and the reader is therefore only presented with an overview of the Netherlands's involvement.

The doctoral thesis by Frank Jaap Buijs completed in 1995, *Overtuiging en geweld. Vreedzame en gewelddadige acties tegen de apartheid*, focuses on the actions taken against apartheid inside the Netherlands.<sup>101</sup> Buijs briefly mentions the main anti-apartheid movements within the Netherlands, but then focuses on the actions of Kairos and the KZA with regard to Shell Petroleum Company. The first half of Buijs' work considers the actions taken by these movements to get Shell to leave South Africa, along with actions aimed at the government to try bring about sanctions against South Africa. The view of the government on this, and the related parliamentary debates surrounding the oil issue are all considered.<sup>102</sup> In this way Buijs provides an account of the role of these anti-apartheid movements as regards Shell, and the Netherlands's government's lack of action in this regard.

In the second half of his study he focuses on the armed struggle within the Netherlands. This information is rarely mentioned in other sources. He looks at how this action became more violent, and the role it played in the struggle. The reaction of the government, business, anti-apartheid movements and the ANC is also considered. Buijs presents the historical development of Revolutionaire Anti-Racistiese Aktie (RaRa) out of the *Kraak*

---

<sup>100</sup> C. van Lakerveld (ed.), *Nederland tegen apartheid*. Amsterdam, 1994.

<sup>101</sup> Frank Jaap Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld. Vreedzame en gewelddadige acties tegen de apartheid*. Amsterdam, 1995.

(squatter) movement, and shows how it became more violent. He also explains their actions and how their aims differed from those of the other anti-apartheid movements' view. He links this discussion to the actions against Shell through the actions by RaRa, which included the blowing up of Shell buildings.<sup>103</sup>

This study by Buijs appears to be one of the first looking generally at the anti-apartheid movements from a position outside the movement. He does not take a specific stand as to which of the anti-apartheid movements he agrees with the most, although the KZA and Kairos are mainly focused on due to their actions against Shell. Although Buijs does appear to reveal a preference for the peaceful actions, he generally provides an objective study into the views and role of the armed struggle within the Netherlands. Buijs appears to have approached his study from a social point of view, as he discusses the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist views of those in favour of violent action. The thesis was submitted as a doctorate in theology, which further underlines this as a social study.

Another study of importance is that published in 1996 by Jos van Beurden and Chris Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek. Solidariteit met Zuidelijk Afrika, 1961-1996*.<sup>104</sup> This book considers the origin and actions of KZA, one of the anti-apartheid groups based in Amsterdam. The book provides insight into the campaigns of this group, the thoughts behind their actions as well as the results. It does however mainly focus on this one anti-apartheid group, although occasional mention is made of Kairos and even less of the AABN. This detailed type of study is needed for all the movements.

One shortcoming of this book lies in the fact that the sources used are purely Dutch, and so the view of the ANC, or other South African anti-apartheid organisations, are not really taken into account. Also, although the book tries to be critical and does use a wide range of sources and interviews with people of various organisations, it takes the view that the KZA was the best organisation, and tends to be slightly negative about the AABN.<sup>105</sup> The reason for this could lie in the fact that, of all the Netherlands anti-apartheid movements, the AABN was most closely connected to the Communistische Partij van Nederland (CPN).

---

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.15- 60.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.61-84, 104-110.

<sup>104</sup> J. van Beurden & C. Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek. Solidariteit met Zuidelijk Afrika, 1961- 1996*. Amsterdam, 1996.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.149-151.

The book also takes on a very conversational tone, resulting in it being more the relaying of the history of the group than a scientific study into the success and role of the group. The reason for this again lies in the fact that the authors are not historians, but rather a journalist and political scientist, and so they use different techniques.

Another problem with this study is that due to its focus on only one movement, the total impact of the Netherlands's anti-apartheid movements is neglected. A critical comparison into what the different movements did, both on different and similar issues, would improve the understanding of the role of these movements in the struggle against apartheid. It would also help clarify why the Netherlands is considered to have done so much in the struggle against apartheid and why their organisations are thanked so specifically by the ANC.

In 1996 a book was published by Thomas Scott, which focused on the relations between the ANC and the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR).<sup>106</sup> The information he gives regarding relations with the West is of interest for this essay. In the introduction to *The diplomacy of liberation: The foreign relations of the African National Congress since 1960*, Scott says that during the 1960s most of the Western world forgot about the ANC, except for a few anti-apartheid movements and some small countries such as Sweden. He goes on to say that in this period the survival of the ANC was dependent on foreign relations, as they tried to get legitimacy as the representative of the apartheid struggle.<sup>107</sup> Scott discusses when and how the ANC were able to partake in United Nations (UN) discussions about apartheid, and looks at some of the actions taken by the UN against South Africa.<sup>108</sup> He also looks briefly at action taken by some Western countries, saying that aside from the Nordic countries, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands, the ANC received very little help from the West. He mentions some anti-apartheid movements, including the DAF.<sup>109</sup>

Scott does however look at the Netherlands's policy in more detail, and for the purpose of this essay, this is the section that will be focused on. Scott labels the Dutch policy as

---

<sup>106</sup> S. Thomas, *The diplomacy of liberation. The foreign relations of the African National Congress since 1960*. International Library of International studies. London, 1996.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.xi- xxi.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.109-117

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.173- 185.

‘surprisingly ambivalent’.<sup>110</sup> He points out that the Netherlands upheld friendly relations with Portugal despite developments in Africa, and that the gift by Queen Juliana to the WCC’s PCR caused embarrassment. It was only in 1973, after a call by the UN, that the Netherlands government announced funds for humanitarian assistance. Scott mentions that after the Soweto uprising of 1976, ANC leaders got to meet with the Dutch Prime Minister (PM) for the first time. Here help was promised to the ANC in Angola and Tanzania. However, most of this help was still to come from anti-apartheid committees rather than the government.<sup>111</sup> Mention is also made of some of the anti-apartheid movements in the Netherlands, including the CZA, DAF and AABN, although not much detail is given about them. The role of the church in the Netherlands is also referred to. Scott goes on to explain that in the Netherlands there were often discussions over whether the ANC really was the legitimate representative of all the people of South Africa.<sup>112</sup>

Scott’s discussion on the relations between the Netherlands and the ANC is quite adequate given the nature of his book. He does however neglect to look into aspects such as the Netherlands’s government’s funding of the anti-apartheid movements. By doing this, the broader support offered to the ANC by the Netherlands is overlooked.

Another relevant book published in 1996 and edited by Christopher Hill is *The actors in Europe’s foreign policy*.<sup>113</sup> The book considers the influence of various European countries, but only the section on the Netherlands, by Alfred Pijpers entitled, ‘The Netherlands: The weakening pull of Atlanticism’ is of importance for this study.<sup>114</sup> Pijpers describes Dutch foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s as ‘unbalanced’, as a result of their faithfulness to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the 1960s and their criticism of it in the 1970s. He attributes this primarily to the loss of colonial status, until a point in the 1980s, when the Netherlands accepted its position as a smaller nation. Pijpers then uses this as the basis to explain Dutch action in Africa in the 1970s. He says the Netherlands saw Africa as an opportunity to continue their ‘colonial project’<sup>115</sup> by helping poor people in their development. He sees this expressed in its comparatively large

---

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p.179.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.179-185.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.185-186.

<sup>113</sup> A. Pijpers, ‘The Netherlands: The weakening pull of Atlanticism’ in C. Hill (ed), *The actors in Europe’s foreign policy*. London, 1996.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, p.247.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, p.250.

development budget in the 1970s and in their support for some progressive Third World countries despite the conflict this caused with certain other Western powers. Pijpers describes J. Pronk, Minister for Development Cooperation, as a leader in this direction, pointing out how aid quadrupled from 1973 to 1976, where it reached 1.2% of Gross National Product (GNP). Pronk was also a supporter of other radical ideas, such as verbal support for Vietnam and Cuba, sympathy for liberation movements and increased sanctions against South Africa. This brought the Netherlands into conflict with many other European powers, and plans often never materialised, as the only other countries to back them were the Scandinavian countries.<sup>116</sup>

Pijpers argues that it was in the 1980s that the Netherlands's policy began to fall into line with the policy of the other European partners. This was largely due to the new Foreign Minister, H. Van den Broek. Pijpers feels that although human rights remained important for the Dutch in the 1980s, their attitude towards South Africa and the Arab-Israeli conflict started to reflect the general European standpoint.<sup>117</sup> Pijpers thus presents a different interpretation of the basis for Dutch actions in Africa. The role of the Dutch colonial experience cannot be disregarded when considering reasons for their involvement in Africa, although the extent to which Africa was just another colonial experience can be debated. The reasons for the Dutch change in policy in the 1980s can also be interpreted in various ways, and the role played by Van den Broek is of importance, although possibly not to the degree indicated by Pijpers.

H.O. Terblanche, a South African historian, published a study in 1998 on the newspaper exchanges between the Netherlands and South Africa. *Nederland en die Afrikaner: gesprek over apartheid. Die paginaruil tussen Trouw en Die Burger, 1963-1964*, considers the view expressed by each group during this exchange.<sup>118</sup> This study analyses what the person on the street thought about apartheid in the Netherlands, along with how the Afrikaner reacted to this view. Terblanche also discusses the readership of each newspaper, mentioning that the *Transvaaler* refused the request to partake in the exchange, resulting in *Die Burger* being approached. *Trouw* is one of the more liberal newspapers in the Netherlands, so the views expressed here cannot be accepted as representative of the

---

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.247-250.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.251-252.

<sup>118</sup> Terblanche, *Nederland en die Afrikaner: gesprek oor apartheid*.

general public view, but only the view of a relatively small left group. The exchange took place on two separate occasions, once in 1963 and then again in 1964.<sup>119</sup>

This work makes an interesting study, especially in the way in which it expresses the South African reaction to criticism from the Netherlands. South Africans generally tended to react more harshly to negative comments from the Netherlands, than those from other countries, which would influence the Netherlands's lack of reaction during the early years of apartheid. Terblanche comments on how the discussion could not take an easy path as readers from both sides were too adamant about their respective positions. He thus mentions it as not so much a dialogue, as initially planned, but as two conflicting viewpoints being expressed.<sup>120</sup> Research was conducted both in the Netherlands and in South Africa, with newspaper research forming the main source.

One of the most recent and more complete studies of the Netherlands's government's reaction to apartheid is that of Stefan de Boer, *Sharpeville tot Soweto*, published in 1999.<sup>121</sup> This book was completed after De Boer had done extensive research in this area for his doctoral thesis, along with writing various articles on different aspects of Netherlands-South African relations. *Sharpeville to Soweto* concentrates only on government policy, and the reasons for both the action and the lack of action of the Netherlands government. It focuses on the period from 1960 to 1977, beginning with the Sharpeville massacre, and concluding with the Soweto uprising in 1976 and death of Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko in 1977.<sup>122</sup> It thus does not cover the entire period of apartheid, which would be 1948-1990. De Boer's book is however the most complete and scientific study of the relations between the Netherlands and South Africa during the apartheid period to date. He focuses rather on the lack of action by the Netherlands than on their involvement, saying more about where they did not act than where they did. Although he does on occasion mention the Netherlands's anti-apartheid movements and their actions, this is more just as background to the Netherlands government policy. On the other hand, De Boer looks at the Netherlands pro-South African movements in more detail. He justifies this approach by

---

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.23-58.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.66-89, 149-185.

<sup>121</sup> De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*.

<sup>122</sup> Biko was the leader of the Black Consciousness Movements and died while in police custody in 1977. The police denied any brutality, but this was later found untrue; *Ibid.*, pp.9-17.

saying that he is focusing on government relations, and only mentions the independent movements as of secondary importance.<sup>123</sup>

In his reference to the anti-apartheid movements, De Boer focuses on certain groups more than on others. For instance, the church orientated, Utrecht based Werkgroep Kairos is discussed in much more detail than the Amsterdam based AABN. The reason for this probably lies in the fact that De Boer regards the role of the church in Dutch policy making as more important than the role played by the other anti-apartheid movements.<sup>124</sup>

De Boer did extensive research on the Netherlands side, and displays a good understanding of the actions of the Netherlands's government. However, due to doing most of his research in the Netherlands, and being Dutch himself, he does not always show as complete an understanding of the South African position. This is seen in the way he underplays the importance of the 'European link' for the South African government, and only concentrates on the fact that economic relations between South Africa and the Netherlands were not that important. He mentions the development of a hatred by the Afrikaner for the Dutch, but does not substantiate this sufficiently.<sup>125</sup> Similarly, by focusing on government relations, De Boer does not see the close link that was kept alive between the Netherlands and South African churches. He contends that since the Anglo Boer War until after the Second World War, relations between South Africa and the Netherlands were basically non-existent. He mentions the trade agreements, but says these were of minimal importance.<sup>126</sup> However, during this entire period there was still a close link on a more personal level between the Netherlands and South Africa, mainly kept in tact through religion. Once the South African government became more English dominated, the official relations did decrease, but were replaced by relations of an unofficial nature. This can also be seen in the academic link that developed between the Netherlands and South Africa at this time, visible for example in the Nederlands Cultuurhistorisch Instituut (NCI) opened at the University of Pretoria in 1932. De Boer makes no mention of these relations.<sup>127</sup>

---

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.79, 115-120, 155-177

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.271-280.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.17-20, 31-35.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.31-35, 65-74.

<sup>127</sup> Central Archives Depot (SAB), Pretoria: Goewerneur-Generaal, 1905-1977 (GG) 2401.6/20/1: His Excellency's engagements and patronage. Netherlands embassy: Nederlands Cultuurhistorisch Instituut,

De Boer's study of the years 1960 to 1977 is fairly comprehensive, despite his exclusive focus on official relations. De Boer points out the need for studies of the other years, and calls for other aspects of relations to be considered in more depth.<sup>128</sup>

## v. Conclusion

Netherlands-South African relations in the early twentieth century are characterised by cultural unity with a certain section of the population. Relations on an official level are thus of less importance than those between church, academic and cultural institutions. The link is however kept alive. After the end of the World War II and the take over by the NP in South Africa, relations enter a new phase. In this period they are characterised by changing views. At the start of the period, the Netherlands and South Africa form closer links on an official level, despite different political views. However, during the period the role of apartheid begins to become all encompassing, and all relations are affected by political outlook. This causes a divide between Netherlander and Afrikaner, and between Netherlander and Netherlander as each choose which side to support. This results in a period of writing that is often emotional and subjective.

With the end of apartheid in 1994, the relations during the apartheid period can be considered more objectively, and with less political concern. It is thus only during this period that historical works on these relations really begin to surface, and that opposing views can be compared. In this way the actions of government and non-governmental organisations, in both countries, can be looked at critically, and a complete overview of relations between the two countries can be drawn up. However, even in these books objectivity is not reached, as each author writes with a particular point of departure. In this chapter an attempt has been made to identify these different points of departure, and to explain how different authors have focused on different aspects of the struggle in order to highlight their own subjective view. It is also apparent that not all studies focus on the actions of the Netherlands against apartheid, but some show in what ways the Netherlands continued to work with South Africa during the apartheid period.

---

1951-1959; Anonym, *Ad Destinatum I, 1910-1960*. Johannesburg, 1960, pp.128-129, 309; F.J. duT Spies & D.H. Heydehrych, *Ad Destinatum II, 1960-1982*. Pretoria, 1987, pp.36, 65.

<sup>128</sup> De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*, pp.12-13.

### **3. The Netherlands' government's view**

#### **i. Reaction to apartheid**

In order to understand the need for and the development of the non-governmental anti-apartheid organisations in the Netherlands, the policy and actions of the Netherlands' government must be considered briefly. With the introduction of apartheid policy in 1948, the relations between South Africa and the Netherlands continued without change. The Netherlands' government took note of the new policy being introduced, but appeared to believe that there was no real cause for alarm.<sup>129</sup>

The first disagreement to take place between the Netherlands and the NP government was at a diplomatic level. Otto du Plessis was sent to the Netherlands as ambassador in 1948, but a problem arose due to rumours that he had Nazi tendencies. Du Plessis was recalled and was replaced by D.B. Bosman, quickly resolving the problem. The Netherlands' ambassador in South Africa, J. van den Bergh, remained on friendly terms with Du Plessis back in South Africa, who apparently held no bad feelings towards the Netherlands.<sup>130</sup> With this problem out of the way, relations between the Netherlands and South Africa continued as they were before World War II. South Africa remained one of the most important countries for the Netherlands with regards to emigration, with 2839 Dutch immigrating to South Africa in 1954 alone. Exchanges on academic and scientific level also continued,<sup>131</sup> while the cultural link between the Netherlands and South Africa was strengthened, culminating in the signing of the Cultural Accord in 1953.<sup>132</sup>

Although discussions on apartheid did take place, and the UN General Assembly criticised the policy,<sup>133</sup> most countries, including the Netherlands, believed that the UN had no right to comment on apartheid as it fell within the realm of the domestic affairs of South Africa.<sup>134</sup> Ambassador Van den Bergh felt apartheid should not be compared to ideologies

---

<sup>129</sup> NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, pp.5-6.

<sup>130</sup> Archief van de Ministerie van Buitelandse Zaken (BZ), code 9, 2435, 911.26, ZA, binnelandse bestuur, 1958-1960.

<sup>131</sup> Jaarboek Buitelandse Zaken overgelegd ann der Staten Generaal (BZ), 1955/1956, Afrika, p.134.

<sup>132</sup> SAB, Pretoria: Sekretaris van Onderwys, Kuns en Wetenschap (OKW). Sekretaris van Unie-Onderwys, 1911-1968 (UOD). E261/4/8/1: SA Nederlandse Kultuurverdrag, leerstoele en institute, 1931-1961; SAB, Pretoria: (UOD). E261/4/2/3: Cultural agreement with the Netherlands, October 1950- April 1960; Jaarboek BZ, 1952/1953, Afrika, p.147.

<sup>133</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1960/1961, Afrika, p.101.

<sup>134</sup> Klein, 'Relations between the Netherlands and South Africa in the twentieth century', pp.32-34.

of World War II, and indicated to the South African government that the Netherlands' government could not accept apartheid due to the general public's view of the policy. He also said that the official view was less radical and that the UN standpoint did not reflect the real situation.<sup>135</sup> The ambassador still did not criticise the policy in 1959 when the police suppressed rioters, or with the introduction of land division policies. He regarded the latter as 'fair' when the protectorates were taken into consideration as the Blacks received almost half of South Africa. There was however criticism when leaders of the ANC, who were seen as moderate, were banned. It was believed that banning would just lead to more radical action, as was seen in the forming of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1959. Apartheid was considered to have a logical grounding with regard to Blacks, but problematic when considering the Coloureds, who had no separate living area or culture.<sup>136</sup>

## **ii. Sharpeville - the first turning point**

The turning point in the world wide view of apartheid came in 1961. Pictures of the Sharpeville massacre of 21 March, where police opened fire on protestors killing 69, were flashed across the front pages of international newspapers (figure 1). The horror and violence of apartheid was brought home, and instant criticism of the policy flooded the South African government. The Netherlands faced the same change of heart, and the events of 1961 are regarded as the turning point in the Netherlands' South Africa policy.<sup>137</sup> Hereafter they no longer supported South Africa in the UN.<sup>138</sup>

At parliamentary level there was also reaction in the 1960s to the impact of apartheid. During the 1965 budget discussion, the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) pointed out that World War II was over, but that the Netherlands government was not doing much to prevent a similar situation from happening again, as they were not acting against racial discrimination. The Pasifistisch Socialistische Partij (PSP) agreed, saying it was shocking how racial discrimination in South Africa was just accepted. The Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP) disagreed, saying South Africa was doing all they could for

---

<sup>135</sup> Archief BZ, code 9, 2442, 911.30, ZA, binnelandse toestand (rasenprobleem), 1957-1958.

<sup>136</sup> Archief BZ, code 9, 2443, 911.30, ZA, binnelandse toestand (rasenprobleem), 1959.

<sup>137</sup> Hendricks, 'De betrekking tussen Nederland en Suid Afrika', p.210; Schutte, *De Roeping ten aanzien van het oude broedervolk*, pp.7-8.

<sup>138</sup> Hendricks, 'De betrekking tussen Nederland en Suid Afrika', pp.217-218, 239-241.

the Blacks and it would be suicide to give them the vote.<sup>139</sup> However, in the light of this discussion the Netherlands' government decided to make a donation to help those accused under apartheid legislation. The DAF was chosen to receive the donation as other European countries also gave money to this organisation.<sup>140</sup> Although an amount of 100 000 guilders was decided on, disagreement continued as some government members felt South Africa still saw the Netherlands as a motherland. Some members of the public also felt that they should not interfere in the internal politics of South Africa.<sup>141</sup> The donation became known as the 'ton van Luns',<sup>142</sup> and caused much debate in parliament and in public circles. The South African government reacted by declaring the DAF a banned organisation in March 1966.<sup>143</sup> The Netherlands' government decided to go ahead with the donation, and gave it to the UN Trust Fund for South Africa formed in 1965.<sup>144</sup>

However, due to the problems caused by the 'ton van Luns' the Netherlands' government decided a policy of critical dialogue would be more productive.<sup>145</sup> Internationally criticism of apartheid continued, and the Netherlands government also openly criticised apartheid. At an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) discussion joined by the UN, resolutions were accepted regarding apartheid, both financially and politically.<sup>146</sup> The Security Council of the UN also asked members not to sell arms to South Africa and to end diplomatic relations with South Africa. The UN also discussed the ANC sabotage case, the tense situation in South Africa due to mass arrests and Transkei's independence.<sup>147</sup>

The Netherlands' government criticised the General Law Amendment Act, 1963 and particularly the clause which allowed for detention without trial for up to 90 days. It was pointed out that detention under this clause continued indefinitely, and how the situation was made worse due to the Sabotage Act, 1962 and Suppression of Communism Act, 1950. It also condemned an incident where lawyers only met their clients shortly before

---

<sup>139</sup> Bibliotheek van het Algemeen Rijksarchief (Bib ARA): Verslag de handelingen van de tweede kamer der Staten General gedurende het zittingsjaar (2de kamer) 1964-1965, 4<sup>th</sup> meeting, 6 October 1964, pp.114-115, 142-143, 227-229.

<sup>140</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1964/1965, Zuid Afrika, p.126.

<sup>141</sup> Bib ARA: 2de Kamer 1964-1965, 25<sup>th</sup> meeting, 2 February 1965, p. 1151.

<sup>142</sup> Luns was the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of the proposed donation to the DAF.

<sup>143</sup> Hellema & Van den Bergh, 'Dialogo of boycott' IZA nr 2, p. 6; De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*, pp.134-151.

<sup>144</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1965/1966, Zuid Afrika, p.125.

<sup>145</sup> Rozenberg, *De Bloedband Den-Haag- Pretoria*, pp.21-22.

<sup>146</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1967/1968, Afrika, p.145.

<sup>147</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1962/1963, Afrika, p.94; Jaarboek BZ, 1963/1964, Afrika, pp.110-111.

their trials, and after the accused had been held in solitary confinement for many days. The ANC's change to the armed struggle was also discussed, and the way the death sentence was handed out was criticised. Despite this, the discussions that took place between the Netherlands' ambassador and the South African government in 1963 remained cordial. The ambassador said apartheid could not be accepted as it was against human rights, and urged that South Africa should participate in UN discussions on apartheid.<sup>148</sup> Luns stated that the Netherlands found apartheid unacceptable considering the mixed nature of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.<sup>149</sup> The Netherlands' government also took note of the position of Albert Luthuli, whose house arrest was extended with stricter restrictions as soon as it expired. The new Dutch ambassador to South Africa, H.A. Helb, saw him as moderate and an important leader. Comment was made on how the Sharpeville uprising was unorganised, but resulted in an organised attempt to stop resistance through the Rivonia Trial. This resulted in increased violence and Black resistance.<sup>150</sup>

The only other issue of major concern which arose in the 1960s was the question of the Netherlands supplying South Africa with submarines. Due to the selective arms embargo this became an issue in parliament, and the debate ended with the decision that they would not supply South Africa. This was one of the first times that a question regarding South Africa took such a prominent place in the Dutch parliament.<sup>151</sup> The Netherlands continued to follow a policy of open dialogue with South Africa for the next few years, and nothing spectacular came of the post-1961 change in government policy (figure 2).

### **iii. The Den Uyl government - a more radical policy**

The first Netherlands' donations to the freedom movements came in 1969 under the P.J.S. De Jong Cabinet when they gave 250 000 guilders for education and health services to Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FREMILO) in Tanzania. In 1971 the Netherlands' Queen, Juliana, gave a donation to the Anti-Racism fund of the WCC. This action caused a lot of negative reaction inside South Africa, but the Dutch government felt it was acceptable as long as the money was not used for violence.<sup>152</sup> The B.W. Biesheuvel

---

<sup>148</sup> Archief BZ, code 9, 2449, 911.30, ZA, binnelandse toestand (rasseprobleem), 1963.

<sup>149</sup> Archief BZ, code 9, 3152, 912.1, ZA, verhouding tot diplomatieke betrekkinge met Nederlands, 1955-1964.

<sup>150</sup> Archief BZ, code 9, 2450, 911.30, ZA, incident politieke studiegroepen, 1964.

<sup>151</sup> De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*, pp.155-174.

<sup>152</sup> KZA, 'Partij kiezen voor Zuid Africa. Balans van het Nederlandse beleid.', Amsterdam, sa, Deel 1, pp.14-15.

Cabinet continued the support by giving 60 tons of milk powder to FREMILO and Partido Africano para a Independencia de Guine-Bissao e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) in 1972 on the condition that it be used outside the borders of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. The next turning point in the relations with South Africa however only came in 1973 when the Den Uyl government came to power. The Den Uyl government made promises of support for the freedom movements in their governing statement, saying that:

Het Kabinet zal, zonder bepaalde vormen van dialoog uit te sluiten,...bijdragen tot het doen verdwijnen van rasdiscriminatie. Bevrijdingsbewegingen in de koloniale gebieden van Zuidelijk Afrika zullen worden gesteund- deze steun zal, bij voorkeur via multilaterale en regionale organisaties, met name gegeven worden voor humanitaire en ontwikkelingshulp projecten op het terrein van onderwijs en gezondheidszorg ten behoeve van de bevrijde gebieden.<sup>153</sup>

The Den Uyl government promised to increase donations to 12.5 million guilders in 1974 for Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. Aid would be given through the UN and only under guarantee that it would not be used for military purposes. The government policy however became one of help for refugees via the freedom movements, rather than direct support for the freedom movements.<sup>154</sup>

The Den Uyl government started a new phase in the Netherlands' support for the victims of apartheid. It concentrated on humanitarian aid to southern Africa, especially Angola and Mozambique.<sup>155</sup> The 1975 budget for aid to countries fighting for their freedom in Africa stood at 20 million guilders. Independent countries in Africa received developmental aid, which was budgeted separately. With regards to South Africa, it was seen as a developing country so that aid could be provided through the homelands. The Den Uyl government also gave help to southern Africa via other organisations, including the WCC, UN, DAF, Netherlands' trade unions and other Netherlands' financial organisations.<sup>156</sup> Support was also given to the frontline states, which were independent countries in southern Africa whose economy relied strongly on South Africa and whose independence was often undermined by South African military action. To strengthen their position, and to help the South African freedom movements they united in the Southern Africa Development

---

<sup>153</sup> KZA, Partij kiezen voor Zuid Afrika', deel II, p.2.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, p.5.

<sup>155</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1975/1776, Afrika, pp.164-170.

<sup>156</sup> Archief BZ, code 9, 6077, 911.30, ZA, rassenprobleem 2de spoor, 1984, KZA, Partij kiezen voor Zuid Afrika', deel II, pp.5-6.

Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1979 to organise regional development. Western countries were very important to SADCC, resulting in the Den Uyl government giving aid to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola.<sup>157</sup>

During 1976 the government continued to offer help to the victims of apartheid and racism and increased donations to southern Africa. Aid to SWAPO remained the same on condition it was not for military purposes. Donations to the UN Fund for Southern Africa were increased from 670 000 to 850 000 guilders, and the Trust Fund for South Africa got the normal 100 000 guilders plus 250 000 guilders extra for judicial help.<sup>158</sup> The Den Uyl government did face problems as not all members wanted to support the freedom movements and the cabinet was divided on the point of economic relations with South Africa. It was however under Den Uyl that aid to the freedom movements increased considerably, although not all expectations were achieved.<sup>159</sup>

After his term as PM expired, Den Uyl spoke more openly for sanctions against South Africa, and joined Socialistische Internationale, a federation of socialist parties, which he became chairman of in 1980. In this position he travelled to southern Africa frequently, and had contact with ANC chairman, Oliver Tambo and African leaders such as R. Mugabe (Zimbabwe), S. Machel (Mozambique) K. Kuanda (Zambia) and J. Nyerere (Tanzania). Den Uyl's correspondence reveals his concern with Africa, his willingness to listen to the freedom movements and his attempts to introduce an active policy. He saw it as the Netherlands' duty to act against apartheid through internal, political and economic pressure.<sup>160</sup>

The Den Uyl government did not stay in power for long, and in 1977 was replaced by the Van Agt government. Under the Van Agt government, aid to the freedom movements continued, but was reduced to a few million guilders per year. Aid was also given via different organisations, making it difficult to determine how much was actually given. Material support to the freedom movements remained limited to humanitarian uses, and could not be used for transport, communication or military action. The government did

---

<sup>157</sup> KZA, Partij kiezen voor Zuid Afrika', deel II, pp.5-6, deel IV, pp.11-13.

<sup>158</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1976/1977, Afrika, pp.159-1.65

<sup>159</sup> NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, pp.5-6; R. Pameijer, 'Het is een elementaire plicht van ons land om op te treden' in *Amandla*, October 1993, pp.23-25.

<sup>160</sup> Pameijer, 'Het is een elementaire plicht...' in *Amandla*, October 1993, pp.23-25.

however stay in contact with the freedom movements, receiving visits from both Tambo and Sam Nujoma (SWAPO). The Budget for aid was reduced during 1977, although money could still be taken from other emergency and development funds. Aid to the frontline states continued under Van Agt, but was a less active policy. During the 1980s, support to the frontline states remained a priority, especially in the face of oil boycotts and other pressure on the government.<sup>161</sup>

An important South African issue from 1975-1976 was the discussion on the provision of nuclear power plants to South Africa. Some members of parliament were strongly against the Netherlands getting involved, feeling it dangerous to extend the nuclear power of South Africa in this way. They wanted the government to play no role in the provision of nuclear power, either directly or indirectly. They contended that the situation would be dangerous for the whole of southern Africa, and they wanted the government to stop any information of this sort from going to South Africa from the Netherlands. They also wanted the government to put pressure on other EC partners not to provide nuclear power to South Africa.<sup>162</sup> After a number of debates on the issue in the Netherlands' parliament, South Africa decided to rather turn to France with the request before getting a final answer from the Netherlands.<sup>163</sup>

The next important event which impacted on the Netherlands' government was the Soweto uprising of 1976. Once again there was an outcry in the Netherlands, and across the world, about the racially discriminatory policy of South Africa. The Netherlands' government argued that the uprising was the expected outcome of the discriminatory South African policy.<sup>164</sup> Solidarity was shown with those fighting apartheid, but by this time the most decisive actions within the Netherlands were being taken by the anti-apartheid movements rather than by the Netherlands' government. Despite support for some form of sanctions and an arms embargo, the Netherlands' government was not prepared to go alone. Action would not be taken unless in the form of EC actions against South Africa.<sup>165</sup>

---

<sup>161</sup> KZA, Partij kiezen voor Zuid Afrika', deel II, pp.5-6, deel IV, pp.11-13.

<sup>162</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XV; 2de Kamer, 1979-1980, doc: 16079, nr 1.

<sup>163</sup> De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*, pp.325-329.

<sup>164</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1975/1976, Zuid Afrika, p.167.

<sup>165</sup> De Boer, *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto*, pp. 334-363; Hellema & Van den Bergh, 'Dialogo of boycot', IZA nr 2, pp.7-8.

The combined impact of the Soweto uprising and the fact that South Africa made no changes to her policy, but just continued with bannings and arrests, led to many within the Netherlands' government wanting to drastically review their South Africa policy. After the death of Biko in 1977 the Netherlands' government froze the Cultural Accord. In November 1977 the UN decided to make the voluntary arms embargo mandatory, while the EC introduced a code of conduct for business.<sup>166</sup> The 1970s thus ended with plans for a more concrete and critical policy to be introduced by the Netherlands' government. However, rather than live up to such expectations, the policy became more moderate again, making the 1970s the most radical period in the Netherlands' official criticism of apartheid.

#### **iv. Few concrete steps during the 1980s**

The 1980s were characterised by small changes in the relations between South Africa and the Netherlands. Debate regarding sanctions and boycotts continued, humanitarian support for those affected by apartheid was provided and attempts at dialogue with the South African government persisted. In the early 1980s the Netherlands' government attempted to make their South African policy more concrete. The first change made regarding relations with South Africa concerned the Cultural Accord. In 1977, as already mentioned, the government had frozen the Cultural Accord, but as the South African government made no changes to their policy, it was decided to finally abandon the Accord in 1981. At the same time the Netherlands' government declared that it would no longer give a subsidy to immigrants going to South Africa.<sup>167</sup>

In March 1982 the Netherlands government decided to introduce a visa requirement which was co-ordinated with the Benelux countries in 1983. This was implemented because they felt it was unfair that South Africa restricted anti-apartheid people from entering South Africa, but that they could do nothing in return.<sup>168</sup> It had previously been agreed that South Africans did not need a visa to enter the Netherlands, and the same had applied for Netherlanders visiting South Africa.<sup>169</sup> Along with the visa requirement it was decided to

---

<sup>166</sup> Archief BZ, code 9, 6077, 911.30, ZA, rassenprobleem 2de spoor, 1984; Jaarboek BZ, 1977/1978, Zuid Afrika, pp.161-162.

<sup>167</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XIII; BZ, 1977/1978, Africa, p.168.

<sup>168</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, II; 2de Kamer, 1981-1982, pp. 2507; Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, II, 2de Kamer, 1983-1983, doc: 17895, nr 1, 2.

<sup>169</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XVI; 2de Kamer, 1980-1981, doc: 16759, nr 1-3.

introduce a strict policy with regard to allowing South Africans into the Netherlands.<sup>170</sup> The PSP, Democraten 1966 (D'66) and Politieke Partij Radikalen (PPR) were all in favour of the visa requirement, and the PPR pointed out how the government could now stop pro-apartheid people, South African sportsmen and homeland leaders from coming to the Netherlands. They stated that the requirement must however not affect asylum seekers. The Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (GPV) felt the Netherlands government was only trying to get attention away from the oil issue, and was not in favour of the visa restriction, while the SGP was also against it because they believed the P.W. Botha government was busy introducing reform.<sup>171</sup>

In the same period many parliamentarians wanted to introduce legislation to make investment in South Africa impossible. The UN Security Council had as yet made no moves in this direction, and so countries like Sweden introduced their own legislation. The Netherlands' government decided to investigate the effects of such a law, and found that while most within the economic sector were against apartheid, they were not in favour of breaking all ties with South Africa. It was felt by some that investment had a positive effect on change in South Africa, as could be seen through certain labour improvements. Along with this, it was felt that one-sided sanctions would be ineffective, bad for the Netherlands' economy and would result in work loss at Rotterdam harbour, which would all mean a loss of trust in the Netherlands' economic sector. The government thus decided to look for an alternative, and turned to the EC code of conduct. This code was based on the view that social equality would lead to political equality, and laid out guidelines for businesses in South Africa. It was decided to limit investment to those who adhered to the code,<sup>172</sup> and any Netherlands' company with a branch or section in South Africa needed to hand an annual report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs showing they met the minimum requirements of the EC code. A company who failed to do this would be punished. Companies wanting to expand in South Africa or wanting to give a loan of more than five years to South Africa needed to get special permission from the government. Political parties had mixed views regarding the code: the PvdA and Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) thought it would not work; the D'66 felt it limited the law; the SGP

---

<sup>170</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XIII; 2de Kamer, 1983-1983, doc: 17895, nr 6.

<sup>171</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, II; 2de Kamer, 1981-1982, pp.2503- 2505.

<sup>172</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XIII; 2de Kamer, 1983-1983, doc: 17895, nr 3, 8, 11.

was against any type of economic sanction, including the code; and the PSP felt peaceful resistance was insufficient.<sup>173</sup>

In 1982 the Lubbers government came to power in the Netherlands, introducing the two-stream policy, which would remain policy until the end of the apartheid period. The South African government, under P.W. Botha, who promised to introduce changes in South Africa, influenced their policy. The Lubbers' government felt they should encourage the South African government, and so brought in a policy that on the one hand desired dialogue with South Africa and on the other offered financial assistance for development projects inside South Africa. The policy aimed to support peaceful change, social development and those inside South Africa who wanted change. The government believed that in this way it could influence the treatment of banned anti-apartheid activists, and saw this policy as a type of cultural link with the entire South African population. The policy included humanitarian support for the ANC and PAC, and offered money for projects inside South Africa dealing with training, information and development. This money was distributed via the Netherlands' embassy in South Africa. Further support was given to the nine frontline states to help them obtain economic independence from South Africa.<sup>174</sup> This policy was however regarded as a step back after the increased actions of the Van Agt government.<sup>175</sup>

The Netherlands' government did however still take careful note of the political developments in South Africa, and although they did not abandon the two-stream policy, they did realise that the South African government was not introducing real reform. The Netherlands' government continued to see P.W. Botha as less dogmatic, as he was prepared to discuss the homeland policy, allowed trade unions, unbanned some people and granted Black permanent residence in certain areas after ten years. The tricameral parliament was also seen as an attempt at peaceful change. However, aside from these aspects they saw no real change in the situation in South Africa.<sup>176</sup> The 1980s were rather

---

<sup>173</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, IV; 2de Kamer, 1987-1988, doc: 18689, nr 4.

<sup>174</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XIII; 2de Kamer, 1983-1983, doc: 17895, nr 1, 2.

<sup>175</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1984/1985, Zuid Afrika, p. 42-44; Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XIII; 2de Kamer, 1983-1983, doc: 17895, nr 1, 2; NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, 1989, pp.5-6.; Rozenburg, *De Bloedband Den Haag-Pretoria*, pp.28-39.

<sup>176</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1979/1980, Zuid Afrika, pp.102-103; Jaarboek BZ, 1982/1983, Zuid Afrika, pp. 119-120; Jaarboek BZ, 1984/1985, Zuid Afrika, p. 42-44.

characterised by a State of Emergency,<sup>177</sup> which led to violence and many dying. The South African government blamed the need for the State of Emergency on the ANC, but rather than help the situation it only led to further radicalisation of the Black population.<sup>178</sup> Internal tension increased as the promised reform came to nothing.<sup>179</sup> The Netherlands' government felt that the South African government was only bringing in small changes to the constitution, but continued to act on the apartheid laws.<sup>180</sup> Some political parties wanted the government to send a clear message to South Africa that the reform was insufficient.<sup>181</sup>

The Netherlands' government took note of the chain reaction which resulted when the South African government attacked the ANC in Lesotho in December 1982 and the ANC responded with attacks on the Koeberg power station in April and in Pretoria and Bloemfontein in May. The South African government was aware of the need for reform, but instead attacked the ANC in Mozambique.<sup>182</sup> This aggressive action led to increasing international attention for the freedom movements and isolation of South Africa, despite attempts by the South African government leaders to hold meetings with various leaders. In April 1982 P.W. Botha met with Kuanda,<sup>183</sup> in 1984 he visited eight European countries to discuss changes to the apartheid policy,<sup>184</sup> and from 31 August to 2 September 1985 he met with representatives of the EC, including Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, Van den Broek.<sup>185</sup>

Joint actions by the EC also tried to bring about changes in South Africa, and due to the formation of the European Political Samenwerking (EPS) in 1977, the countries worked together more easily.<sup>186</sup> They made a request to the South African government to free Mandela, end discrimination and end the State of Emergency. An EPS mission went to South Africa in 1985 to try and discuss an end to apartheid, and as this had no result decided that together they should give support to non-governmental organisations

---

<sup>177</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1987/1988, Zuid Afrika, pp.39-42.

<sup>178</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1984/1985, Zuid Afrika, p.42-44; Jaarboek BZ, 1985/1986, Zuid Afrika, pp. 45-48.

<sup>179</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1981/1982, Zuid Afrika, pp.104-106; Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, II; 2de Kamer, 1981-1982, pp.1843.

<sup>180</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1982/1983, Zuid Afrika, pp.119-120.

<sup>181</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, X; 2de Kamer, 1983-1984, doc: 18162, nr 1-2.

<sup>182</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1982/1983, Zuid Afrika, pp.119-120.

<sup>183</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1981/1982, Zuid Afrika, pp.104-106.

<sup>184</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1983/1984, Zuid Afrika, pp.104-107.

<sup>185</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1986/1987, Afrika, pp.45,52.

<sup>186</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, IV; 2de Kamer, 1987-1988, doc: 18689, nr 3.

supporting peaceful change. They also decided to introduce restrictive political and economic measures,<sup>187</sup> and protested when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) lent South Africa \$1 million after the fall in the gold price.<sup>188</sup>

In reaction to the lack of change in South Africa, the Netherlands' government did continue to criticise and condemn apartheid.<sup>189</sup> They pointed out how the majority of the population still lived as second rate citizens with no political say and continued repression.<sup>190</sup> They decided to increase actions organised under the second stream of the two-stream policy<sup>191</sup> and again called for the freedom of Mandela, with some parties even wanting to offer him political asylum.<sup>192</sup> The Netherlands' government wanted to increase international pressure on South Africa, and after numerous debates in parliament were able to convince the UN to introduce a resolution ending the import of military goods from South Africa.<sup>193</sup> They also wanted to extend the ban on fruit, coal, wine and vegetables, but could reach no agreement within the EC. Within the EC they also criticised the South African actions in the frontline states and called for national dialogue so as to prevent further polarisation of groups inside South Africa. The Netherlands' government did not have much success within the EC in these actions,<sup>194</sup> as was the case with the call for an oil boycott.

The oil boycott was the issue that was central in most discussions on South Africa during the 1980s. Many felt that if the Security Council did not introduce measures the Netherlands should go it alone. The issue was investigated, and it emerged that the EC members and the Benelux countries did not want to join the Netherlands in an oil embargo. The issue also had certain legal obstacles, but remained an important.<sup>195</sup> Y. Scholten, of the Christen Democratisch Appel (CDA), felt that southern Africa's political and social stability was in danger due to the internal politics of South Africa and that it was time for the Netherlands to stand up for the development of other southern African countries. During 1979 a motion had been accepted which left three options for the oil embargo:

---

<sup>187</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1985/1986, Zuid Afrika, pp.45-48.

<sup>188</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1982/1983, Zuid Afrika, pp.119-120.

<sup>189</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XIII; 2de Kamer, 1983-1983, doc: 17895, nr 1, 2.

<sup>190</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1979/1980, Zuid Afrika, pp.102-103.

<sup>191</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1987/1988, Zuid Afrika, pp.39-42.

<sup>192</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XIII; 2de Kamer, 1983-1983, doc: 17895, nr 10.

<sup>193</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1984/1985, Zuid Afrika, p.42-44.

<sup>194</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1986/1987, Zuid Afrika, pp.38-41.

<sup>195</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XIII; 2de Kamer, 1983-1983, doc: 17895, nr 1, 2, 9, 11.

either an oil embargo with the EC; an embargo with some countries of the EC; or otherwise the Netherlands would introduce a voluntary oil embargo alone if the EC did not find a better weapon to fight apartheid. By 1980 no better weapon had been found and Western Europe just continued to watch the situation from a distance. Scholten therefore called for the oil embargo to be introduced alone. He took this stand on behalf of the CDA faction, but pointed out that a minority of the faction did not support the request. They felt the embargo would be useless as the Netherlands did not supply oil herself but just a few oil products, and so the embargo would be ineffective without wider support. They also did not think the embargo would end apartheid, and felt the effect on southern African states would be negative.<sup>196</sup>

A second motion by the CDA, supported by the entire faction, called for round table discussion with all racial groups. They pointed out how the Security Council demand for an end to the use of violence against peaceful demonstrators was ignored, along with the call for the freedom of political prisoners. The group realised that in the face of the breaking of fundamental human rights the oil issue appeared small, but felt that this would show solidarity with those suffering under apartheid. The CDA asked that the government take the initiative within the EC for development programmes in southern Africa, so as to build up the frontline states and make them economically independent.<sup>197</sup>

The CDA motion calling for an oil embargo was accepted in the Second Chamber on 30 May 1980. The PPR questioned what the government had achieved, as they had asked for the freedom of Mandela and for round table discussions in 1961, but nothing came of these calls. It seemed to many as if South Africa was moving closer to another incident like Sharpeville or Soweto, and that foreign pressure was ineffective. In this climate the PPR felt they should move towards breaking all ties with South Africa and should introduce the oil boycott. Even if the boycott was ineffective, it would still show solidarity with the frontline states. The D'66 also felt that things had only got worse in the southern African region since the debate in 1976, aside from a few positive changes in Zimbabwe. They felt economic pressure went against ideals of an open economy, but was the only solution. The oil embargo should be seen together with the visa, Cultural Accord and code of conduct as giving a sign to the Third world, West and to South Africa of their rejection of apartheid.

---

<sup>196</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, V; 2de Kamer, 1979-1980, pp.5417- 5418.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.5417- 5419.

The D'66 also supported the introduction of restrictive measures with regards the supplying of coal and uranium.<sup>198</sup>

The SGP saw the effectiveness of the embargo as the most important issue, and therefore felt attention should rather be given to the rest of southern Africa. They felt the isolated position of South Africa on the continent should be remembered, and that the embargo would only lead to radicalisation of the South African government, greater suppression of the Black movements inside South Africa and negative changes in the world economy. The SGP also felt that although the changes in South Africa appeared small from the outside, they were bigger and more noticeable from the inside. The GVP also felt that a boycott alone would be negative for the West, and that the Netherlands' should find out why the other countries did not want to join the boycott. The UN identified sanctions as the last resort, so the Netherlands should try social development first. The GVP said the reason for no discussions could be because the freedom movements were too radical. The VVD also felt that isolating South Africa was not the answer, as it would lead to a decrease in the liberal influence in the country, and further radicalisation and polarisation.<sup>199</sup>

The CPN agreed that radicalisation had increased in southern Africa, but felt the apartheid regime should no longer be given what it wanted, and therefore supported boycotts. The PvdA criticised the Netherlands' government, saying that the government did not want to introduce a boycott and so were glad that their EC partners had rejected the idea on the grounds that it would be ineffective, was not forced by UN and would be bad for new developments. The PvdA agreed with Scholten of the CDA that an embargo would show solidarity with the Black population, and so supported an embargo. The PSP also felt that the lack of action by the UN Security Council was not a good enough reason not to introduce a boycott. They felt the Netherlands' government were too optimistic about developments in South Africa, and should rather move towards the isolation of South Africa, even if the embargo was not effective and only showed solidarity. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, C.A. van der Klaauw, outlined his position, saying South Africa had reached a critical point, and so actions should be cautious. He said they wanted to end apartheid and bring change. The PPR felt that over the last 30 years it had been proven that

---

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.5419-5421.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.5421-5422.

the West's investment kept apartheid going, but Van der Klaauw still had problems with going alone with a boycott.<sup>200</sup>

It is therefore apparent that there were a wide range of views within the Netherlands' government regarding the oil embargo. Many within the Netherlands' government wanted to introduce more concrete steps against apartheid and were critical of apartheid, even though their ultimate policy did not always reflect this view. Despite the support for the introduction of a one-sided oil embargo, at the final vote it was decided not to introduce the measure. A final debate took place on the night of 26 June 1980, and the cabinet almost collapsed. A motion of no confidence in the government was passed, but at the last minute more members of the CDA, who were divided over the issue, gave their support to the government, saving the cabinet and stopping the introduction of the oil embargo.<sup>201</sup> In the meantime it was decided that steps to boycott coal, stop investment and end the 1935 Trade Agreement should be introduced.<sup>202</sup>

Another issue to come under discussion during the early 1980s was the question of an arms embargo against South Africa. As has been mentioned, this resulted in the UN resolution in 1985 to stop the import of arms from South Africa. During 1983 various motions were proposed in the second chamber concerning the provision of arms to South Africa. It was felt, after noticing human rights violations in Namibia and the frontline states, that the Netherlands' should stop providing all arms and strategic goods to South Africa.<sup>203</sup> The UN Security Council provision of 1977 remained the minimum requirement for the embargo,<sup>204</sup> although it was noticed that not all Western countries adhered to these compulsory measures. It was felt the government should put pressure on these countries and extend actions in the UN.<sup>205</sup> The PSP wanted to extend the embargo, as not all strategic goods were included on the list of restricted items. The SGP however felt it was counter-productive, as South Africa had increased their own production of arms after the UN embargo. They would rather the embargo lists were shortened and argued that the ban should be extended to the importing of arms from South Africa.<sup>206</sup>

---

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.5419-5425, 5434, 5437, 5443.

<sup>201</sup> Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.39- 44; Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.95-98.

<sup>202</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XIII; 2de Kamer, 1983-1983, doc: 17895, nr 4.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, nr 5.

<sup>204</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XV; 2de Kamer, 1981-1982, doc: 18409, nr 3.

<sup>205</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XIII; 2de Kamer, 1983-1983, doc: 17895, nr 7, 11

<sup>206</sup> Bib ARA: Handeling beide Kamers, XV; 2de Kamer, 1981-1982, doc: 18409, nr 4, 5.

Another aspect of Netherlands' government policy that changed during the 1980s was support for the freedom movements. The government officially gave no support to the ANC, and only gave humanitarian aid to South African refugees. The problem for the majority of the Dutch was the violent nature of the ANC, so the government did not want to be seen as giving funding directly to the ANC. In 1981 the Van Agt government said that the ANC was considered to represent a large proportion of the South African population, and that the government supported them in their striving for equality in South Africa. The government policy was however not really in line with this statement, and increasingly changed under the Lubbers government. During March 1985 the Second Chamber debated the Netherlands' foreign policy, and new departments were created for the donation of money to anti-apartheid movements. Van den Broek said only legal activities in South Africa should be supported under the two-stream policy, which limited help to trade unions, churches and educational institutions. No money was to go to political organisations, cutting out both the ANC and the United Democratic Front (UDF). However, due to pressure from various groups, humanitarian help to freedom movements continued, although the main source of aid by the mid-1980s was the Netherlands' embassy in connection with the two-stream policy.<sup>207</sup>

It was not only the Netherlands' government that had problems with the question of support for the ANC, but also numerous non-governmental organisations in the Netherlands. For example, the four organisations which the Netherlands' government gave money to for development projects: the Catholic Medefinancierings Organisatie (CEMBO) decided on no direct support for the ANC, while HIVOS had no connection with the ANC at all. The Protestant Interkerkelijke Coördinatie Commissie Ontwikkelingsprojecten (ICCO) was involved in one project concerning the ANC from 1977 to 1987. The only one of the four organisations with an ANC program was the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Internationale Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (NOVIB). This organisation gave 50 000 guilders to the ANC office in Belgium annually, and was further involved with transport courses in Tanzania, Zambia and Angola, and a garage project in Angola. It also gave support to the cultural section of ANC and helped with the ANC refugees.<sup>208</sup>

---

<sup>207</sup> Archief BZ, code 9, 6077, 911.30, ZA, rassenprobleem 2de spoor, 1984; *Amandla*, April 1985, p.7; *Amandla*, January 1987, pp.14-15, AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Jan 1987 (special edition), p.a.

<sup>208</sup> *Amandla*, January 1987, pp.14-15; AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Jan 1987 (special edition), p.b.

Numerous church organisations also had problems with deciding on a policy with regards to the ANC. There were two main views, with some churches supporting the idea of giving money to the struggle against apartheid, and others feeling that there should be ‘geen kerk geld voor geweld’. The Algemeen Diaconaal Bureau (ADB) of Gereformeerde Kerk gave 15 000 guilders annually to the ANC in Brussels and to two other projects involving the ANC. Some people withdrew from the church due to the support they gave to the ANC, but the church board said it was not supporting violence, only showing solidarity. The General Diaconale Raad (GDR) of Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk said that it did distance itself from the politics of the ANC, but still gave monetary support. During 1986 they supported two ANC projects, giving about 100 000 guilders in total. The Stichting Oecumenische Hulp (SOH) of the Protestant church kept its policy more secret, as although it supported the ANC, it did not want to lose supporters. During 1986 it gave a total 60 000 guilders for three projects. Another church organisation, the Bisko Vastenactie, gave no direct support to the ANC. There were also trade unions that gave support. Both the Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond (CNV) and FNV gave money to trade union organisations inside South Africa. The only other support the ANC got from the Netherlands was that given by the anti-apartheid groups.<sup>209</sup>

The way in which the Netherlands’ government did do quite a lot for South Africa during the 1980s was through the second stream of the two-stream policy. Here the aim was to run programmes giving bursaries, supporting health care, education, trade unions and children’s projects.<sup>210</sup> The two-stream policy also aimed at spreading information on South Africa throughout southern Africa by radio and TV, so as to inform those in exile.<sup>211</sup> The government did receive criticism of this project, especially as there was disagreement over exactly where money should go and where support was needed most.<sup>212</sup> Different political parties wanted to focus on different areas, and many felt more support should be given to the frontline states.<sup>213</sup> The AABN felt that the two-stream policy reduced resistance against South Africa. The Netherlands’ government wanted dialogue, but the South African government refused, and due to the two-stream policy the Netherlands’ government was

---

<sup>209</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Jan 1987 (special edition), pp.b, c.

<sup>210</sup> See Appendix II for some examples of projects funded by the two-stream policy.

<sup>211</sup> NIZA, 10.1E (Tweede spoor), 1985-1994, Projects.

<sup>212</sup> NIZA, 10.1E (Tweede spoor), 1985-1994, Tweede Kamer, 10/12/1986.

<sup>213</sup> NIZA, 10.1E (Tweede spoor), 1985- 1994, 2de kamer, 17 895, nr 5, 1987/8.

restricted to action in the frontline states and humanitarian projects in South Africa. Their discussions were also limited to the NP government, rather than discussions with the ANC. The AABN felt that Van den Broek did not support the ANC due to the armed struggle, and that the government tended to stay away from projects involving the ANC. Other groups had stepped in here with special funds for developing the ANC and educating its members, but the AABN wanted the government to support these activities.<sup>214</sup>

In the late 1980s a South African policy was still important to the government, and the Lubbers government came up with a three-phase policy after F.W. De Klerk came to power in 1989. The first phase would give De Klerk time to introduce reforms. The PvdA felt six months was long enough to wait, and that the releasing of Mandela would not be sufficient to stop the introduction of phase two, but the CDA was more lenient. Phase two would be a new attempt to expand EC sanctions, and to ban the import of coal. Phase three would introduce one-sided sanctions if the Netherlands could not get EC action. No final date was given for such a decision. The policy meant that in principle the CDA could continue as before, unless the PvdA, now in coalition with them, tried to enforce the changes. The CDA did regard effective sanctions as important, but wanted to wait until the end of 1990 before taking any action.<sup>215</sup> In this period economic pressure would continue with the EPS, and social development through the two-stream policy would still be supported, with the focus on education, schooling, rural development, humanitarian help and trade unions. A third stream was also developed to allow for dialogue with members of the anti-apartheid movements.<sup>216</sup>

The above overview of the Netherlands government's reaction towards apartheid is a mere summary as it only aims to show to what extent another outlet for anti-apartheid action was needed within the Netherlands. The Netherlands government did pay attention to apartheid, despite their general lack of concrete action. They also focused on protecting their own trade priorities and on historical links with South Africa, and for these reasons were slow to start active criticism of apartheid. After Sharpeville in 1960 criticism began, although it was only after 1973 and 1976 that real action was introduced. The Netherlands never

---

<sup>214</sup> NIZA, 10.1E (Tweede spoor), 1985-1994, AABN evaluation of 2 stream policy, 11/2/ 1987.

<sup>215</sup> R. Rozzenburg, 'CDA and PvdA leggen een windei' in *Amandla*, November 1989, p.3.

<sup>216</sup> Jaarboek BZ, 1988/1989, Zuid Afrika, pp. 48-49.

played a leading role in the anti-apartheid struggle,<sup>217</sup> although their role within the UN and EC should not be downplayed or ignored. It can however be seen that those wanting to take definite steps against apartheid could not count on the Netherlands' government to do so, especially where these actions were in support of the freedom movements.

---

<sup>217</sup> NIZA, 10.1, D. Hellema in *Het Parool*, p.7, 6/6/1995.

#### **4. The anti-apartheid groups in the Netherlands**

##### **i. Introduction**

The fact that there were different anti-apartheid groups within the Netherlands was often criticised for being less effective than had there been one large organisation. In order to understand why there were different organisations, the origin and aim of each needs to be considered. Through outlining their different focuses, it can be seen that the division did also have positive effects, as more elements of the struggle could be dealt with simultaneously and more members of the public were drawn into the struggle. Before looking at the actions and relative effectiveness of each group, it is necessary to look at how and why each group developed.<sup>218</sup>

##### **ii. Origin of the anti-apartheid organisations**

Anti-apartheid organisations began in the Netherlands in May 1960, with the CZA being formed by Buskes, K. Roskram, and two members of the PvdA.<sup>219</sup> The basic aim of this organisation was to inform the Netherlands' public on the situation in South Africa.<sup>220</sup> The 1970s saw the rise of numerous anti-apartheid organisations in the Netherlands. The main reason why civil society organisations started was in reaction to the Netherlands' government's lack of action against apartheid. This decade saw the birth of three main organisations - Werkgroep Kairos, the AABN and the KZA, smaller organisations and thirty work groups to support these organisations locally. All these organisations focused on ending apartheid and supporting those fighting apartheid. In 1970 the first annual Zuidelijk Afrika Congress was held in the Netherlands to discuss the South African situation. Over time the anti-apartheid movement's knowledge on South African issues improved, and they developed the know-how and political contact necessary to take effective steps in their desire to bring apartheid to an end. The power of the South African movement was especially strong in the media and they received much social support from churches, trade unions and communities.<sup>221</sup>

---

<sup>218</sup> E, van den Bergh, 'Dialoog was geen dialoog, sancties bleven onstreden' in *Amandla*, November 1995, pp.16-17.

<sup>219</sup> NIZA, 19.4, A. Vuurens, 30/5/1997, p.62.

<sup>220</sup> Buskes, *South Africa's Apartheid Policy-unacceptable*, pp.2-4; CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, December 1960 (1), p.1; Hellema & van den Bergh, 'Dialoog of boycot' IZA nr 2, p.12.

<sup>221</sup> KZA, 'Partij kiezen voor Zuid Afrika', Deel 1, p.14; Van Klaveren (ed.), *Nederlands' andeel in apartheid*, p.52; Hellema & Van den Bergh, 'Dialoog of boycot', IZA nr 2, pp.4, 12-13.

The three anti-apartheid organisations that are going to be focused on in this essay are Kairos, the AABN and the KZA. These were the three most important anti-apartheid organisations in the Netherlands, and were the ones highlighted by both Mandela and the NP government as playing an important role in the struggle against apartheid. Unlike some other organisations, these three were also general organisations, dealing with various aspects of the struggle despite their focus on a certain areas. However, in order to understand their origin, position and background, the CZA needs to be considered first. Due to the fact that the CZA will not be discussed later, the discussion of the CZA will be more detailed than that of the other three organisations.

The CZA was the first movement established inside the Netherlands with an anti-apartheid character. The CZA saw the Sharpeville massacre as a potentially dangerous situation, and aimed to inform the public about apartheid so that they could join together against it.<sup>222</sup> The founder of the CZA, Jan Buskes, was a Christian minister who visited South Africa in 1955 at the request of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation. He came in order to investigate race relations and apartheid in South Africa. On his return he felt he needed to go about informing the public on the realities of apartheid, and was specifically concerned about the number of Dutch immigrating to South Africa, and wanted to be sure that they were aware of apartheid.<sup>223</sup> Buskes was very important in the running of the CZA, until December 1961 when it was necessary for him to leave the organisation for health reasons, and Roskram took over from him.<sup>224</sup> The CZA decided to go about informing the public through articles and its own publication, the *Informatie Bulletin*. This publication not only contained its own articles pertaining to South Africa, but also reproduced articles from South African newspapers, such as the *Burger* and *Die Transvaler*.<sup>225</sup>

---

<sup>222</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, December 1960 (1), p.1.

<sup>223</sup> Buskes, *South Africa's apartheid policy- unacceptable*, pp.1-4, 154.

<sup>224</sup> NIZA, 19.4, S. de Boer, July 1994, pp. 33-24; CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, December 1961/ January 1962 (5), p.1.

<sup>225</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, December 1960 (1), p.1.

The foremost aim of the CZA was to keep the Netherlands' public informed on what apartheid was and what developments were taking place at Netherlands' government level regarding apartheid. The CZA thus differed from later anti-apartheid groups in its aim, which focused on the Netherlands public, rather than on the people partaking in the freedom struggle. This can be seen in its magazine which only asks for donations to cover the cost of the magazine, making no mention of collecting money for the movements in Africa.<sup>226</sup> From this it can be deduced that the CZA was not yet focusing on collecting money to fight apartheid actively, but rather just to fight apartheid through information.

The CZA also organised various actions to try and break the ties between South Africa and the Netherlands, and in this way it tried to isolate South Africa. For example, in 1961 the CZA protested to the Education Board about the Netherlands partaking in an essay contest with South Africa. It was pointed out that most of the topics for the essays were pro-South Africa and so the full picture was not being depicted. The CZA said that if the essay contest did take place topics should be included that highlighted the reality of apartheid. The CZA also organised a protest at the opening of the South African Airways' (SAA) office in Amsterdam in 1962,<sup>227</sup> and was against the continued close link between the Netherlands and South Africa on an economic level. In 1968 the CZA objected to South Africa being allowed to partake in the Olympic Games in Mexico. It was very unhappy with the Netherlands' government's decision not to mix sport and politics and with its decision to leave it up to individual sportsmen and clubs to decide if they would take part in the games.<sup>228</sup>

In early 1964 the CZA decided to hold a meeting in Amsterdam to try and influence the South African government to free its political prisoners. This was part of a larger international action and included the sending of letters calling for their release to the government of South Africa, the embassy in The Hague and the Netherlands' PM, A.G.M. Marijnen.<sup>229</sup> Another form of protest that the CZA organised was the boycott of certain South African products. It advertised these boycotts via its publication, and here highlighted which products should be boycotted. Boycotted products included jams, fruit,

---

<sup>226</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, January/February 1965 (18), p.10.

<sup>227</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, January/February 1962 (10), pp.16-18.

<sup>228</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, April 1968 (39), p.6.

packed fruit, wines, cigarettes and Dutch products that contained ingredients imported from South Africa.<sup>230</sup> The CZA objected to the Outspan advertising campaign and competition that was taking place in the Netherlands. It wanted the public to be aware of the conditions under which the fruit was produced and the situation of migrant labour.<sup>231</sup>

Aside from informing the Dutch public on the facts of apartheid, and moving to isolate South Africa, the CZA also concentrated on communicating with the Netherlands' government. The aim of this communication was generally to bring about a change in the Netherlands' government policy. In 1962 a letter was sent to the Netherlands' government informing them of the position of Winnie Mandela<sup>232</sup> in South Africa, and of the breaking of human rights. The Netherlands' government however responded that this was a matter of internal affairs.<sup>233</sup> In May 1963 a letter of protest was sent to the South African Ambassador in The Hague about the state of apartheid, and had the support of twenty other organisations. Another letter to the Netherlands' government protested against the Netherlands still supplying the South African Police with dogs.<sup>234</sup> Later in 1963 a letter was sent to the government, highlighting the amount of resistance to apartheid from both inside and outside South Africa.<sup>235</sup>

The CZA was not only concerned with South Africa, but also with other countries in southern Africa, such as Rhodesia.<sup>236</sup> The CZA asked that the Netherlands' government take a stand in the UN, and through this body to call on all other nations to end diplomatic and trade relations with South Africa. The CZA also asked that the government move towards individual sanctions, stop the export of weapons and police dogs to South Africa, stop the subsidising of immigration to South Africa and stop the Cultural Agreement with South Africa. A separate letter was addressed to PM Marijnen pointing out that the Netherlands was making more profit from apartheid, than the fund they were using to try and bring the system to an end.<sup>237</sup>

---

<sup>229</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, 1964 (14), p.15.

<sup>230</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, November/ December 1962 (9), pp.21-23.

<sup>231</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, October 1965 (24), p.14.

<sup>232</sup> Winnie Mandela is the ex-wife of Nelson Mandela and leader of the ANC Women's League.

<sup>233</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, January/February 1962 (10), p.17.

<sup>234</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, 1963 (11), pp.13-15.

<sup>235</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, 1963 (12), p.16.

<sup>236</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, June 1968 (40), p.19.

<sup>237</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, 1963 (12), pp.16-18.

In May 1965 the CZA sent a letter to the new PM, J.M.L. Cals, stating how it hoped that the new government would take specific action against South Africa. It mentioned how the Netherlands continued to condemn apartheid as a policy, but at the same time continued to uphold a Cultural Accord with South Africa. The CZA called for a new accord, where the Netherlands' view of apartheid would be highlighted. It said the government's support for a selective arms embargo was a positive step, but was insufficient.<sup>238</sup> Near the end of 1965 a letter was sent to the Second Chamber just prior to the handling of the budget for 1966. In this the CZA wished to inform the Cabinet of the aims and needs of the DAF, and requested that the government make available 100 000 guilders for the DAF in the next budget.<sup>239</sup>

The connection between the DAFN and the CZA brought in a new era, as the CZA decided to support the DAFN in its aims, although the two movements remained separate. This meant that the CZA moved away from only informing the public, towards more concrete action against apartheid. In 1965 the CZA made its first call for money for the struggle in South Africa when it asked for more money for the DAF after the Netherlands' government's promise of the 'Ton van Luns'. The CZA did however start to lose its identity in this period as it was absorbed into the DAFN.<sup>240</sup>

The CZA soon began to experience problems within its management. It had been set up in the period before concrete actions against apartheid were being taken, and its aims had thus been quite moderate. The problem now occurred that while some members of the CZA wanted to remain moderate, others felt that it was time to start taking more concrete steps. This led to a division within the CZA, and eventually some members broke away in 1971. The 1970s saw the rise of Kairos in 1970, the AABN in 1971 and the KZA in 1976. Smaller organisation focusing on one aspect of the struggle also developed, such as Betaald Antwoord in 1970 and the BOA in 1973.<sup>241</sup>

---

<sup>238</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, May 1965 (20), pp.2-5.

<sup>239</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, November/December 1965 (25), pp.1-2.

<sup>240</sup> CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, June 1965 (21), p.7, CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, December 1968 (42), p.2.

<sup>241</sup> NIZA, 19.4, A. Vuurens, 30/5/1997, p.63; CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, December 1968 (42), p.2; KZA, 'Partij kiezen voor Zuid Afrika', Deel 1, pp.14-15; Van Lakerveld (ed.), *Nederland tegen apartheid*, p.63.

### iii. Aims of the three main anti-apartheid organisations

The origin and aim of Werkgroep Kairos, the AABN and the KZA need to be considered in order to understand why there was a need for three different anti-apartheid organisations in the Netherlands. In the light of this, it can be seen that the division led to actions taking place in different areas simultaneously, although there were times when the groups acted together on certain projects.

Werkgroep Kairos came into being in 1970 as a result of a connection with the Christian Institute (CI) of Beyers Naude that was based in South Africa. Cor Groenendijk was the leader of the organisation, with Erik van den Bergh also holding an influential position. Kairos decided to fill the need for a Christian anti-apartheid organisation in the Netherlands as well as focus on informing the Dutch public because the *Trouw* newspaper received many requests for more information on South Africa. Kairos continued to work for the first years after apartheid, and in 1995 it celebrated its 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary.<sup>242</sup>

As a Christian organisation, Kairos' aim was to give information to the churches on developments in South Africa. It did not have a broad following, but was very important in church circles, both inside the Netherlands and South Africa.<sup>243</sup> It emphasised its function as informing people of the developments in South Africa and the surrounding countries regarding the church, making people aware of the relation between structures in Western countries and South Africa and working towards financial and other support for organisations and people fighting apartheid. It also participated in activities to help the victims of apartheid. Concerning the spreading of information and actions, Kairos paid particular attention to keeping contact and offering support to church organisations and Christians in South Africa that supported ending apartheid and forming solidarity with victims of the system. It also focused on developing support for and knowledge of the freedom movements in the region of southern Africa, developing support for the Black trade unions and doing everything possible to end economic, political, cultural and church ties with White minority groups and the government of South Africa.<sup>244</sup>

---

<sup>242</sup> NIZA, 19.4, A. Vuurens, 30/5/1997, pp. 64- 65; *Amandla*, August 1985, p. 29; Kairos, pamphlet, Utrecht.

<sup>243</sup> Van Kalveren (ed), *Nederland's aandeel in apartheid*, p.55; NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, 1989, pp.17- 18.

<sup>244</sup> Kairos, *Jaarverslag 1990*, pp. 57-58.

Kairos focused on working with churches inside South Africa as the South African government used certain churches to spread myths about White superiority, and Kairos worked against such ideas. It also offered financial support to people living under apartheid and supported Black churches, morally and financially. Kairos also worked closely with the churches in the Netherlands, making them aware of problems in South Africa, especially as many people had family members in South Africa. In the first years of apartheid, very few churches or church leaders acted openly against apartheid, with Buskes being an exception. However, over the years more churches turned against apartheid although the discussion remained abstract. Some individuals remained against the church supporting anti-apartheid movements, and formed the 'Geen kerkgeld voor geweld' organisation in 1975, in reaction to Hervormde and Gereformeerde Churches collecting money for the freedom struggle.<sup>245</sup>

Aside from dealing with the churches, Kairos also acted against investment in South Africa, published numerous pamphlets and tried to convince the Netherlands' government to stop investment in South Africa. One such pamphlet was 'Steunt uw geld apartheid?', which highlighted the effects of investment in South Africa. They were involved in campaigns to end investment in South Africa, to boycott South African products and to end exports to South Africa.<sup>246</sup>

Kairos relied heavily on volunteers and donations throughout their existence. Donations came from Roman Catholic Orders, help organisations and the ADB of the Gereformeerde, Hervormde and Remonstrantse churches. Other organisations, such as the Nationale Commissie Voorlichting en Bewustwording Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (NCO), Algemene Spaarbank Nederland (ASN) and the Haella Stichting also supported Kairos.<sup>247</sup> Kairos did ask for funding from the government, but would not say if the money was only for its own costs or if some of it was for the freedom movements.<sup>248</sup> Funding also came from the Stichting Oecumenische Hulp van Kerken aan Vluchtelingen, which gave money specifically for training, supporting and helping South African priests and ministers who

---

<sup>245</sup> Van Kalveren (ed), *Nederland's aandeel in apartheid*, p.55; NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, 1989, pp.17- 18, 30-32.

<sup>246</sup> NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, 1989, pp.17, 19.

<sup>247</sup> Kairos, *Jaarverslag 1991-1992*, pp. 7-8; *Amandla*, August 1985, p. 29.

<sup>248</sup> Kairos, *Kairos Berichten*, 1970, no 2, p.9.

were against apartheid.<sup>249</sup> Kairos workers were all volunteers who got no pay, and without them Kairos would not have survived. The organisation did still experience many financial problems, especially at the end of the 1980s. Its budget had to be reduced in 1990, and it got extra assistance from the Haella Stichting and the Vastenactie.<sup>250</sup>

The more radical elements within the CZA broke away under Braam, B. Schuitema and P. Juffermans and formed the AABN in 1971.<sup>251</sup> The leaders of the AABN highlighted the role World War II played in their interest in apartheid. During the war they had personally experienced the evils of racism first hand with the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands. Resistance movements developed in the Netherlands, which tried to help those they could and also spread anti-Nazi information. The AABN saw itself as a similar resistance movement, and felt its task was to support those fighting apartheid and disseminating information on the apartheid situation.<sup>252</sup>

The aim of the AABN was ‘direkt of indirekt bij de dragen tot afschaffing van maatschappelijke diskriminatie, ...met betrekking tot Zuidelijk Africa’.<sup>253</sup> Unlike the Netherlands’ government, and many other organisations, the AABN did not find the question of whether to support the armed struggle a moral dilemma, but rather felt that support for and solidarity with the freedom movements was the most important facet of its work. For the AABN, it was these freedom movements that represented the population, and it was through the armed struggle that Africa would be freed from apartheid and other forms of oppression.<sup>254</sup> The reason for this could lie in the fact that of the three main anti-apartheid movements, the AABN was politically the most left. They are often criticised for this, and are sometimes dismissed as being aligned to the CPN.<sup>255</sup>

The AABN identified co-operation with the freedom movements as its most important action. This co-operation was not only seen as the giving of financial aid wherever possible, but also the showing of solidarity with those partaking in the struggle. Relations with the freedom movements therefore included visits to Africa and inviting leaders to

---

<sup>249</sup> Kairos, *Kairos Berichten*, 1971, no 1, p.9

<sup>250</sup> Kairos, *Jaarverslag 1990*, p. 55-56.

<sup>251</sup> NIZA, 19.4, A. Vuurens, 30/5/1997, p.63; CZA, *Informatie Bulletin*, December 1968 (42), p.2; KZA, ‘Partij kiezen voor Zuid Afrika’, Deel 1, p.14; Van Lakerveld (ed.), *Nederland tegen apartheid*, p.63.

<sup>252</sup> Hellema & Van den Bergh, ‘Dialogo of boycott’ IZA nr 2, p.12.

<sup>253</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1976*, p.1.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*, p.1.

Amsterdam. Furthermore, the AABN went about trying to get public support for the freedom movements within the Netherlands.<sup>256</sup> The AABN did not only work with freedom movements fighting for South African freedom, but also with those fighting for independence in other southern African countries such as Zimbabwe and Namibia. In South Africa it worked to end apartheid and supported the ANC, South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the UDF. It also gave money for the spreading of information on apartheid, for an ANC school in Tanzania and to the ANC Women's Movement. Aside from this, the AABN organised their own newspaper every six months in which they informed the public on what the situation in South Africa was like. It also had a cultural aim at one point, focusing on increasing interest in African culture in the form of music and art.<sup>257</sup>

Although the AABN identified support for the freedom movements as the most important element of its work, it did not limit itself to this. The AABN also set about informing the Dutch public on the situation inside South Africa. In order to get support for its cause it was necessary that the public be aware of the conditions suffered in South Africa under apartheid. The main actions aimed at informing the public were marches held in Amsterdam, the publication of books explaining apartheid, the screening of films and videos depicting the situation in South Africa, and the publication of a newspaper reporting on events in South Africa and on the freedom struggle. The AABN also concentrated on informing the public about what actions the Netherlands' government was taking regarding apartheid, and highlighting their lack of action. It also set out and discussed the policy of the different political parties.<sup>258</sup>

To a much lesser extent than the other anti-apartheid movements, the AABN also realised the need for economic sanctions against South Africa. In this regard some publications were brought out listing the companies which continued to have close links with apartheid South Africa. The government was called on to introduce compulsory sanctions and to break economic ties with South Africa.<sup>259</sup> The AABN did get a small subsidy from the Netherlands' government, but this was less than that made available to the KZA. The EC

---

<sup>255</sup> Van Lakerveld (ed.), *Nederland tegen apartheid*, p.65.

<sup>256</sup> AABN, *Komminikee*, November 1974, p.5; AABN, *Komminikee*, April 1975, p.2.

<sup>257</sup> NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, 1989, p.15-17.

<sup>258</sup> AABN, *Anti-Apartheid Nieuws*, November 1974 (69), p.10.

<sup>259</sup> R. Hendricks & H. Van der Zant (red.), *Dit is apartheid*. AABN, Amsterdam, 1986, pp.1-4.

also offered a subsidy to anti-apartheid organisations, but the AABN continued to rely most heavily on donations from the public.<sup>260</sup> It was thus important to inform the public on the work it was doing and the situation it wanted to bring to an end. Financially the AABN was never as successful as the KZA, although they did still manage to offer considerable support to the freedom movements.<sup>261</sup>

In order to be able to pay attention to its actions in other spheres, the AABN found the most effective method was the establishment of various work groups. For example, The Union/Freedom work group did research on the Black trade unions in South Africa and the way in which they could be supported. It also considered the various trade unions in the Netherlands and investigated which unions were supporting the freedom struggle in South Africa. The NATO/Military work group focused on South Africa's nuclear military power, along with the role the West, and in particular the Netherlands, played in the establishment of this. Another group, the Rhodesia/Namibia work group, dealt with the freedom movements in these countries, and the offering of military and political support. Material support was given to SWAPO and to various groups within Angola. An Education work group was established to spread information about developments within South Africa in the Netherlands. This group also produced various pamphlets and brochures. A Material Help work group co-ordinated the collection and distribution of funds to the various freedom movements. The work group system allowed for information to be passed on to the relevant group quickly, so that current developments were taken note of.<sup>262</sup>

The KZA was the last of the three main anti-apartheid organisation to be founded, but in many ways it was the most effective of the three movements. The KZA is often identified as the biggest of the committees working with southern Africa, and the group had a number of paid workers, as well as volunteers. Some within the group were fairly radical, and although the KZA was not politically aligned to any group they worked most closely with the PvdA and PSP. In the second half of the 1980s the KZA had approximately 40 000 donators. Unlike the AABN and Kairos, it did not develop initially with the aim of fighting apartheid. In 1961 the Angola Comite (AC) was established to support the freedom struggle in Angola, with Sietse Bosgra and Trineke Weijdema as leaders. Aside

---

<sup>260</sup> NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, 1989, p.17.

<sup>261</sup> Van Lakerveld (ed.), *Nederland tegen apartheid*, p.65.

<sup>262</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1976*, pp. 2-5, AABN, *Jaarverslag 1977*, p. 8.

from just supporting Angola, the whole of southern Africa became a zone of concern growing out of its interest in the decolonisation process. With its aim being reached in Angola in 1975, the committee decided to change its name and focus. The KZA was established in 1976, and decided to focus its actions on the South African, Zimbabwean and Namibian freedom movements.<sup>263</sup>

The KZA felt that the struggle could not be left to the AABN, mainly due to it having links with the CPN. It believed that the AABN would not be able to get the support of the majority of the society, especially those who were not politically inclined to the left. The KZA also looked at the other anti-apartheid movements, and decided that Kairos's focus on the Christian section of society was too small, and that other groups focused too much on only one aspect of the struggle. The situation in South Africa was becoming more urgent in the 1970s, and the focus of southern African problems had shifted from Angola to South Africa. Although the AC had always believed in Angola first, by 1976 they felt the time had come to alter their focus. The AABN was a little sceptical about a new group with the same aim also based in Amsterdam. The KZA thus decided to work more closely with Kairos, which was based in Utrecht.<sup>264</sup>

Unlike the AABN, which focused on supporting the movements fighting for the liberation of South Africa, the KZA focused its work within the Netherlands. For the KZA the most important element of the struggle was to increase international awareness of the situation in South Africa, and in this way increase international criticism of apartheid. The KZA focused on the ending of diplomatic, economic and friendly relations with the White South African government. This did not mean that the KZA did not work with the ANC, SWAPO and other freedom movements, and in actual fact did give them a lot of material and political support and developed close ties with them. It rather means that it focused mainly on actions inside the Netherlands and on economic sanctions against South Africa. The KZA also tried to get the Netherlands to stop buying South African gold and other South African products. It published lists of the companies still investing in South Africa and those trading with South Africa, and called on people to boycott these companies.<sup>265</sup>

---

<sup>263</sup> NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, 1989, p.14, C. Van Lakerveld, *Nederland tegen apartheid*, p.63; F.J. Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p. 25.

<sup>264</sup> Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.81-82.

The above discussion highlights the different ideologies and aims of the three most important anti-apartheid groups in the Netherlands. The three did not always get along due to their different ideologies, which influenced their actions. In short, Kairos was a Christian organisation, the KZA was influenced by pacifism, socialism and social democracy, and the AABN was politically left.<sup>266</sup> By highlighting their different focuses it can be understood why they continued to function as three separate organisations and the respective importance of each group is apparent.

---

<sup>265</sup> Van Klaveren (ed.), *Nederland's aandeel in apartheid*, pp.53- 54.

<sup>266</sup> Van Lakerveld, *Nederland tegen apartheid*, p.65.

## 5. Actions by the anti-apartheid groups within Africa

### i. Introduction

Having considered the origin and aim of the three main anti-apartheid organisations, it is important to look at the actions they organised and took part in. Their different aims are highlighted in the type of actions they focused on, although all the organisations did arrange similar campaigns. The different style of the three organisations was sometimes a hindrance and a waste of time as they often fought over what demands should be made on the Netherlands' government; what actions should be focused on; and disagreed over how to react to human rights violations by the freedom movements. They also differed on issues such as total or partial boycott; should the UDF be supported as well as the ANC; and was it more important to get mass mobilisation or government action. Division did however also have a positive side, especially in the competition between the two Amsterdam based organisations, the AABN and the KZA. It led to a more active agenda for both organisations, as they competed to increase their contact with South African organisations. The anti-apartheid organisations were also pushed to greater action by the Netherlands' governments' lack of reaction and due to the fact that the NZAV concentrated on keeping ties with White South Africa alive.<sup>267</sup>

On occasion the anti-apartheid groups decided to work together in order to be more effective in their aims. Kairos and the AABN did not work together very often, probably because they were based in different towns and because of their very different ideologies - the one was Christian and the other leftist.<sup>268</sup> On the other hand, relations between Kairos and the KZA went well from the start and their leaders' personalities did not clash. They joined together on important campaigns, smaller projects, and co-published *Amandla*. The campaigns organised by Kairos and the KZA together filled up a lot of their time, and their different working methods and support bases within the Netherlands' public led to increased success.<sup>269</sup>

There was however much conflict and competition between the AABN and the KZA. The AABN was the first group to be formed, and did not like the KZA trying to take over their

---

<sup>267</sup> E, van den Bergh, 'Dialog was geen dialoog, sancties bleven onstreden' in *Amandla*, November 1995, pp.16-17.

<sup>268</sup> Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.50.

<sup>269</sup> Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, p.157.

sphere of work. The KZA felt the AABN could not obtain success due to their leftist political views, but the conflict already began when the KZA was still the AC. In 1974 there was a disagreement between the Medisch Komitee Angola (MKA) and the AC. The AC considered the MKA to have been set up by the CPN, whereas the AC was non-aligned to any party. There was conflict in the arena of their work as they both focused on Angola, and they had different views regarding Portugal. The MKA and the AABN worked closely together, and so the AABN was involved in this tension, which increased when the AC changed to the KZA and started working more closely with South Africa. There was also competition between the AABN and KZA to build up a close link with the ANC.<sup>270</sup>

This section of the mini-thesis will look at actions organised by all three movements in southern Africa. Firstly, all aspects of relations with movements inside South Africa will be considered, then in the second section relations with movements in the rest of Africa will be outlined, and finally financial and material aid for the freedom movements outside South Africa will be discussed. From this it will be clear that it was the AABN that concentrated mostly on actions relating to the freedom movements, and that had the closest links with the ANC. The KZA on the other hand played a very important role in funding the struggle, whereas Kairos focused more on actions inside the Netherlands. When examining actions in each section, Kairos will be considered first as they were the first group to be formed, followed by the AABN and then the KZA, and finally actions of a joint nature will be discussed.

## **ii. Relations with movements inside South Africa**

All three of the anti-apartheid movements found ties with groups inside South Africa important as this kept them in touch with South African developments. The AABN and KZA however concentrated more on the exiled freedom movements, while Kairos built up stronger links with movements operating inside South Africa. Kairos' main focus however remained actions inside the Netherlands.

Kairos formed a very close link with the CI of Naude based in South Africa,<sup>271</sup> and had other contacts with representatives from church organisations inside South Africa. Kairos also helped those who were visiting the Netherlands from South Africa for research and

---

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.143-145.

<sup>271</sup> NIZA, 19.4, A.Vuurens, 30/5/1997, pp.64- 65.

study purposes.<sup>272</sup> In June 1985 Kairos organised a campaign with thousands of protestors gathered in Utrecht behind the banner ‘stop apartheid, steun het UDF’. This protest coincided with the celebration of 15 years of Kairos working against apartheid in the Netherlands. After the protest, Naude and Groenendijk went to the Vrijheidsmonument to honour the victims of apartheid. Kairos was however still concerned about whether the church was doing anything concrete to end apartheid. Kairos owed their existence to the church, but in 15 years not much had changed.<sup>273</sup> Naude called for support for the South African trade unions. This support should not only be for development, but also in their struggle against South Africa. Naude warned that radical militant action would result if help was not received soon.<sup>274</sup>

Although the AABN focused mainly on the exiled freedom movements, it did also show support for those operating inside South Africa. An AABN demonstration was held in Amsterdam in 1976 in order to show solidarity with the school children of Soweto after the uprising, and to take a stand against apartheid.<sup>275</sup> During 1984 the AABN decided to extend its help, which included both financial and moral assistance, to the UDF,<sup>276</sup> and it developed ties with the GASA (Gay Association of South Africa) which started to support the fight against apartheid.<sup>277</sup> During 1987 an AABN delegation, including Braam, attended a conference in Harare. The conference dealt with violence against children and included many speakers from South Africa.<sup>278</sup>

The KZA continually discussed the allocations of its funds, and if money should be used for the struggle or for development. The founding of the UDF in 1983 made this decision easier, as it was a non-racial movement inside South Africa, dealing with the struggle.<sup>279</sup> From 1985 onwards the KZA no longer saw the armed struggle as sufficient to bring freedom to southern Africa, and so it supported other movements and developments inside South Africa and focused increasingly on actions inside the Netherlands.<sup>280</sup>

---

<sup>272</sup> Kairos, *Jaarverslag 1990*, pp.47-50.

<sup>273</sup> *Amandla*, August 1985, p.29.

<sup>274</sup> NIZA, 10.1A (Algemene regeringsbeleid), 1985-1991, Beleid beschouwd NR 5185 5/7/1985. Samengesteld door de rijksvoorlichtingdienst afdeling interne voorlichting, Den Haag /Zuid Afrika, p.5, from: *De Volkskrant*, 11 Junie 1985. ‘Beyers Naude vraagt steun voor bonden Zuid-Afrika’.

<sup>275</sup> Instituut voor Internationale Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG), stzmap AABN I & II, AABN document, 1976/6/18.

<sup>276</sup> IISA, stzmap, AABN I & II, AABN documents, 1984.

<sup>277</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1983/1984*, pp.24- 25.

<sup>278</sup> C. Braam, *Operatie Vula*, p.117.

<sup>279</sup> Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.131-140.

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*, p.131.

In 1991 the KZA collected money to give support to victims of human rights violations in South Africa. In 1990 2.1 million guilders was given for judicial help and re-integration. The KZA also gave 435 000 guilders in 1990 to save the free press, *Vrije Weekblad*, from bankruptcy, and another 550 000 guilders in 1991. Two education policies were supported through the African Scholarship Program (ASCOP), amounting to 590 000 guilders, and the South African Prisoners Education Trust (SAPET) received 690 000 guilders to give 1250 bursaries to children of political prisoners in 1990. The income for the KZA for 1990 stood at 1 million guilders from collections and donations, 500 000 guilders from the Netherlands' government, 4 million guilders from the EC and 1.3 million guilders from other organisations. Of this 6.8 million guilders, 900 000 guilders went to Namibia, 5.1 million guilders to South Africa, and 700 000 guilders to the ANC, showing how by this time the KZA was concentrating on funding actions inside South Africa.<sup>281</sup> The National Postal Code Lottery of 1993 gave 500 000 guilders to projects in South Africa via the KZA. This money went to an eco-project in Cape Town, where the money was used in the townships for water, energy and ground conservation, and to the Community Banking Project for setting up banks for Blacks.<sup>282</sup>

At the end of 1980 Kairos and the AABN stood together in a campaign calling for the freedom of Mandela and other political prisoners. With the support of many local groups, they collected 56 000 signatures, which were handed over to ANC Secretary General, Oliver Tambo during a visit to the Second Chamber in November.<sup>283</sup> The AABN, DAF, KZA and Kairos worked together in trying to get support against the death penalty in South Africa in 1989. Since 1980 more than 1000 people were executed and hundreds waited on death row, many of them for political reasons and participation in resistance.<sup>284</sup> In 1992 the AABN, KZA and Kairos decided to work together in a campaign to support the first democratic elections in South Africa, bringing out the newspaper *De Verwachting*.<sup>285</sup>

---

<sup>281</sup> NIZA, 10.2B, Werk tegen apartheid, 8/1991.

<sup>282</sup> *Amandla*, October 1993, p.24.

<sup>283</sup> F.J. Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.50.

<sup>284</sup> NIZA, 5.1, Aktie tegen de doodstraf in Zuid Afrika, 10.1989.

<sup>285</sup> Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, p.170.

### iii. Relations with movements in Africa

Keeping contact with the exiled movements was considered to be very important for both the AABN and the KZA. These groups felt that the exiled freedom movements represented the largest portion of the South African population, and for this reason should be aided in their cause.

The AABN spent most of their time trying to form closer relations with the freedom movements in Africa and trying to raise money for them. Near the end of 1975 the AABN decided that moral and monetary support for the ANC was insufficient, and that the AABN should take a role in helping to train guerrilla forces.<sup>286</sup> During 1976, the contact between the AABN and the freedom movements began to increase considerably. The AABN felt that aside from active support for the freedom movements, it should also keep close contact with individual members of the freedom movements. This contact grew over the years, both with members of the AABN visiting Africa, and members of the freedom movements visiting Amsterdam, mainly funded by the AABN or by other anti-apartheid groups. On 7 April 1976, six SWAPO leaders came to the Netherlands for a four week course in the running and organisation of trade unions, forming part of the solidarity actions of the Nederlands Verbond en Vakverenigen (NVV).<sup>287</sup> In May 1976 an AABN delegation under Braam partook in a seminar, organised by the UN, in Havana, Cuba, dealing with apartheid. At the seminar various resolutions were taken to support the freedom movements and frontline states in southern Africa, and to work towards freedom for political prisoners. The situation regarding sports ties, trade unions and working together with South Africa in general, was also discussed.<sup>288</sup> In the form of visits to the Netherlands, 1976 saw the general secretary of SACTU visit the Netherlands. Later in the same year, Duma Nokwe of the ANC Executive Committee came to Amsterdam together with three members of SWAPO, and another visit brought Stephen Nkomo of the ANC-Zimbabwe and Herby Piley and Reg September of the ANC. During November a meeting was held at the RAI Congress Centre in Amsterdam. This meeting included Da Silva Lopes (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)), E. Katjirena (SWAPO)

---

<sup>286</sup> AABN, *Kommunikee*, April 1975, p.11.

<sup>287</sup> AABN, *Kommunikee*, March 1976, p.6.

<sup>288</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1976*, p.18; AABN, *Kommunikee*, May 1976, p.1.

and B. Nanna (ANC). Later in the year, N. Dlamini of the ANC met the AABN for an interview.<sup>289</sup>

During 1977 the AABN experienced a further increase in international connections, both in quantity and quality of contact. Various representatives from the freedom movements were met during the ANC-Noordkreet campaign, including S. Mij, T. Seedat, and G. Motsipe. Later in the year, the AABN together with the MKA, held a meeting in Amsterdam with a SWAPO delegation led by president Nujoma. Braam represented the AABN at the 'Wereld Konferensie voor aktie tegen apartheid' held in Lagos in August 1977. She was able to build links with various members of the ANC, and got to meet some political refugees. She remained in Africa during September, and went to the offices and refugee camps of the freedom movements based in Angola, Zambia and Tanzania. During the last months of the year, talks were held in Amsterdam and London with representatives of the ANC, SWAPO and the Patriotic Front (PF). Here the material help offered by the AABN and their program of action was discussed. On 6 October 1977 a solidarity meeting was held in Amsterdam, with a visit from the top delegation of the ANC led by the Secretary General, Alfred Nzo, who returned again three months later. The AABN played a role in the organisation of this meeting, which was supported by the progressive political parties, and attended by groups of school children.<sup>290</sup>

The main focus of the AABN's international activity during 1978 was the increase of contact with the various freedom movements, and at the beginning of the year Braam and her husband Hans visited the ANC in Tanzania, while taking them supplies.<sup>291</sup> The AABN was able to increase their funding for and the number of official visits by delegations from the ANC, SWAPO, PF and SACTU. Visits by the ANC included a visit by Nzo, and Thabo Mbeki in January, followed by Mac Maharaj and Tony Mongalo and later M. Tshabalala. There were also visits from various SACTU representatives, including Zols Ntambo, SACTU European representative, Shapua Kaukungua, and a four-week visit by Eli Weinberg. During April 1977, a delegation of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)/PF under the leadership of Nkomo was met, and they received 30 000 guilders. Later in the year other ZAPU/PF representatives visited the Netherlands, including Pamela

---

<sup>289</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1976*, pp.17-18.

<sup>290</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1977*, pp.11-12, 22-23.

<sup>291</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Feb 1978 (89), p.13.

Maponga, Arthur Chadzingwa, Secretary General of SACTU, J. Gaetsewe and a delegation to discuss education. Contacts were also made with anti-apartheid organisations in London and various conferences were attended. In August the Non- Governmental Organisations (NGO) Conference was held, and in November the Nuclear Energy Conference. Other conferences were also attended by AABN representatives in Sweden and in Finland, and contacts were established with the UN special committee against apartheid.<sup>292</sup>

Aside from increasing international visits during 1978, the AABN also expanded the support offered by the Material work group to include work camps, help in the teaching at schools, and the forming of educational centres and secondary schools.<sup>293</sup> In June 1982 the AABN advertised that they were looking for volunteers to go and teach at the ANC teaching centre in Tanzania.<sup>294</sup> This shows the more direct contact the AABN had with the ANC. It not only sent money to the ANC, but also tried to get involved on the ground level in ANC projects.

The AABN's international visits increased even more during 1983, with many taking place in connection with the campaign 'openbare hoorzitting tegen de Zuid Afrikanse aggressie'. The campaign focused on the South African aggression against the front-line states, and looked particularly at Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho. During October 1983 Braam and Fons Geerlings went to southern Africa to help make a video by Marleen Rees dealing with the war situation in South Africa. The AABN joined the 'World campaign against military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa', with participants from Scandinavia, Western Europe and the United States of America (USA), and established new contacts in this way. During 1983 and 1984 much attention was paid to the education campaign and the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College received specific preference. The ANC's Radio Freedom's Patrick Makaya was given a course in radio at the Netherlands' Training Centrum in 1984, and was followed by Golden Mqwebu and Solly Rasebotsa. During 1984 a new contact was made with the IGA (International Gay Association) as it joined the struggle against apartheid.<sup>295</sup>

---

<sup>292</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1978*, p.26; AABN, *Jaarverslag 1977*, pp.22- 23.

<sup>293</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1978*, p.9.

<sup>294</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, June 1982 (115), p.15.

<sup>295</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1983/1984*, pp.24- 25.

In 1987 the ANC had its 75<sup>th</sup> anniversary, and to mark this occasion the AABN organised a celebration activity on 10 January in the Odeon Theatre in Amsterdam. Various representatives of the ANC were present,<sup>296</sup> and to mark the anniversary, the AABN brought out a special edition of its newspaper. From 10-20 December 1987 two hundred South African artists came to Amsterdam as part of the new AABN Cultural Agreement, introduced at the 1982 conference. It was started as a Cultural Agreement with a different focus to the Cultural Accord which the government had recently given up, and became known as Stichting Cultureel Alternatief Zuid Afrika (CAZA). This would replace the 1976 idea of 'Artists against apartheid', which focused on ties with those artists excluded from the Cultural Accord, and would include different types of artists.<sup>297</sup> The AABN organised a Women's Conference in 1989 to show solidarity with the position of women in South Africa.<sup>298</sup> This shows how the AABN kept up contact with the exiled freedom movements till the end of the apartheid period.

Operation Vula is further evidence of the close link between the AABN and the ANC, and through this the relationship on a non-economic level is apparent. Operation Vula was an ANC operation concerned with the setting up of safe houses inside South Africa and in the frontline states, as well as the infiltration of South Africa by people from the top levels of the ANC. The leader of the AABN, Braam, was asked to help the ANC with this operation, which differs from other AABN operations in that it was an ANC initiative.

In 1986 while in Lusaka, Braam was approached by Ronnie Kastrils, Head of Military Intelligence of the ANC, and asked if she would help with an operation. The problem for the ANC was that it was difficult to control what was going on inside South Africa from the frontline states, especially as the frontline states were becoming more dangerous and the ANC were getting pushed further and further away from South Africa. The ANC therefore wanted safe houses inside South Africa where members of the ANC could safely stay over. The ANC could however not rent these houses themselves, and so wanted friends or foreigners to do so. They were thus looking for people who would be prepared to settle in a frontline state or in South Africa. It could not be a person who was known to be part of the international struggle against apartheid.<sup>299</sup>

---

<sup>296</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Dec 1986 (142), p.8.

<sup>297</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Dec 1987 (148), p.10.

<sup>298</sup> Braam, *Operatie Vula*, p.204.

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.24-28.

While Braam was trying to get in touch with people she could send to the frontline states, she was contacted by prominent ANC member, Maharaj. Maharaj said that he would soon be going into South Africa by order of Tambo who felt that leaders were needed within South Africa. The mission was only known to the top level members of the ANC and much preparation was needed. The South African police had a good description of him, and he would therefore need a semi-permanent disguise. He wanted to know if Braam could help him. Maharaj also asked if she could put him in touch with computer and communication experts, as good communication would be vital while inside South Africa.<sup>300</sup>

In the European summer of 1987 Braam met Ivan Pillay who had been put in charge of the practical aspects of Operation Vula. Tambo, Joe Slovo and Maharaj were the leaders of the project, and asked that Braam and Pillay remain in daily contact with one another. It was also necessary that papers, money and communication devices be smuggled into South Africa on a regular basis. Aside from this, a specially adapted vehicle would be needed to smuggle people and arms into the country. Braam was able to find a Dutch air hostess who flew into South Africa regularly, and could therefore help with the money and documents. It was decided that the car would be bought in Britain, adapted in the Netherlands and then taken into South Africa.<sup>301</sup> By December 1987 Braam had direct lines through to London and Lusaka with coded messages.<sup>302</sup>

From this account it can be seen that Braam and thus the AABN played an important role in the freedom struggle on the side of the ANC. It was through the AABN that the ANC got to know Braam, and this shows the trust and close relationship the AABN formed with the ANC. The important role of the AABN can thus be deduced for the prominent part played by Braam in an operation of this calibre, and by the AABN's close contact with members of the freedom movements throughout this period.

The KZA also focused on forming relations with the freedom movements, focusing on the ANC and SWAPO.<sup>303</sup> In 1976 ANC member and South African Communist Party (SACP) leader Slovo invited Bosgra and Weijdemans to Luanda for the celebration of one year of

---

<sup>300</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.34-40.

<sup>301</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.101-114.

<sup>302</sup> *Ibid.*, p.129.

<sup>303</sup> NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, 1989, p.14.

freedom for Angola. At the celebration they met not only Slovo, but also nineteen other ANC members. During the celebration they were asked many questions, such as what their political affiliation was, how they differed from the AABN and what their relationship with the PAC was like. They did not fully understand the need for the questions at the time, but realised later that it was a reaction to the lack of trust the ANC had for new movements. The division between the AABN and KZA was also overemphasised in reports, which made it difficult for the ANC to trust this new group. The KZA did later establish good relations with leading figures in the ANC, such as Frene Ginwala. They were seen as providing immense financial and material support, together with solidarity. They also never told the ANC what they should be doing. Both the AABN and the KZA had their own contacts within the ANC.<sup>304</sup> In 1988 the KZA also still thought about Angola, and on the South African withdrawal from Angola asked the Netherlands and the international community for both financial and political support for the country.<sup>305</sup> In 1992 after Mandela was released from prison he met with Bosgra of the KZA, highlighting how this group also built up strong relations with the ANC.

#### **iv. Financial and material support for the freedom movements**

Aside from moral support for the freedom movements, material support was also seen by all three of the Netherlands' anti-apartheid groups as very important. The groups went about offering support in different ways, both through the supplying of money and goods. Although it was the AABN that concentrated the most on the exiled movements, it was the KZA that offered them the most financial assistance.

As a result of its links with the church, Kairos worked together with the WCC on many of their campaigns and supported calls for financial support made by the WCC. In 1970 the WCC decided to start a separate fund to support the struggle to end racism in the world, which was called the Programme to Combat Racism (PCR), and indicated it would concentrate on southern Africa. From this fund, the WCC provided support to anti-racist programmes, and organised actions against racism.<sup>306</sup> The PCR was established as separate to the Special Fund to Combat Racism,<sup>307</sup> which was run entirely through special donations and had a wider focus. The PCR received donations, but was also paid out of the general

---

<sup>304</sup> Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.141-143, 157-158.

<sup>305</sup> NIZA, 10.1F (Southern Africa), 1985-1994, KZA oproep, 6/12/1988.

<sup>306</sup> Kairos, 'Kairos, kerk en bevrijdingsbeweging', p.61.

<sup>307</sup> See Appendix III for donations by this fund.

funds of the WCC which often resulted in criticism.<sup>308</sup> Kairos supported and promoted the PCR. It felt that each individual should make a choice in a war situation regarding what actions they saw as justified. The apartheid situation in South Africa was seen by it to be a war situation, and it believed it should offer material help to churches and refugees in South Africa. Many groups supported the PCR, which continued to help the struggle, although it was stipulated that the money was not to be used for violent actions.<sup>309</sup>

Kairos also made known the views of the different churches and tried to encourage churches to support the programme. Within the Netherlands the various denominations debated the question of support for the PCR. The Roman Catholic bishops decided to support the fund although they were not part of WCC, and gave a once off donation of 10 000 guilders. The Hervormde church decided to support the PCR, but the ADB of the Gereformeerde church was uncertain how to react. It gave no support in 1972, changed its policy in 1974 after protest in the Netherlands among their congregation, and changed again after protest from South Africa. Only in 1978, after the death of Biko and the banning of the CI, did they start to support the PCR actively.<sup>310</sup> Resistance to the church supporting the struggle however continued, and 'geen kerkgeld voor geweld' were against donations being made to these 'terrorists' in Africa.<sup>311</sup> Thus while Kairos tried to increase support for the PCR 'geen kerk geld voor geweld' tried to stop Netherlands' churches from supporting the struggle financially.

During 1980 an ANC delegation under Tambo visited the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark in connection with the WCC. Kairos viewed this personal contact as good, but did not favour all of European support being given to the ANC. Kairos was worried about them getting too much support, and wanted people to remain aware of the division within the struggle. Although the ANC represented the majority of the population at that time, Kairos felt it should be remembered that this could change, and that support should then also change.<sup>312</sup> It continued with this point of view in the mid-1980s, when Kairos wanted

---

<sup>308</sup> A. Van den Heuvel, *Shalom and Combat. A personal struggle against racism*. Geneva, 1979, pp.35-37.

<sup>309</sup> Kairos, 'Kairos, kerk en bevrijdingsbeweging', p.74.

<sup>310</sup> *Amandla*, August 1985, p.30; Kairos, 'Kairos, kerk en bevrijdingsbeweging', p.61.

<sup>311</sup> Kairos, 'Kairos, kerk en bevrijdingsbeweging', p.62.

<sup>312</sup> *Ibid.*, p.74-75.

to increase the financial support made available to the UDF, showing how Kairos favoured relations with groups inside South Africa.<sup>313</sup>

One of the early actions of the AABN was the 1974 'steun die vrijheidsstrijd in Zuidelijk Afrika' campaign which was planned together with various youth organisations, but mainly run by the AABN and MKA. The main concern of the AABN with this project was to help fund education in the African refugee camps, while the MKA focused on funding the ANC hospital in Morogora.<sup>314</sup> December 1974 saw the AABN organise an art sale in De Toe, Amsterdam in aid of the ANC, which raised 20 000 guilders, with art that was produced by the Makanda tribe in Tanzania.<sup>315</sup> By the end of 1974 the AABN was already thinking of forming a 'Steunfonds' for the trade unions, and felt that financial support should be given to SACTU, ZAPU and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) without any restrictions on what the money should be used for.<sup>316</sup>

At the end of 1974 the AABN brought out a report highlighting its aims and discussing its program for 1975. Here the aim was seen as direct and indirect financial help to various organisations so as to bring about an end to social discrimination based on racial or other differences.<sup>317</sup> Already in early 1975 the AABN highlighted financial support for the freedom movements as more important than an economic boycott. It also felt that it was not only the ANC they should be supporting, but also other South African groups. The AABN did however recognise the ANC as representative of the largest portion of the South African population. The closest ties were therefore formed with the ANC.<sup>318</sup> During the year the AABN began to discuss the starting of a fund so as to collect money for the freedom movements.<sup>319</sup> In April meetings of groups of the AABN were held in Amsterdam, Nijmegen and IJmand, where it was decided to introduce a Steunfonds to support the underground trade unions in South Africa.<sup>320</sup> After only four months of the Steunfonds campaign, 13 000 guilders was already collected.<sup>321</sup>

---

<sup>313</sup> NIZA, 10.1A (Algemene regeringsbeleid), 1985-1991, Beleid beschouwd NR 5185 5/7/1985. Samengesteld door de rijksvoorlichtingdienst afdelinginterne voorlichting, Den Haag .Zuid Afrika, p.5, from: De Volkskrant, 11 Junie 1985. 'Beyers Naude vraagt steun voor bonden Zuid-Afrika'.

<sup>314</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1978*, p.15.

<sup>315</sup> AABN, *Anti- apartheids Nieuws*, Dec 1974 (70), p.2.

<sup>316</sup> AABN, *Anti- apartheids Nieuws*, Nov 1974 (69), p.4.

<sup>317</sup> AABN, *Kommunikee*, November 1974, p.5.

<sup>318</sup> AABN, *Kommunikee*, April 1975, p.2.

<sup>319</sup> AABN, *Kommunikee*, January 1975, p.11.

<sup>320</sup> AABN, *Anti- apartheids Nieuws*, April 1975 (72), p.6.

<sup>321</sup> AABN, *Anti- apartheids Nieuws*, July 1975 (73), p.10.

A demonstration was held in Amsterdam on 28 August 1976 in reaction to the Soweto uprising to try and get more people to support the resistance movements in South Africa. About 2 000 people from the various anti-apartheid groups partook in the event. Donations were also made towards the Steunfonds to support the strikers in South Africa through the underground trade union SACTU. By the end of 1976 the Steunfonds stood at almost 80 000 guilders. By the end of the year the fund was better known, and so got more support. Donations also increased at this time due to the Soweto uprising. Most of the money was given to SACTU and used for a strike fund in South Africa to help look after the families of those strikers fired and those imprisoned. Money also went to the union officials, and a union centre was started for training and for the expansion of SACTU.<sup>322</sup> By December the importance of the Steunfonds campaign was highlighted as reports were received on the South African government's harsh treatment of strikers after the ANC had called on workers to strike in the wake of the Soweto uprising.<sup>323</sup>

Advertising by the AABN increased at this time, as it called for unconditional support for the ANC and the freedom struggle in South Africa. The most important aspect for the AABN was the collection of money, and various collection days were organised for house-to-house collection in Amsterdam during 1976,<sup>324</sup> and a street collection was held on 20 November 1976.<sup>325</sup> October 1976 saw the AABN bring out the first *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, which replaced the *Anti-Apartheids Krant*. The newspaper had a page asking for donations for the AABN and gave the bank account details of the organisation.<sup>326</sup>

During 1977 the AABN wanted to increase its material support for the freedom movements, and for this reason planned an increase in the number of campaigns. Special attention would be paid to the ANC and to their increased number of refugees, thus introducing operation ANC- Noordkreet. The financial help was mainly aimed at supplying basic needs of food and clothing for these refugees who had left South Africa due to the bad situation there. Various meetings and concerts were held to try and collect money for ANC-Noordkreet, including a performance by Jabula. Locals also partook in these

---

<sup>322</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1976*, pp.9-10; AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, October 1976 (81), pp.5-7.

<sup>323</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, December 1976 (82), pp.9-10.

<sup>324</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1976*, pp.9-10; AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, October 1976 (81), pp.10-11.

<sup>325</sup> IISG, stzmap AABN I & II, AABN document, 1976/11/18.

<sup>326</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, October 1976 (81), p.15.

festivals. A protest march, entitled 'een jaar na Soweto' was organised in aid of ANC-Noordkreet. This brought in money for the purchase of clothing, food, sleeping bags, groundsheets, writing material and educational material. Collections of medicine, food and toiletries were also made.<sup>327</sup> During an ANC visit in October 1977 the AABN organised a meeting and collection in Amsterdam in aid of the ANC. This collection raised over 20 000 guilders, and encouraged many new committees to form across the country, with the group in Groningen collecting about 7 000 guilders.<sup>328</sup>

Another 1977 campaign entitled 'Zuidelijk Afrika vecht voor zijn vrijheid' ran from mid-November until mid-December. This campaign aimed at getting increased financial support for the ANC, SWAPO and PF due to their increased needs after Soweto. The campaign was the initiative of the AABN, with the MKA cooperating. In its October magazine the AABN started to request financial support for this campaign and for the freedom movements.<sup>329</sup> A house-to-house and street collection held from 14-19 November as part of this campaign, raised 21 000 guilders.<sup>330</sup>

No separate campaign for trade unions was held in 1977, although support was still given to SACTU and local support groups developed. Due to the increased amount of material support planned for 1977, a Material Help work group was formed during the year. The AABN also decided that it would not only help the refugees, but it would also focus on an increase in its general dispatches to the freedom movements. The planned increase in material help to freedom movements for 1977 was successful, and greater solidarity was shown for the freedom struggle.<sup>331</sup> In drafting its programme for 1978 the AABN decided to increase campaigns calling for the material support of the freedom struggle, and to increase funds donated to 'onderwijs tegen apartheid'.<sup>332</sup> During 1978 the Material work group expanded considerably, and began to give more form to the material support offered by the AABN. The work group therefore went about organising the practical buying of transport for the ANC and the production of technical material.<sup>333</sup>

---

<sup>327</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1977*, p.10; AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, April 1977 (84), p.2.

<sup>328</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1977*, p.23.

<sup>329</sup> IISG, stzamp, AABN I & II, AABN documents, 1977; AABN, *Kommunikee*, October 1977, p.10.

<sup>330</sup> IISG, stzamp, AABN I & II, AABN documents, 1977; AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, October 1977 (87), p.10; AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Dec 1977 (88), p.10.

<sup>331</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1977*, pp.7, 8, 12-13; *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, April 1977 (84), p.2.

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*, p.24.

<sup>333</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1978*, pp.8-9.

More donations were needed for the ANC in 1978, as more refugees fled South Africa and joined the ANC which had insufficient supplies. The AABN thus stepped in with more humanitarian support in the form of sleeping bags, trousers and milk powder. The AABN held various campaigns and in this way raised 60 000 guilders in just a few months.<sup>334</sup> A street collection held in early 1978 in Groningen brought in 28 000 guilders, while collectors in Gouda brought in 560 guilders for humanitarian support and a Delft School Project raised 15 000 guilders.<sup>335</sup> Together this allowed for three deliveries of supplies to the ANC, the first containing 1000 safari outfits. The ANC received the goods, and sent letters thanking the AABN for the supplies and support.<sup>336</sup> During 1978 the AABN also supplied the ANC with 35 000 guilders for the purchase of two cars. In order to be able to increase the collections for material support, the AABN realised the necessity of getting as many new people as possible involved in their organisation so that new projects could be launched.<sup>337</sup>

In April 1978 the programme 'onderwijs tegen apartheid' began in order to help the young students who had fled South Africa after the Soweto uprising. Financial support was needed to continue the student's education while in exile. Further monetary support was required for SWAPO and the PF.<sup>338</sup> By June 1978 'onderwijs tegen apartheid' had already raised 30 000 guilders, but more money was still needed, and so the campaign continued.<sup>339</sup> The end of November 1978 saw another collection being held in Amsterdam for the ANC hospital. Schools again partook in the collection, and over 20 000 guilders was collected. After the campaign the AABN again highlighted the central role material support for the freedom movements should play. Decisions needed to be made regarding where the money should go, although education would always remain a top priority. Other items to be sent to Africa included food, school supplies, recreational supplies, audio-visual material, agricultural supplies, Vaseline and soap. During 1978 support for SACTU also increased with the founding of the A.C. de Bruyne Instituut to spread information about the struggle. The AABN was at the level of nearly being able to afford a third car for the organisation, with the help of local groups raising 30 000 guilders in Groningen and 3

---

<sup>334</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Feb 1978 (89), p.13.

<sup>335</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, April 1978 (90), p.17.

<sup>336</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Feb 1978 (89), p.13.

<sup>337</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1978*, pp.17-18.

<sup>338</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, April 1978 (90), pp.2-3.

<sup>339</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, June 1978 (91), p.3.

000 guilders in Harlem. SACTU however needed five cars, and so readers of the AABN newspaper were asked to donate money to this cause.<sup>340</sup>

Actions continued to increase over the next few years, as apartheid gained greater priority in the post-Soweto period. As has been seen, it was also in this period that the Netherlands' government began to take more concrete steps against apartheid. However, within a few years apartheid once again lost its prominent position, and the government became more relaxed as regards South Africa. It will however be seen that the AABN continued its actions until the end of apartheid.

During April 1982 the Netherlands' branch of the ANC organised a fund raising event in Amsterdam. The evening cost 12.50 guilders each, and included a South African meal, a speech by an ANC representative and the singing of freedom songs.<sup>341</sup> In October it called for donations for Radio Freedom, the ANC radio station broadcast from Tanzania, and raised 85 000 guilders by January 1983. It also helped with the education of presenters and the provision of radio equipment.<sup>342</sup> On 12 October 1982 a concert against apartheid was held at the Melkweg in Amsterdam. African bands performed, and postcards were sold to bring in extra funds.<sup>343</sup> The AABN thus continued their policy of direct support for the freedom movements through material support, education and other assistance.

In October 1984 the AABN's annual donation campaign began, focusing on the needs of Radio Freedom. The AABN was however in a weaker financial position than in previous years. This can be attributed to the more friendly line the Netherlands' government had decided to take towards South Africa, which influenced public opinion. Government claimed that the new political ideas being implemented in South Africa would probably lead to reform, and that international pressure should therefore continue but only along peaceful lines. The AABN continued to feel that the government's criticism of Pretoria was insufficient, but lost support due to its close relations with the ANC and the armed struggle.<sup>344</sup>

---

<sup>340</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Feb 1978 (89), p.5; AABN, *Jaarverslag 1978*, pp.16-19.

<sup>341</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, April 1982 (114), p.7.

<sup>342</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, October 1982 (117), pp.4-7.

<sup>343</sup> *Ibid.*, p.15.

<sup>344</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, October 1984 (129), pp.2-3.

As late as April 1989 the AABN was still trying to collect money for the ANC and SWAPO. Braam and W. Kok of the PvdA organised a collection for the freedom movements in Amsterdam, with similar collections following throughout the Netherlands.<sup>345</sup> This shows how the AABN continued to support the ANC until the ANC was unbanned by the South African government in February 1990. It can thus be seen that the efforts of the AABN in supporting the ANC were fairly successful. Although its monetary support was never extensive, it did help the ANC in various projects, and provided considerable advice and support.

Financially the KZA was much more successful than the other anti-apartheid organisations. From 1977 until 1991 the KZA collected 57.5 million guilders through their 'Bevrijdingsfonds'. Of this money, more than 25% went to the ANC.<sup>346</sup> The KZA received funding from various organisations, and their funding was often higher than that received by other anti-apartheid organisations within the Netherlands.<sup>347</sup> The KZA, just like the AABN, Kairos and BOA, got a subsidy from the Netherlands' government and money from the Nationale Commissie Voorlichting en Buwustwording Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (NCO). It also got money from the EC, UN and other ministries.<sup>348</sup> The KZA was also the organisation through which the government made their donation to the freedom movements available. This meant that the KZA did receive more money from the government than the other organisations.<sup>349</sup> The money from the Netherlands' government could only be used for refugees from South Africa and Namibia and the money from the EC was to be used for peaceful development. Some of this money was used for the underground freedom movements.<sup>350</sup>

Generally the anti-apartheid movements in the Netherlands believed that the struggle should be given more than just ideological support, leading to the KZA introducing the Bevrijdingsfonds in 1977 when it decided that it would rather support freedom movements than developing countries. The Bevrijdingsfonds collected money from individuals, churches, development organisations and from other European organisations. In the first

---

<sup>345</sup> AABN, *Antiapartheids Krant*, April/May 1989, p.6.

<sup>346</sup> NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, 1989, pp.14-15; Van Lakerveld, *Nederland tegen apartheid*, p.65.

<sup>347</sup> Van Lakerveld, *Nederland tegen apartheid*, p.65.

<sup>348</sup> Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.25; Van Lakerveld, *Nederland tegen apartheid*, p.65; Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.131-132.

<sup>349</sup> Van Lakerveld, *Nederland tegen apartheid*, p.111.

<sup>350</sup> NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, 1989, pp.14-15.

year, individual donations alone equalled nearly 1 million guilders and even more came from institutions. The fund was used to sponsor the ANC, SWAPO and other movements in Namibia and South Africa. The KZA saw itself as a supporter of the ANC, but from a distance, so most of the money was used for refugee camps run by the freedom movements. It saw itself as having a political responsibility, and agreed with the ANC on most issues, including the armed struggle. Over the years, the KZA also provided some military equipment to the ANC, such as infrared video cameras, maps and deep-sea-diving apparatus. Arms were however mainly supplied by the Eastern Bloc countries. On occasion, the KZA did question the strategy of the ANC, and were never quite sure whether the ANC or UDF should get more support.<sup>351</sup>

The great success of the KZA's Bevrijdingsfonds meant that many important decisions needed to be made. In the first year, most of the money was given to the freedom movements without restrictions, and decisions were made quickly and requests were acted on immediately. However, when the KZA started to get funding from larger organisations such as the Netherlands' government and the European authorities, it was stipulated that the money be allocated more carefully and specifically. The allocation of the money was handed over for external control, and from then on any request from a freedom movement was considered carefully by the Bevrijdings Komitee. They also considered the possibility of each request being turned into a campaign in the Netherlands.<sup>352</sup> The policy followed within the Netherlands from 1975 was that the ANC could only get humanitarian help, which forbade donations of cars and communication apparatus as these could be used for military purposes. The Netherlands thus never gave financial support openly to the freedom movements, and followed the example of other Western countries.<sup>353</sup>

The KZA also had an emergency fund, such as was used to help fly refugees out of Mozambique to Tanzania after the signing of the Nkomati Accord by Mozambique with South Africa in 1984. This fund could be called on by the freedom movements in any urgent situation. In Angola the Bevrijdingsfonds supported the garage of the ANC where their vehicles were repaired and youngsters were trained to be mechanics. The KZA also helped SWAPO with their needs, especially with the purchase of goods. SWAPO was

---

<sup>351</sup> Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.25; Van Lakerveld, *Nederland tegen apartheid*, p.65, 111; Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.124-128, 131-132.

<sup>352</sup> Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.26; Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.130-131.

<sup>353</sup> Van Lakerveld, *Nederland tegen apartheid*, p.111.

concerned about the South African and White control of the Namibian economy. During the struggle, ZANU and ZAPU were also supported. After their freedom was achieved, they still made requests to the KZA, but this caused disagreement within the KZA until the Cooperantenprogramma was formed to help development.<sup>354</sup>

In 1988 1.4 million guilders was collected through various donations by the KZA. The total support for 1988 for the Bevrijdingsfonds amounted to 7.2 million guilders. The KZA guaranteed that at least 90% of all donations would go to the Bevrijdingsfonds, with the rest being used for administration.<sup>355</sup> Of this money, 1.6 million guilders was brought in through collections and donations, 1.8 million guilders came from the Netherlands' government, 2.3 million guilders came from the EC and 1.5 million guilders came from other funding organisations. In 1988 the KZA donated 90.995 guilders to Namibian movements, 380.121 guilders to SWAPO, 296.549 guilders to general South African movements, and 436.258 guilders to the ANC.<sup>356</sup> In 1991 refugees were still fleeing South Africa due to conflict with Inkatha, so the KZA gave 15 000 guilders to the ANC in Mozambique.<sup>357</sup> Money was also used for the spreading of information inside the Netherlands, and for the production of the magazine *Amandla*. The donations to the Bevrijdingsfonds increased quickly in the late 1980s, with total donations in 1986 equalling about 3.5 million guilders, and by 1989 equalling 10 million guilders. After this the amount fell again, to about 4.5 million guilders in 1994.<sup>358</sup>

A joint campaign between Kairos and the AABN in 1981 collected money for an ANC newspaper, and ended in February 1982 after 100 000 guilders had been collected.<sup>359</sup> In 1987 the AABN and KZA cooperated in a campaign at the request of the ANC. This resulted in June becoming 'actiemaand voor het ANC', with the aim of collecting money for the ANC and making the policy of the ANC better understood (figure 3). The campaign got broad support from political parties, church groups and youth organisations. Concerts were held in aid of the ANC, radio and TV adverts placed, Mandela Park was opened in Hoorn and in Amsterdam an anti-apartheid monument was unveiled. On the 14 June a

---

<sup>354</sup> Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.128, 312-136.

<sup>355</sup> KZA, Pamphlet.

<sup>356</sup> NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, 1989, pp.14-15.

<sup>357</sup> NIZA, 10.2B, Werk tegen apartheid, 8/1991.

<sup>358</sup> Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, p.132.

<sup>359</sup> F.J. Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.50.

demonstration was held in The Hague, and two weeks later the month was closed off with a gathering in the Vondelpark, Amsterdam.<sup>360</sup>

In 1988 the AABN and KZA again entered into an action programme together to support the ANC and its Freedom Charter.<sup>361</sup> They decided to hold a demonstration together on 11 June 1988 in Amsterdam. The demonstration was in order to bring about an active government policy in the form of sanctions, support for the freedom movements and support for the release of political prisoners. Trade unions and churches also joined together in the demonstration.<sup>362</sup> Other joint actions during 1988 took place, with emphasis being placed on the 'weg met apartheid' campaign, which reached its height in June with a demonstration. Political and material support for the ANC was highlighted throughout the campaign and the 'Amandla' ensemble performed. The AABN organised the '10 dae voor het ANC' from 16-26 June with a nation wide demonstration and the KZA organised collections to be held for projects connected to the Freedom Charter of the ANC. The demonstrations were very successful, with campaigns taking place in over one hundred places and about one million guilders being handed over to the ANC at Vondelpark. Another collection in Wageningen brought in 32 000 guilders. There were however still clashes, as the AABN felt that the KZA did not focus enough on the ANC. During the AABN campaign discussions on violence, the future of South Africa and boycotts took place. The AABN wanted actions along this line to increase. Another joint action in 1988 was 'Amsterdam bouwt mee aan het nieuwe Zuid Afrika', which had various Amsterdam groups all working together, including the AABN, KZA and some political parties.<sup>363</sup> October 1989 saw the 'steun SWAPO en ANC' campaign as well as the June ANC campaign as in 1988. The year was however not as successful, with fewer campaigns as well as less being collected during campaigns.<sup>364</sup>

The above discussion sums up the direct contact the anti-apartheid groups had with movements in southern Africa, and the support they gave these movements (figure 4 and figure 5). The success of the anti-apartheid groups can however not be assessed until their campaigns within the Netherlands have also been taken into consideration.

---

<sup>360</sup> Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.129.

<sup>361</sup> *Speerpunt*, October 1987, p.4.

<sup>362</sup> *AABN-KZA info*, April 1988 nr 1(2), p.5.

<sup>363</sup> AABN-KZA, 'Informatie oor de gezamenlijke acties', March 1988 (1), pp.5, 8, AABN-KZA, 'Informatie oor de gezamenlijke acties', August 1988 (5), pp.5-8; *Speerpunt*, October 1987, pp.4-5.

<sup>364</sup> AABN-KZA, 'Informatie oor de gezamenlijke acties', Oct 1989 (5), p.6.

## **6. Actions by the anti-apartheid groups within the Netherlands**

### **i. Introduction**

Actions inside the Netherlands were also a very important element of the struggle against apartheid, and it was this type of action that both the KZA and Werkgroep Kairos focused on. There were different types of actions taking place inside the Netherlands; some aimed at bringing about boycotts; some wanted to break ties with South Africa; some focused attention on informing the public about apartheid; while others aimed at changing government policy. In order for the anti-apartheid groups to get sufficient donations, it was imperative that they made themselves known within the Netherlands, and for this reason all three of the groups under discussion organised activities in the Netherlands. This section of the discussion will look at the actions inside the Netherlands, focusing on their successes and effectiveness.

### **ii. Boycott and sanction actions**

It was not only foreign countries that saw the breaking of economic relations with South Africa as very important in the struggle against apartheid. The ANC also called on governments to boycott South African products and stop the provision of arms to South Africa. Actions to bring about sanctions therefore played a very important role in the activities of the anti-apartheid groups. The KZA did however point out that they felt that foreign economic pressure could never replace the internal struggle.<sup>365</sup>

In August 1972, the Central Committee of the WCC held a meeting in Utrecht, and took a resolution to fight racial politics in South Africa through member churches, Christian organisations, and individuals. The church called on all individuals outside South Africa to use their influence through actions, disinvestment, stopping of trade and the pulling out of shareholders in South Africa.<sup>366</sup> The reason for the WWC decision lay in racial discrimination, economic exploitation of the non-White labour force and unequal pay for equal work. All companies working in South Africa profited from this, including foreign investors. This meant that foreign companies were profiting from racial discrimination.

---

<sup>365</sup> KZA, *Sancties tegen Zuid Afrika*, pp.19-20.

<sup>366</sup> Raad van Kerken Nederland (Internationale Zaken) 'Buitenlandse investering in Zuid Afrika' in *Oecumenische Informatie* (1), 1975, p.3.

The WCC called on churches to take positive steps to try and change the situation.<sup>367</sup> In reaction to this call by the WCC, Kairos decided to embark on a campaign against investment in South Africa in 1973. They decided to focus on the Koninklijke Nederlandse Petrolieum Maatschappij NV, with Shell Nederland being a part of this company. South Africa relied on oil imports, and so an oil boycott would affect all spheres of her economy. Shell was also one of the Netherlands' biggest investors in South Africa, and it was felt that her withdrawal would not have a very negative impact on the Black population. Shell was also targeted as it was involved with providing oil for the army and government of the Ian Smith regime in Zimbabwe.<sup>368</sup>

In the beginning, the focus of the oil campaign lay in dialogue and investigation. During the 1973 shareholders meeting Kairos leader, Groenendijk, requested a discussion with the leaders of the concern where he discussed the provision of oil to both Zimbabwe and South Africa. Three more discussion meetings took place before 1976, but brought no change in the Shell policy. The UN also called for an oil boycott in 1975, in reaction to the request made by Luthuli in 1960. This was however not a mandatory embargo, and thus had little real impact.<sup>369</sup> In 1976 Kairos, together with the Oecumenische Studie en Actiecentrum voor Investerings (OSACI), brought out 'Shell in Zuid Afrika'. This study highlighted how Shell was involved in the whole region, and that they were openly backing the South African government. They also found that, although Shell paid her workers slightly more than others in South Africa, the wages were still too low and that the company practised racial discrimination.<sup>370</sup>

The KZA quickly chose what aspect of the struggle it wished to focus on - economic investment in South Africa and sanctions against South Africa, and thus joined Kairos's Shell campaign. The important question for the KZA was what to do about Netherlands' companies that still invested in South Africa, and in this way supported apartheid. It was against these companies that it wanted to take action.<sup>371</sup> The KZA held the view that South Africa was very dependent on her outside contact, and for this reason economic boycotts would be beneficial in ending apartheid. It identified three areas of investment where

---

<sup>367</sup> *Ibid.*, p.24.

<sup>368</sup> *Amandla*, August 1985, p.29; Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.85-86.

<sup>369</sup> Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, p.86.

<sup>370</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.87-88.

<sup>371</sup> *Ibid.*, p.84.

boycott could be effective: the first was with regard to information and technological advances; the second was trade; and the third looked at loans and credit facilities.<sup>372</sup> The first action that the KZA got involved in from 1977-1990, was the oil campaign. Kairos and the KZA had different methods of working, but together could make the campaign more successful. Their relationship was characterised by ongoing co-operation, and Van den Bergh, who was chiefly responsible for the Kairos side of the Shell boycott, was often in daily contact with the KZA.<sup>373</sup>

The second phase of action against Shell was brought about by the KZA joining the campaign and introducing a phase of greater action with wider political and social support after a second call by the WCC (figure 6). The role of Shell in Zimbabwe was emphasised, and with the help of some British activists who were looking into the role of British Petroleum (BP) in Zimbabwe, the KZA and Kairos brought out the publication *Het Olieschandaal*. On 12 March 1979, Kairos and the KZA started a new campaign in the Netherlands, where they tried to get government support for the oil embargo and tried to get them to introduce measures to stop the export of oil products. The work of the organisations now rested on three pillars - actions against Shell, investigation into the provision of oil to southern Africa and the influencing of politics.<sup>374</sup>

To begin with focus was placed on the spreading of information about Shell, aiming to have an effect on the name of Shell within the Netherlands. There was a need for countrywide support for the campaign and so they focused on advertising and publications. This advertising was successful, and protest meetings were held in approximately 150 places across the Netherlands with the support of hundreds of local groups, NOVIB, political parties, including the PvdA and Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (ARP), and even the FNV. Shell employees were provided with information on the actions of Shell, and about one million copies of the pamphlet 'Shell helpt apartheid, deel 13' were distributed. The discussions begun by Kairos in 1973 continued. In order to make the impact of the oil campaign more international, Kairos and the KZA set up the Shipping Research Bureau (SRB) in 1980. With donations from inside the Netherlands and from the UN, the SRB soon had four staff members who worked together with representatives from the ANC and

---

<sup>372</sup> KZA, *Sancties tegen Zuid Afrika*, p.17.

<sup>373</sup> Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.85, 157.

<sup>374</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.88-90; Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.38.

the UN Committee against apartheid. The SRB researched the secret export activities of oil companies with relation to southern Africa, and published its findings. In its first report it highlighted the important role played by some Dutch companies. A disagreement however followed, as the ANC and UN Committee wanted the findings of the research to be kept secret so that pressure could be exerted in this way. The problem was made worse by division within the ANC, which often caused conflicts with the anti-apartheid movements, and its questioning of the worth of an action against only one company. The ANC was also more accustomed to working with the AABN, and was not yet quite sure of the loyalty of the KZA.<sup>375</sup>

Another aspect of the campaign was to convince the government to introduce an oil embargo, and to do this the KZA and Kairos worked together with some Second Chamber members of the PvdA and of the Christian parties. In 1979 Iran joined in the oil embargo, meaning that the Rotterdam harbour became very important in the provision of oil to South Africa. A petition was signed by about 500 church leaders, and was published in the media, calling for support for a one-sided oil embargo by the Netherlands. Thousands of letters and telegrams were sent to parliament in support of an oil embargo. Den Uyl highlighted the importance of the Netherlands joining the oil embargo, and was supported by the CDA, but Van der Klaauw was against the embargo, which led to the debate on 26 June 1980 (figure 7). This action reflects the prominence of the South African issue, and after this cabinet members were more careful about getting involved with the anti-apartheid groups.<sup>376</sup>

The last phase of the oil campaign was influenced by the internal situation in South Africa. In June 1985 P.W. Botha called off the State of Emergency and internationally there were expectations for reform. However, it soon seemed as if the South African government would make no real concessions. This led to many companies withdrawing from South Africa and discussions started within Shell. It was also in 1985 that Shell became the victim of various acts of sabotage within the Netherlands when RaRa burnt various buildings in protest against investment in South Africa. The AABN, KZA and Kairos were against these actions. January 1986 also saw the start of actions within the USA against

---

<sup>375</sup> Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.38-39,50; Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.90-95.

<sup>376</sup> Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.39- 44; Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.95-98.

Shell, mainly as a result of the violent actions a year earlier on a Shell controlled mine in South Africa.<sup>377</sup>

It was thus the perfect climate for the launch of another campaign in the Netherlands, and Kairos started a campaign with eleven other church groups called 'Steunt uw geld apartheid?' A public survey was held, finding that 54% of the population was in favour of the Netherlands introducing one-sided boycott measures, and 35% were against it. A report was prepared for the Shell shareholders meeting and, influenced by the actions in the USA, 150 Shell workers in the Netherlands called on Shell to leave South Africa. Shell was in a difficult situation, but got some help from a group that blamed the KZA and Kairos for the violent actions against Shell. The campaign continued and in 1989 a huge demonstration was held outside the Shell laboratory in Amsterdam North. Discussions continued during the shareholder's meetings, and actions continued until 1990 when De Klerk released Mandela.<sup>378</sup>

Although the oil campaign never resulted in Shell leaving South Africa, it did still have an effect on Shell and on the Netherlands' public, with the image of the Shell Company being negatively affected within the Netherlands, which negatively influenced sales. The research of the SRB also had far reaching consequences. The entire oil campaign also had an effect on South Africa, and P.W. Botha reported that the oil boycott between 1973 and 1984 cost South Africa 22 billion Rand. The effect could have been greater had more countries organised and participated in the campaigns.<sup>379</sup>

The oil campaign was not the only economic action by the KZA within the Netherlands, and when the second phase of the oil campaign was declared a failure, the KZA decided to expand the boycott action to all South African products. The first action of this regard was that against the purchase of Kruger Rands by Netherlands' banks and ran from 1982-1983 (figure 8). The banks however, following the lead of ABN/AMRO, were not quick to take up this campaign.<sup>380</sup> The situation in the gold mines was publicised, and the campaign got the support of local groups and trade unions. With the help of members of the public who threatened to change banks if the sale of Kruger Rands was not stopped, the campaign

---

<sup>377</sup> Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.101-102.

<sup>378</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.102-105; Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, pp.105-106.

<sup>379</sup> Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, p.106.

ended up being highly successful.<sup>381</sup> The youth section of the CDA published an article pointing out that the cost of a Kruger Rand was 1200 guilders and of this money 70 guilders from each sale went directly to the South African army.<sup>382</sup> The success of the campaign can be attributed to banks not relying on the sale of Kruger Rands and the opportunity for public participation. By February 1985 the sale of Kruger Rands was entirely stopped within the Netherlands.<sup>383</sup>

Due to the success of the Kruger Rand campaign, the KZA began the ‘Pluck geen vruchten van apartheid’ campaign against the trade in South African fruit in 1985. The KZA got the help of several local groups, and small grocers, larger shops and importers were all asked not to import or sell South African fruit. The importers were the most difficult to convince, but by 1986 virtually no South African fruit was available in the Netherlands.<sup>384</sup>

Although the AABN concentrated on actions related directly to the freedom movements and were therefore not as active in information and other campaigns within the Netherlands, they also realised the importance of isolating South Africa financially. Already in 1976 the AABN together, with the Dutch trade unions, partook in a disinvestment action calling for a boycott of South African goods and publishing information on contacts with South Africa.<sup>385</sup> The AABN also published lists showing the boycott actions of other countries compared to those of the Netherlands; which companies still invested in South Africa and the export figures to South Africa were compared to those of other countries.<sup>386</sup> The AABN called on people to boycott companies who still invested in South Africa, and made the public aware of the Netherlands’ trade relations.<sup>387</sup>

### **iii. Actions to break all ties with South Africa**

All of the anti-apartheid organisations realised the importance of breaking ties with South Africa. They also believed that this was a form of concrete criticism of apartheid and a way

---

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 98-100; Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.56.

<sup>381</sup> Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.101.

<sup>382</sup> NIZA, 10.1I (CDA), CDJA, October 1984.

<sup>383</sup> Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.98-100.

<sup>384</sup> Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.101.

<sup>385</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1976*, pp.11-12, 14; AABN, *Jaarverslag 1977*, p.9.

<sup>386</sup> See Appendix IV for an example of the type of information spread by the AABN in this regard.

<sup>387</sup> K. Zeelberg & F. Nijssen, ‘De Nederlandse belangen in Zuid Afrika. Handel en wandel van ‘onze’ multinationals’. AABN, Amsterdam, 1976; Kongress Map: Zuidelijk Afrika Congress, 6-8 September 1974, ‘Geen geld voor onderdrukkend geweld’. Groningen, 1976, p.7.

of showing solidarity with the freedom movements. Important issues were the Cultural Accord between the Netherlands and South Africa, sporting ties and the subsidy of immigration to South Africa. The ANC continually called on the Netherlands to break ties with South Africa after its banning in 1960.<sup>388</sup> It is however difficult to draw a clear line between actions to break ties and actions to inform the public as they are interrelated.

During 1976 the AABN brought out an information pamphlet discussing the situation in South Africa. It was pointed out how 'Petty' and 'Grand' apartheid differed, and that apartheid was not only for Blacks, but also for all non-Whites. This pamphlet focused on the building company Nederhorst Bouw, which was directly involved in the execution of grand apartheid. It pointed out how Nederhorst was half owned by the Netherlands' government, and that the Den Uyl government was still hesitant about breaking ties with South Africa. They argued that this did not reveal an anti-apartheid policy in the Netherlands with regards to South Africa, as they were helping build 'ghettos'. When the AABN questioned Lubbers on the issue he said they could not do anything as only one fifth of the company was state owned, when in actual fact it was closer to fifty percent.<sup>389</sup> This pamphlet shows the AABN's aim of informing the public on the actions of the Netherlands' government, and trying to encourage disinvestment in South Africa.

The KZA organised an action to try and end all cultural and sport ties between the Netherlands and South Africa, and even after the breaking of the Cultural Accord in 1981, all relations with South Africa did not end. In December 1981, the Netherlands's delegation at the UN voted in favour of a resolution calling for a boycott of South Africa in terms of 'sport, culture, tourism, science and immigration'. The year 1982 became the 'sanction year against South Africa', and all members of the UN were called on to break ties with South Africa. Shortly after this UN decision, a Kairos and KZA delegation met the UN Committee Against Apartheid in London. Here they got permission to set up a special organisation in the Netherlands to co-inside with the proposed sanction year. The organisation received UN funding and 65 000 guilders from the Netherlands' government, and it then set about getting the Van Agt government to take concrete steps in breaking ties with South Africa.<sup>390</sup>

---

<sup>388</sup> Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.107-110.

<sup>389</sup> AABN, 'Nederhorst bouwt mee aan de grote apartheid' Amsterdam, 1976, pp.1-2.

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.107-110.

The formation of this organisation led to some conflict with the AABN, who felt that it had already been campaigning for a total boycott of South Africa for over a decade. The AABN was worried that the KZA and Kairos would unite, and felt they were going against the agreement not to overlap on campaigns. Kairos and the KZA however disagreed, as they had given prior notice of their plan for the sanction year and were respecting the AABN's choice for actions around the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the ANC. Friction continued however, and the AABN did not join in activities at the end of the year.<sup>391</sup> In the leadership of the sanction organisation were people from various political parties, including the CDA, PvdA, D'66, PSP and the trade union organisation FNV.<sup>392</sup>

Kairos and the KZA decided to focus on education and cultural links with South Africa during the sanction year. With regard to education, the sanction organisation had three aims: to spread information on what was happening in South Africa; to show solidarity with the victims of apartheid; and to break all education and scientific links with South Africa.<sup>393</sup> They wanted to act within the education sector both within the Netherlands and in Africa. In the Netherlands they wanted to inform school children about apartheid and to stop control over books that were about South Africa so that the real situation in South Africa could be known. In Africa, they wanted to help in the refugee and freedom movement schools, and to provide schooling material.<sup>394</sup> With regards to the cultural sphere, the organisation was happy that the Cultural Accord no longer existed, but there were still organisations that kept up links on a non-governmental level, and this needed to be stopped so that South Africa would be fully isolated.<sup>395</sup>

With regard to business, the organisation decided to work closely together with the FNV from October 1982 until 1983. The organisation recognised that the expanding economic relations of South Africa with Western Europe and America were important pillars on which apartheid rested. Economic sanctions were therefore a big threat to South Africa. Although sanctions by the UN would be best, these were always vetoed by the larger

---

<sup>391</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.107-112.

<sup>392</sup> KZA & Kairos, 'Akktiesuggesties in het kader van het jaar van de sancties tegen Zuid Africa', Amsterdam, 1982, p.1.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*, p.11.

<sup>394</sup> KZA & Kairos, 'Suggesties voor acties in het kader van de sanctie jaar tegen Zuid Africa', sl,1982, pp.2-5.

<sup>395</sup> KZA & Kairos, 'Akktiesuggesties in het kader van het jaar van de sancties tegen Zuid Africa', p.16.

powers, and as long as the Security Council did not bring in sanctions, the organisation felt the Netherlands should go it alone. However, sanctions never materialised, and the Lubbers government was not interested in encouraging voluntary disinvestment. The sanction organisation therefore decided to publish the names of those companies still operating in South Africa, together with a discussion on apartheid. Some of the Netherlands' companies that were still doing business in South Africa were Chemco, Bols, Shell, Unilever, Phillips, and ABN/AMRO.<sup>396</sup> It also wanted to stop the exchange of technical ideas and people.<sup>397</sup>

This organisation made various suggestions regarding the government policy, and what could be done within the Netherlands to break ties more fully with South Africa. In connection with sport, Minister H. de Boer called on all sport organisations at the end of August 1983 to end contacts with South Africa. However, there was initially very little reaction to this call, and so on 6 September, De Boer sent letters to various communities asking for support for his plan. He asked that the non-participation of South Africa become a pre-requisite in connection with the special subsidy that most clubs received from the community when renting sports grounds. Some of the communities agreed to this provision.<sup>398</sup>

#### **iv. Information activities**

In order to get public support the anti-apartheid organisations needed to interact with the Netherlands public. Activities of this sort focused either on informing the public about the situation in South Africa, on the actions of the Netherlands' government or on the actions of the anti-apartheid group themselves. Through informing the public the anti-apartheid organisations hoped to gain support for their campaigns and get financial assistance.

Kairos focused on the spreading of documentation on South Africa, as the only way to end apartheid was to inform people on what was really going on. One of its aims was to spread information to Christians and it did this through pamphlets and the *Amandla* newspaper, which it distributed together with the KZA and BOA. It called on churches to hold anti-apartheid meetings and organise anti-apartheid programmes. It informed Christians on

---

<sup>396</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.5-7.

<sup>397</sup> KZA & Kairos, 'Suggesties voor acties in het kader van de sanctie jaar tegen Zuid Africa', pp.2-5.

<sup>398</sup> KZA & Kairos, 'Akktiesuggesties in het kader van het jaar van de sancties tegen Zuid Africa', pp.2-3.

what it felt they should be doing in the struggle against apartheid, calling on them to use civil disobedience; accept their responsibility to bring about a better future; and take part in consumer boycotts, actions against deportations and to offer help to political prisoners. Kairos emphasised the cross as a symbol of liberation, and for this reason felt that Christians should encourage people to liberate themselves. It did however not want the church to become a third force, and so called on people to act with secular groups that had the same aim as they did. Kairos also gave the view of other organisations in their pamphlets and discussed the various opinions of the different churches. It also worked with the media, as it was in daily contact with people in South Africa by fax and therefore provided information to many Netherlands' journalists and established a library on South Africa.<sup>399</sup>

An important element of the AABN's work was keeping the Dutch public informed. This task had two aspects: In the first place the AABN wished to inform the Dutch about apartheid, the situation in South Africa and the actions of the freedom movements. This was largely done in order to get more support for the AABN so that it could support the freedom struggle more effectively. In the second place, the AABN wanted to inform the public on the actions of the Netherlands' government against apartheid and of the government's continuing relations with the South African government. Publications were sold for profit, and thus constituted another way of collecting funds.

As early as May 1971 the AABN was active in about seventy places in the Netherlands, with information evenings being organised. The AABN decided to work together with the PvdA, the Zuid Afrika work groups and the Third World Shops.<sup>400</sup> In *AABN Kommuniquee* of 1973 the AABN discussed how the government policy was starting to show a slight turn around. Pronk handed in the budget, and despite greater expectations due to 'keerpunt '72',<sup>401</sup> the only real difference to the budget of his predecessor, C. Boertien, was the 21 million guilders for the UN in Africa. This meant that still less than 1% of the budget was being used for aid. Money was also still being processed via other organisations and not being given directly to the freedom movements, although they knew best what their needs were. This was done to appease the opposition, who were worried that money would be

---

<sup>399</sup> Kairos, *Jaarverslag 1990*, p. 4-50; Kairos, 'Challenge to the Church. Theological comment on the political crisis in South Africa'. Utrecht, 1985, p.48-51; *Amandla*, August 1985, p.29.

<sup>400</sup> AABN, *Anti-apartheids Nieuws*, May 1971 (55), p.2.

used for violent means.<sup>402</sup> During 1974 various information meetings were also organised by the AABN.<sup>403</sup>

In August 1976 the AABN published an ANC report on the situation in South Africa and on the number of children arrested for resistance. Along with this, the ANC called for the spread of information on South Africa and support for the freedom movements. The ANC also asked for support for solidarity movements and for UN resolutions against apartheid.<sup>404</sup> The AABN distributed a pamphlet calling on people to participate in the struggle in any way they could. Donations were solicited for the ANC and the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). The pamphlet further gave a list of all the Netherlands' companies still investing in South Africa despite ongoing apartheid.<sup>405</sup> During 1976 solidarity was built up in the Netherlands, and information on Soweto was widely spread. Sympathy among the Dutch public increased, and solidarity developed with Soweto.<sup>406</sup> The AABN recognised the struggle as entering a new phase in 1976, and so called for money for spreading information, bringing ANC representatives to the Netherlands and organising meetings.<sup>407</sup>

During 1983 various campaigns aimed at informing the public were organised by the AABN. From August to October a national collection was held for a veld clinic in Angola, and the cultural group of the ANC came to the Netherlands. During September, information was spread regarding the situation in the frontline states. November saw a work congress and collection for the frontline states under the title 'Samen tegen die Zuid Afrikaanse aggressie', resulting in a conference being held from December 15-18 regarding South Africa's aggression in the frontline states.<sup>408</sup> In 1987 a special edition of *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws* was brought out to celebrate the ANC's anniversary, in which the relationship between the ANC and the Netherlands was outlined. This combined the AABN's support for the ANC with its function of informing the Netherlands' public. It is also in this way that the AABN called for support for certain ideas, and tried to let the

---

<sup>401</sup> The government published this document discussing their policy for the next year, in this case for 1972.

<sup>402</sup> AABN, *Kommunikee*, December 1973, pp.6-8.

<sup>403</sup> AABN, *Anti-apartheids Nieuws*, Nov 1974 (69), p.10.

<sup>404</sup> AABN, *Kommunikee*, August 1976, pp.1, 4 10.

<sup>405</sup> AABN, 'Investeer niet in apartheid', Amsterdam, sa.

<sup>406</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1976*, pp.1, 7.

<sup>407</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, December 1976 (82), pp.9-10..

<sup>408</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Aug 1983 (122), pp.5-13; AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, October 1983 (123), pp.6-7

government know where it felt its policy should be different.<sup>409</sup> In 1990, after De Klerk's speech, many reporters asked the AABN for statements regarding his message.<sup>410</sup> This highlights the important role and position the AABN held within Dutch society as providers of information right up until the end of apartheid.

The aim of the KZA in informing the Netherlands' public went together with trying to influence government policy. Already in January 1977 the KZA started bringing out a magazine to replace the *Angola Bulletin*. *Amandla* was brought out by the KZA, Kairos and BOA, although each group kept the money from their own subscribers and got a certain number of pages to report on the specific events relevant to their group. This newspaper aimed at informing the readers about actions by each group, government policy and conditions in southern Africa.<sup>411</sup>

Despite tension between the AABN and KZA, the two groups did work together on some occasions, especially in the late 1980s when they felt they could be more effective united. They also brought out a few publications together as part of the information drive to inform the Netherlands' public.<sup>412</sup> As they were both based in Amsterdam, it was quite easy for them to work together. As from 1988 more and more joint actions took place. Other organisations started calling on the AABN and KZA to work together so as to be more effective as their policies were not in conflict. The KZA said it would like to inform the public on the central role of the ANC and M. van Diepen, of the AABN, wanted to give more support to trade unions. AABN secretary, Geerlings, concluded that both wanted a campaign for the ANC and support for projects inside South Africa, resulting in joint action. They also decided to put combined pressure on the Netherlands' government.<sup>413</sup>

The numerous anti-apartheid groups also sometimes supported each others actions to inform the public. In March an International Woman's Day celebration was held to look at the position of women in South Africa. BOA arranged an anti-racism week in Leiden from 14-21 March 1988, not only looking at racism in South Africa, but also in the

---

<sup>409</sup> *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Jan 1987 (special edition).

<sup>410</sup> Braam, *Operatie Vula*, p.252.

<sup>411</sup> *Ibid.*, p.83.

<sup>412</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Dec 1987 (148), p. 12; Rozenberg, *De Bloedband Den Haag- Pretoria*.

<sup>413</sup> *Speerpunt*, October 1987, pp.4-5.

Netherlands,<sup>414</sup> followed by a march and film week in April.<sup>415</sup> Het Breed Overleg Tegen Apartheid held a march in June calling for a stop to imports from South Africa and for more support for the freedom movements and unions.<sup>416</sup> Later in the year, the ANC was even able to open an office and information centre in Amsterdam.<sup>417</sup>

#### **v. Activities aimed at the Netherlands' government**

The lack of concrete action by the government has already been discussed, along with how this created the need for the anti-apartheid organisations. The organisations still realised that action by the government would have more far reaching results, and for this reason they were continually trying to get the government to introduce steps against South Africa.

Kairos' policy supported economic aid for southern African countries. It called on the Netherlands government to continue financial aid to the frontline states and to increase humanitarian support to the freedom movements and other anti-apartheid groups. It also wanted the government to provide more money for victims of apartheid and South African refugees. Kairos felt the government should take steps to free political prisoners,<sup>418</sup> and was disappointed with the Netherlands' government during the 1980s, whose policy it saw as 'taking a step backwards'.<sup>419</sup>

In February 1977 the AABN held a picket-line outside the South African embassy in The Hague. The protesters demanded that the Netherlands' government break economic ties with South Africa, and that the South African government free political prisoners and recognise the trade unions.<sup>420</sup> In deciding the programme for 1978, it was felt that the importance of working towards a total economic boycott of South Africa should be highlighted.<sup>421</sup> This was followed through with a petition for total economic and military boycotts running concurrently with the campaign for 'steun die vrijheidsstrijd in Zuidelijk Afrika' organised together with the MKA.<sup>422</sup>

---

<sup>414</sup> AABN-KZA, 'Informatie oor de gezamenlijke acties', March 1988 (1), pp.3-5.

<sup>415</sup> AABN-KZA, 'Informatie oor de gezamenlijke acties', April 1988 (2), p.2.

<sup>416</sup> AABN-KZA, 'Informatie oor de gezamenlijke acties', June 1988 (4), p.3.

<sup>417</sup> AABN-KZA, 'Informatie oor de gezamenlijke acties', Oct 1988 (6), p.9.

<sup>418</sup> Kairos, 'CDA- Tweede Kamerfractie. Den Haag 1981-4-7' in 'Zuid Afrika uit Zicht?', Apartheid, Nederlandse kerken en het CDA'. Utrecht, 1981, p.21.

<sup>419</sup> *Ibid.*, p.23.

<sup>420</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, February 1977 (83), p.3.

<sup>421</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1977*, p.24.

<sup>422</sup> AABN, *Jaarverslag 1978*, p.15.

In their newspaper, the AABN highlighted how the Netherlands' government's budget for 1980/1981 no longer provided official support for the ANC. Small amounts were still given to SWAPO and to splinter groups of the Namibian National Front. The government was trying to distance themselves from the freedom movements, although they did still support independence in southern Africa by giving 60 million guilders to the Zuidelijk Afrika Programma for various countries.<sup>423</sup> However, in retrospect the budget was seen as effective with regards helping the struggle in South Africa, and the Zuidelijk Afrika Programma was well received as it directed money towards communication and transport. In order to support the frontline states, the Netherlands' government increased their support financial in 1983. Tanzania received 84 million guilders, Zambia 12 million, and development help and help via the Programma voor Hulpverlening aan Zuidelijk Afrika was offered to Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. From 1980, help was also given to the SADCC, totalling 91 million guilders, and help for the victims of the decolonisation process was given to the ANC and SWAPO. The AABN pointed out how these were steps in the right direction, but that they did not help much if concrete political steps against South Africa did not support them.<sup>424</sup> The AABN continued to criticise the government's two-stream policy.<sup>425</sup> On 14 October 1982 the AABN held a protest at Beursplein, Amsterdam against the use of the death penalty in South Africa. Over a hundred people participated, and a letter was sent to the government asking them to discuss the issue.<sup>426</sup>

By 1986 the AABN was again questioning how anti-apartheid the Netherlands' government really was. They had turned down nearly all requests for help in projects fighting apartheid over the last two years, and in this way were not adhering to the two-stream policy. The government was also not willing to help the anti-apartheid movements within the Netherlands with many of their projects and Van den Broek, was seen to be especially unconcerned. No subsidy was given to the Woman's Day organisations and Radio Freedom was only given one study bursary. In its defence, the government claimed that they could never support violent action in South Africa, and that they did already help ANC refugees in neighbouring countries. Within the Netherlands solidarity with the ANC had increased, and the AABN campaign 'Tegen apartheid? Steun het ANC' had positive

---

<sup>423</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, October 1980 (105), p.4.

<sup>424</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, October 1983 (123), pp.5-6.

<sup>425</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, October 1984 (129), p.3.

results, with over 150 support groups starting at schools and universities. The Vrije Universiteit also organised an action week.<sup>427</sup>

In 1986 the PvdA said they would not go into a government accord with CDA without sanctions being imposed against South Africa. The wishes of the AABN were that the Netherlands would end trade with South Africa, not allow investment in South Africa or Namibia, would increase the arms embargo and would increase their solidarity with and support for the freedom movements. They also wanted an increase in diplomatic and political pressure on South Africa, calling for the independence of Namibia.<sup>428</sup>

In 1989 the CDA member, J. Zijlstra, held talks with business managers from South Africa brought to the Netherlands by the pro-South Africa group Nederlands Zuidafrikaanse Werkgemeenschap (NZAW). The VVD however refused to meet the delegation, and the PvdA was upset that they even got visas.<sup>429</sup> After Walter Sisulu was freed he asked that the Netherlands should continue to put pressure on South Africa, and did not agree with the Netherlands' government's decision to take a six months pause. He also said that the ANC would not yet stop the armed struggle despite the South African government's promises. He thanked the Netherlands' anti-apartheid movements for their years of solidarity.<sup>430</sup>

With regards to government policy, the KZA focused on publicising the lack of a concrete South Africa policy in the Netherlands. The KZA saw the changing of government policy as central to the struggle, and Bosgra identified the central problem as a lack of policy. The KZA recognised that the government would never listen to it completely, but decided to do what it could to influence policy. It knew the government would never turn to a total boycott and unreserved support for the freedom movements, but saw selective sanctions as a good start.<sup>431</sup> In 1977 about ten young South African refugees arrived in the Netherlands after leaving South Africa for anti-compulsory conscription reasons. The Netherlands was not quite sure how to deal with these refugees and the moral issue surrounding them. The KZA called on the government to view all South Africans, Black or White, as political

---

<sup>426</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, Dec 1982 (118), p.15.

<sup>427</sup> AABN, *Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws*, October 1986 (141), pp.3-9.

<sup>428</sup> AABN, 'De Keuze'. Amsterdam, 1986, p.3.

<sup>429</sup> AABN, *Antiapartheids Krant*, Oct/Nov 1989, p.3.

<sup>430</sup> AABN, *Antiapartheids Krant*, Dec 1989/ Jan 1990, pp.1, 5.

<sup>431</sup> Buijs, *Overtuiging en geweld*, p.26.

refugees with all the attached rights of the refugee and all the duties of the Netherlands.<sup>432</sup> The situation did however not improve much, even after the Netherlands supported a UN resolution in 1978 to take in South Africa refugees.<sup>433</sup>

In the Netherlands, the majority of the political parties supported boycotts, but despite campaigns by the KZA to try and get the government to stop the export of oil to South Africa, the government did not change its policy. In 1991, the KZA pointed out that France, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Greece all had a direct or indirect ban on the export of oil products to South Africa. The Netherlands however, continued to export oil to the value of 4.7 million guilders in 1985, 15.2 million guilders in 1986, 2.9 million guilders in 1987, 2.2 million guilders in 1988, 10 million guilders in 1989 and 3 million guilders in 1990.<sup>434</sup> The government was also not prepared to stop investment in South Africa, but encouraged businesses to operate along the lines of the voluntary code of conduct. The Netherlands continued to export technological goods to South Africa, despite the fact that the export was not that important for the Netherlands. Export figures in million guilders were as follows; 591 in 1974; 552 in 1975; 506 in 1976; 357 in 1977; 371 in 1978; 425 in 1979; 522 in 1980; 791 in 1981; 630 in 1982 and 668 in 1983. This import was important for South Africa, and the Netherlands also continued to import from South Africa.<sup>435</sup>

As indicated, the political parties within the Netherlands differed in their views regarding the South African issue, and the anti-apartheid groups viewed it as their job to inform the public on the parties' views. The main parties that wanted to work to end apartheid were the PvdA, PPR, PSP, D'66, CPN, and ARP, with the PSP and CPN being the most radical. Most however agreed that support to freedom movements should only be humanitarian in nature and that economic sanctions should not be introduced alone.<sup>436</sup> The government also gave money to the KZA to help South African refugees in other African countries.<sup>437</sup>

In order to give more effective attention to the apartheid situation internationally, various organisations sometimes decided to work together. This led to a joint action between the

---

<sup>432</sup> KZA, Partij kiezen voor Zuid Afrika', deel II, p.20.

<sup>433</sup> NIZA, 19.4, P.A.Groenhuis, 1989, p.14; KZA, Partij kiezen voor Zuid Afrika', deel IV, p.14.

<sup>434</sup> NIZA, 10.1A (general), Tweede kamer der staten general, nr 77, 17 895, 20/2/1991; KZA, *Sancties tegen Zuid Afrika*, pp.22, 39,49.

<sup>435</sup> KZA, *Sancties tegen Zuid Afrika*, pp.22, 39,49.

<sup>436</sup> KZA, Partij kiezen voor Zuid Afrika', deel III, p.2.

<sup>437</sup> NIZA, 10.1A (general), Tweede kamer der staten general, nr 77, 17 895, 20/2/1991.

anti-apartheid groups in the Netherlands when they arranged for members of the ANC and SWAPO to give information on their situation at a meeting in 1983. Their concluding statement was aimed at the way governments, churches and other organisations could act to bring about the most effective results.<sup>438</sup> The meeting highlighted the need for the West to break ties with South Africa, because otherwise South Africa would have the economic ability to interfere in the rest of southern Africa militarily. The meeting called for the Netherlands to break all ties with South Africa, and to rather support the freedom struggle. It was seen as the moral duty of the West to stop the South African war in Africa, and to help the freedom movements and frontline states. It was felt that not only governments should take action, but also churches, trade unions and political parties.<sup>439</sup>

The AABN went further to point out that the UN had discussed apartheid, and agreed that it must be stopped. The West however continued to maintain relations with South Africa. There were also calls to help the freedom struggle with health supplies, education, and other humanitarian needs, so as to complement the support offered by the Netherlands' government. It was pointed out how South Africa was developing into a military state, as could be seen by looking at the percentage of the budget allocated to the military, along with the way the army was used in the frontline states and in the South African Black townships. The AABN called for an expansion of the arms embargo, an end to investment in South Africa and no goods being exported to the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the South African Police. With regard to the frontline states, the AABN thought the best option was to form better diplomatic, economic and other links with these countries, so as to support them against South Africa.<sup>440</sup>

In the late 1980s Kairos, the AABN and the KZA acted together in sending a letter to Van den Broek discussing how the South African government had placed the UDF and COSATU under restrictions. Many anti-apartheid actions of the UDF were banned and legal action against apartheid became almost impossible. These were seen as the worst actions since the 1977 bannings, and the organisations asked for immediate government reaction and for political and material solidarity with the anti-apartheid organisations.<sup>441</sup>

---

<sup>438</sup> AABN, 'Slotverklaring van de openbare hoorzitting over Zuid Afrika agressie in Zuidelijk Afrika' Amsterdam, 1983, p.1.

<sup>439</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.2, 12.

<sup>440</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.7, 13-16.

<sup>441</sup> NIZA, 10.1E (Tweede Spoor), 1985-1994, To Netherlands' government.

## vi. Conclusion

It can thus be seen how Werkgroep Kairos, the AABN and the KZA differed in their focus and in their actions. All three organisations did organise effective campaigns, and did achieve success in their specific aims. It can also be seen that the AABN concentrated more on the ANC, while Kairos and the KZA focused on economic actions inside the Netherlands. The success of all three groups in informing the public can be seen in their increased support during the 1980s. The groups had little concrete success in changing government policy, but managed to keep the South African issue under discussion in parliament, and their influence is also evident in the June 1980 crisis.

After 1990, the solidarity groups in the Netherlands needed to change their strategies in reaction to developments in South Africa. Kairos decided to alter its structure, but continue through the period of change while there was evidence that apartheid had not yet ended. Close links were formed with the other groups in the Netherlands on certain projects. Kairos decided to focus on human rights issues and violence in South Africa, especially looking at the position of Black labourers on farms. It continued to work with churches in the Netherlands and South Africa, helped answer questions on South Africa and support solidarity movements until 1997. Kairos also continued to exist as a library, information centre and archive. The biggest problem facing Kairos was financial, but within the Netherlands support for Kairos continued. In 1991 Kairos was asked by the DAFN to take over their information activities, and the DAFN closed its doors. De Stichting Vrouw-Kerk, Derde Wereld (VKW) also closed its doors in 1991, asking Kairos to continue with some of its work. In 1992 BOA was forced to stop work due to financial difficulties, leaving the publication of *Amandla* to Kairos and the KZA. The SRB found that its work was completed, but decided to continue in order to create opportunities for working together with South Africa.<sup>442</sup>

The AABN had already decided by 1994 that the end of the apartheid struggle had come, and together with some smaller organisations decided to form IZA. In 1995 the KZA decided to join this organisation, with the aim of developing a stable and democratic South Africa, and to move from boycott to investment in South Africa. The organisation soon

---

<sup>442</sup> Kairos, *Jaarverslag 1990*, p. 9, Kairos, *Jaarverslag 1991-1992*, pp.17-23.

changed its name to the NIZA, which continued to operate in Amsterdam.<sup>443</sup> Kairos did not join NIZA, as people were worried that it would lose its special link to the church.<sup>444</sup>

---

<sup>443</sup> NIZA, 10.2B, *DonateursKrant* 2 (1), 24/3/1995; Van Beurden & Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek*, pp.160-161, 169.

<sup>444</sup> Kairos, *Jaarverslag 1991-1992*, pp.17-23.

## 7. Conclusion

Having considered the actions of both the Netherlands' government and those of the anti-apartheid groups in the Netherlands, it can be seen that it was the anti-apartheid groups rather than the Netherlands' government that had a decisive anti-apartheid policy. The Netherlands' government was aware of the apartheid situation, and did condemn apartheid, but continually failed to introduce concrete steps against South Africa. The majority in the Netherlands' government also supported financial aid to the freedom movements, but actions of this sort were continually downscaled.

On the other hand, the non-governmental groups were prepared to give open moral, political and material support to the freedom struggle. In this mini-thesis only the three main anti-apartheid groups have been discussed, but the numerous small and local groups should not be ignored. Despite having slightly different aims and different procedures, all the anti-apartheid groups were effective in their own way. It is difficult to make an overall generalisation regarding which group was the most effective.

Werkgroep Kairos occupied an important position in the struggle in giving Christian resistance a voice. Its connection to the CI and the meaning of this link for the CI should also not be ignored. The way Kairos worked together with the WCC was also very important, as this organisation made a major international impact on the struggle against apartheid. The AABN also had a special role in its relationship with the ANC. It was the AABN that the ANC formed the closest relationship with, and the ANC remained the AABN's top priority throughout the struggle. The trust in this relationship is visible in the ANC's initial suspicion towards the KZA and in its reliance on Braam during Operation Vula. The KZA was financially the most successful group and made the most money available to the freedom struggle. Within the Netherlands the KZA also had the widest following, and in this way was effective with regards the boycott campaigns. The KZA was also chosen by the Netherlands' government to distribute its aid to the freedom movements, again showing how it was perceived as the group most widely accepted within the Netherlands.

The question of whether the groups could have been even more effective had they all stood together and joined their resources also needs to be considered. This greater unity would

have led to increased action in certain spheres, and also less time would have been wasted on inter-group conflicts. However, the value of the division must not be overlooked. Due to the fact that there were organisations with different views, continual questioning and debate took place within each organisation in order to determine if they were acting in the most effective way. This division also led to various actions taking place simultaneously. In this way people from a wider spectrum could all participate in the struggle along the lines that they saw best. Disagreement took place over whether partial or total boycott was better, if the UDF or ANC should receive the most support and on how to view human rights violations by the freedom movements. Personal differences among the leadership also caused problems. The division in the Netherlands therefore had both positive and negative effects, and the individual contribution of each organisation must not be underrated.<sup>445</sup>

Finally, it needs to be considered whether the Netherlands as a whole really did take a major stand in the apartheid struggle. When looking at the financial support made available, both the anti-apartheid groups and Mandela refer to large amounts of monetary aid. This aid came primarily from the anti-apartheid movements, and not from the Netherlands' government, and these groups obviously did not have access to the same amount of money as the government did. Thus, although they gave considerable aid given the size of their operations, the sum could not equal that of government support. Also, if the money from the Eastern bloc was compared to that from the Western countries, it is likely that aid from the East would far exceed that from the West.<sup>446</sup>

It needs to be remembered that the White South African government identified the Netherlands' anti-apartheid actions as highly dangerous and effective. This is another reason why the Netherlands' actions are considered so important, but it has little to do with the actual nature of the actions. Already in 1965, when the Netherlands' government offered 100 000 guilders to the DAF, the South African government reacted very extremely. This was because South Africa interpreted actions by the Netherlands' government and public as much more serious than actions by other countries. The Afrikaner still looked to the 'blood-bond' experienced at the start of the century, and in light of this, expected the Netherlands to support them. Actions from the Netherlands thus

---

<sup>445</sup> Hellema & Van den Bergh, 'Dialog of boycott', IZA nr 2, pp.12-13.

<sup>446</sup> *Zuid Afrika*, November/December 1996 no 73, pp.191-194.

had to be much less threatening in nature in order to get the same reaction from South Africa, as actions by other countries.

Therefore, although the Netherlands was one of the most important countries in the West with regard to their anti-apartheid struggle, their role should not be over exaggerated. However, at the same time the importance of the support they gave the freedom movements must not be ignored- on moral and material level. In order for the full worth of the Netherlands' actions to be calculated, it would be necessary to do comparative studies with other Western countries, looking at both government and civil society group actions.

## APPENDIX I

The Netherlands' cabinets, 1945-1995.

Here the system of coalition governments is clearly visible.<sup>447</sup>

Cabinet	Year started in power	Parties in coalition
Schermerhorn	1945	KVP, PvdA, VVD
Beel	1946	KVP, PvdA
Drees	1948	KVP, PvdA, VVD, CHU
	1951	KVP, PvdA, VVD, CHU
	1952	KVP, PvdA, CHU, ARP
	1956	KVP, PvdA, CHU, ARP
Beel	1958	KVP, CHU, ARP
De Quay	1959	KVP, VVD, CHU, ARP
Marijnen	1963	KVP, VVD, CHU, ARP
Cals	1965	KVP, PvdA, ARP
Zijlstra	1966	KVP, ARP
De Jong	1967	KVP, VVD, CHU, ARP
Biesheuvel	1971	KVP, VVD, CHU, ARP, DS'70
	1972	KVP, VVD, CHU, ARP
Den Uyl	1973	KVP, PvdA, ARP, D'66, PPR
Van Agt	1977	CDA, VVD
	1981	CDA, PvdA, D'66
	1982	CDA, D'66
Lubbers	1982	CDA, VVD
	1986	CDA, VVD
	1989	CDA, PvdA

<sup>447</sup> R. Rozenberg, *De bloedband Den-Haag-Pretoeria*. Amsterdam, 1986, p.12; J. Bosmans, *Staatkundige vormgeving in Nederland (II). De tijd na 1940*. Assen, 1999, pp. 148-150.

## APPENDIX II

The two-stream policy focused on projects inside South Africa to help uplift the Black population. Critics of the policy felt that it offered less support than had previously been given by the government, and that help inside South Africa was not isolating South Africa sufficiently. This basic outline of a few of the programmes aims only to indicate what sort of projects were supported. Some projects were repeated annually, and others were given a once off donation.<sup>448</sup>

Brief description of project	Total commitment (fl)	Project introduced
Bursaries for study at 'white' universities, 25 p/a	1.100 000	1982
Health project focusing on informing people	450 000	1982
Council of Black education- courses to upgrade Black teachers	36 000	1984
English Literacy Project- courses for urban Blacks	206 000	1984
Finance for publishing 5 books by Black authors	29 000	1984
Training for members of Black trade unions	61 000	1985
Support for victims of violent police acts	260 000	1985
Education for Black teachers in rural schools	166 000	1985
Judicial help to victims of apartheid and families	520 000	1985
Study on the effects of the NP policy on the health of the Black population	425 000	1986
Winter school for preparation for final exams	141 000	1986
Training of 2 Black journalists	85 000	1986
Support to farmers in the homelands	440 000	1986
Programme for Technological Careers	166 000	1986
Pre- school	280 000	1986
Support for Council of Churches, Namibia	561 000	1987
Legal Aid Fund, Namibia (for victims of apartheid)	307 000	1987
Support for National General Workers Union	71 000	1987
Black actors who inform the Black public	335 000	1987

<sup>448</sup> NIZA, 10.1E (Tweede spoor), 1985-1994, Projects

### APPENDIX III

The Special Fund to Combat Racism, unlike the PCR, did not only concern itself with the situation in Southern Africa, but with racism across the world. This can be seen by looking at the allocations made in 1978.<sup>449</sup>

Country and Organisation	Amount in US\$
<b>AFRIKA</b>	
ANC	25 000
PAC	25 000
SACTU	5 000
SWAPO	125 000
	-----
	180 000
 <b>AUSTRALIA</b>	
Aboriginal Community Organisation Course	12 000
North Queensland Land Council	17 500
Kimberley Aboriginal Land Council	12 500
	-----
	42 000
 <b>LATIN AMERICA</b>	
Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca (CRIC)	15 000
 <b>NORTH AMERICA</b>	
<b>Canada</b>	
Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories, DENE	17 500
Hunters and Trappers Association	12 500
<b>USA</b>	
National Indian Youth Council	12 500
Indian Law Resource Centre	12 500
International Indian Treaty Council	12 500
National Conference of Black Lawyers	12 500
	-----
	80 000
 <b>EUROPE</b>	
<b>Britain</b>	
Institute of Race Relations	12 500
Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants	12 500
Race Today collective Association	12 500
<b>France</b>	
Collective of African Organisations in France	20 000
	-----
	57 500

<sup>449</sup> A, Van Den Heuvel, *Shalom and Combat. A personal struggle against racism*. Geneva, 1979, appendix.

## APPENDIX IV

The Netherlands never stopped trade with South Africa, and this was an issue focused on by the anti-apartheid groups. This comparison shows how trade between the Netherlands and South Africa compares to that of other countries and the lack of influence of apartheid developments.

From South Africa to the west (in million Rands):<sup>450</sup>

	1969	1971	1973	1975
Britain	511	418	697	904
Japan	151	182	246	487
US	108	119	163	430
W-Germ	103	110	186	427
Belgium/ Luxembourg	63	63	119	137
Fr	43	38	69	93
Italy	45	37	80	90
Netherlands	32	36	60	84

From the west to South Africa (in million Rands)

	1969	1971	1973	1975
Britain	450	671	630	1.097
Japan	118	292	381	612
US	371	470	530	985
W-Germ	293	409	607	1.034
Belgium/ Luxembourg	24	38	55	105
France	61	105	125	145
Italy	85	105	121	203
Netherlands	41	58	69	142

Although the Netherlands is not South Africa's largest trade partner, it can be seen how trade did increase during the apartheid period, and Rotterdam remained the most important harbour for Western Europe.<sup>451</sup>

<sup>450</sup> K. Zeelberg & F. Nijssen, 'De Nederlandse belangen in Zuid Afrika. Handel en wandel van 'onze' multinationals'. AABN, Amsterdam, 1976, p. xxxvii

<sup>451</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xxxviii.

## 8. Sources

### 1. Archival Sources

#### i. Unpublished

Netherlands Archives Repository:

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (BZ), Den Haag:

Code 9:

3152, 912.1, ZA, verhouding tot diplomatieke betrekkinge met Nederlands, 1955-1964.

2442, 911.30, ZA, binnelandse toestand (rassenprobleem), 1957-1958.

2435, 911.26, ZA, binnelandse bestuur, 1958-1960.

2443, 911.30, ZA, binnelandse toestand (rassenprobleem), 1959.

2449, 911.30, ZA, binnelandse toestand (rassenprobleem), 1963.

2450, 911.30, ZA, incident politieke studiegroepen, 1964.

6077, 911.30, ZA, rassenprobleem 2de spoor, 1984,

Internationale Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG), Amsterdam:

stzmap AABN I & II, AABN document, 1976/6/18.

stzmap AABN I & II, AABN document, 1976/11/18.

stzmap AABN I & II, AABN documents, 1977.

stzmap, AABN I & II, AABN documents, 1984.

Nerderlandse Instituut Zuidelijk Afrika (NIZA), Amsteram

5.1 Aktie tegen de doodstraf in Zuid Afrika, 10.1989

10.1 Kairos, 31/5/1995

10.1A (Algemene regeringsbeleid), 1985-1991, Beleid beschouwd NR 5185 5/7/1985.

Samengesteld door de rijksvoorlichtingdienst afdelinginterne voorlichting, Den Haag .Zuid Afrika, p.5, from: De Volkskrant, 11 Junie 1985. 'Beyers Naude vraagt steun voor bonden Zuid-Afrika'

10.1A (general), Tweede kamer der staten general, nr 77, 17 895, 20/2/1991

10.1D Hellema in *Het Parool*, p.7, 6/6/1995.

10.1E (Tweede spoor), 1985-1994, Tweede Kamer, 10/12/1986

10.1E (Tweede spoor), 1985-1994, Projects

10.1E (Tweede Spoor), 1985-1994, To Netherlands' government  
10.1E (Tweede spoor), 1985-1994, AABN evaluation of 2 stream policy, 11/2/ 1987  
10.1E (Tweede spoor), 1985- 1994, Tweede Kamer, 17 895, nr 5, 1987/8  
10.1F (Southern Africa), 1985-1994, KZA oproep, 6/12/1988  
10.1I (CDA), CDJA, October 1984.  
10.2B Werk tegen apartheid, 8/1991.  
10.2B *DonateursKrant* 2 (1), 24/3/1995  
19.4 P.A.Groenhuis, 1989  
19.4 S.de Boer, July 1994  
19.4 A.Vuurens, 30/5/1997

### South African Archives Repository

#### Central Archives Depot (SAB), Pretoria:

Sekretaris van Onderwys, Kuns en Wetenskap (OKW). Sekretaris van Unie-Onderwys, 1911-1968 (UOD). E261/4/8/1: SA Nederlandse Kultuurverdrag, leerstoele en institute, 1931-1961.

Goewerneur-Generaal, 1905-1977 (GG).2401.6/20/1: His excellency's engagements and patronage. Netherlands embassy: Nederlands Cultuurhistorisch Instituut, 1951-1959. (UOD). E261/4/2/3: Cultural agreement with the Netherlands, October 1950- April 1960.

## **ii. Published**

#### Bibliotheek van het Algemeen Rijksarchief (Bib ARA): Verslag de handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten General gedurende het zittingsjaar:

1964-1965, 4<sup>th</sup> meeting, 6 October 1964.

1964-1965, 25<sup>th</sup> meeting, 2 February 1965.

#### Bibliotheek van het Algemeen Rijksarchief (Bib ARA): Verslag de handelingen van beide Kamers der Staten General, Gedrukte Stukken Tweede Kamer:

XV; 1979-1980, doc: 16079, nr 1.

XVI; 1980-1981, doc: 16759, nr 1-3.

XV; 1981-1982, doc: 18409, nr 3, 4, 5.

II, 1983-1983, doc: 17895, nr 1, 2.

XIII; 1983-1983, doc: 17895, nr 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11

X; 1983-1984, doc: 18162, nr 1-2.

IV; 1987-1988, doc: 18689, nr 3, 4.

Bibliotheek van het Algemeen Rijksarchief (Bib ARA): Handeling van de beide Kamers der Staten General, Handeling Tweede Kamer:

V; 1979-1980.

II; 1981-1982.

## **2. Government Publications**

Jaarboek Buitenlandse Zaken overgelegd aan der Staten Generaal (BZ)

1952/1953, Afrika

1955/1956, Afrika

1960/1961, Afrika

1962/1963, Afrika

1963/1964, Afrika

1964/1965, Zuid Afrika

1965/1966, Zuid Afrika

1967/1968, Afrika

1975/1976, Afrika

1975/1976, Zuid Afrika

1976/1977, Afrika

1977/1978 Afrika

1977/1978, Zuid Afrika

1979/1980, Zuid Afrika

1981/1982, Zuid Afrika

1982/1983, Zuid Afrika

1983/1984, Zuid Afrika

1984/1985, Zuid Afrika

1985/1986, Zuid Afrika

1986/1987, Afrika

1986/1987, Zuid Afrika

1987/1988, Zuid Afrika

1988/1989, Zuid Afrika

### 3. Pamphlets

AABN, 'Mandela, Mbeki, Mahlangu...gevangenen van de apartheid vrij!' 1983.

AABN, 'De Keuze'. Amsterdam, 1986.

AABN, 'Investeer niet in apartheid'. Amsterdam, sa.

AABN, 'Nederhorst bouwt mee aan de grote apartheid' Amsterdam, 1976.

AABN, 'Slotverklaring van de openbare hoorzitting over Zuid Afrika agressie in Zuidelijk Afrika' Amsterdam, 1983.

Centrum voor Zending en Diakonaat, Leusden Persbureau der Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk, 'Belegging in Zuid Afrika. Overwegingen en besluiten van de Hervormde en de gereformeerde Synode.' Leidschendam, 1986.

DU PLESSIS, E., *Outspan: Bouwstenen voor apartheid*, (transl J. Voorhoeve) Boycot Outspan Actie (BOA), Rotterdam, 1972.

HENDRICKS, R & H. VAN DER ZANT (red.), *Dit is apartheid*. AABN, Amsterdam, 1986.

Kairos, 'Challenge to the Church. Theological comment on the political crisis in South Africa'. Utrecht, 1985.

Kairos, 'Kerk en bevrijdings-bewegingen'. Utrecht, 1981.

Kairos, pamphlet, Utrecht.

Kongress Map: Zuidelijk Afrika Congress, 6-8 September 1974, ' Geen geld voor onderdrukkend geweld'. Groningen, 1976.

KZA & Kairos, ' Akktiesuggesties in het kader van het jaar van de sancties tegen Zuid Africa'. Amsterdam, 1982.

KZA & Kairos, 'Suggesties voor acties in het kader van de sanctie jaar tegen Zuid Africa'. sl, 1982.

KZA, 'Partij kiezen voor Zuid Africa. Balans van het Nederlandse beleid.' Amsterdam, sa.

KZA, *Sacties tegen Zuid Afrika. De Mythes ontmaskered*, Amsterdam, 1984.

ZEELBERG, K & F. NIJSSEN, 'De Nederlandse belangen in Zuid Afrika. Handel en wandel van 'onze' multinationals'. AABN, Amsterdam, 1976.

### 4. Periodical Publications

- DE GRAAF, B.J.H., *De mythe van de stamverwantschap. Nederland en de Afrikaners, 1902-1930*. SAI Reeks 2, Amsterdam, 1993
- GRUNDY, K.W., "'We're against apartheid, but...": Dutch foreign policy towards South Africa.' in *Studies in Race and Nations*, vol 5, no 3, 1973-1974, Colorado.
- HELDRING, J., *Changes in Dutch society and their implications for Netherlands-South African relations*. The South African Institute for International Affairs, Braamfontein, 1984.
- HELLEMA, D & E. van den Bergh, 'Dialogo of Boycot. De Nederlandse –Zuid Afrika-politiek na de Tweede Wereldoorlog', Het Instituut voor Zuidelijk Afrika (IZA) nr 2, November, 1995.
- Kairos, 'CDA- Tweede Kamerfractie. Den Haag 1981-4-7' in '*Zuid Afrika uit Zicht?*', *Apartheid, Nederlandse kerken en het CDA*. Utrecht, 1981.
- NZAV, *Zicht op Zuid-Afrika*, Amsterdam, 1981.
- SCHUTTE, G.J., 'Een eeuw Nederlandse aandacht voor Zuid Afrika' in *Zicht op Zuid Afrika. Honderd jaar van Zuid-Afrika, 1881-1981*. NZAV, Amsterdam, 1981.
- SCHUTTE, G.J., *De roeping ten aanzien van het oude broedervolk. Nederland en Zuid Afrika, 1960-1990*. Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut (SAI) Reeks, no 1, Amsterdam, 1993.

## 5. Journal and Newspaper Articles

*Amandla*:

April, 1985

January, 1987

August 1985

October 1993

E, van den Bergh, 'Dialogo was geen dialogo, sancties bleven omstreden' in *Amandla*, November 1995.

R. Rozzenburg, 'CDA and PvdA leggen een windei' in *Amandla*, November 1989.

R. Pameijer, 'Het is een elementaire plicht van ons land om op te treden' in *Amandla*, October 1993.

AABN:

*Jaarverslag*:

1971

1976

1977

1978

1983/1984

*Komminikee*

December 1973

November 1974

January 1975

April 1975

March 1976

May 1976

August 1976

October 1977

*Anti-Apartheid Nieuws:*

May 1971 (55)

November 1974 (69)

April 1975 (72)

July 1975 (73)

April/May 1989

Oct/Nov 1989

Dec 1989/ Jan 1990

*Zuidelijk Afrika Nieuws:*

December 1974 (70)

October 1976 (81)

December 1976 (82)

February 1977 (83)

April 1977 (84)

October 1977 (87)

December 1977 (88)

February 1978 (89)

April 1978 (90)

June 1978 (91)

October 1980 (105)

April 1982 (114)

June 1982 (115)  
October 1982 (117)  
December 1982 (118)  
August 1983 (122)  
October 1983 (123)  
October 1984 (129)  
October 1986 (141)  
December 1986 (142)  
January 1987 (special edition)  
December 1987 (148)

CZA:

*Informatie Bulletin:*

December 1960 (1)  
December 1961/ January 1962 (5)  
January/February 1962 (10)  
November/ December 1962 (9)  
1963 (11)  
1963 (12)  
1964 (14)  
January/February 1965 (18)  
May 1965 (20)  
June 1965 (21)  
October 1965 (24)  
November/December 1965 (25)  
April 1968 (39)  
June 1968 (40)  
December 1968 (42)

AABN-KZA:

*AABN-KZA info:*

April 1988 nr 1(2)  
Informatie oor de gezamenlijke acties:  
March 1988 (1)

April 1988 (2)  
June 1988 (4)  
August 1988 (5)  
October 1988 (6)  
Oct 1989 (5)

Kairos:

*Kairos Berichten*:

1970, no 2

1971, no 1

*Jaarverslag* :

1990

1991-1992

*Speerpunt*, October 1987

Raad van Kerken Nederland (Internationale Zaken) 'Buitenlandse investering in Zuid Afrika' in *Oecumenische Informatie* (1), 1975.

*Zuid Afrika*, November/December 1996 no 73.

## 6. Literature

ANONYM., *Ad destinatum I, 1910-1960*. Johannesburg, 1960.

BRAAM, C., *Operatie Vula. Zuidafrikanen en Nederlanders in de strijd tegen apartheid*, Amsterdam, 1993.

BOSMAN, J., *Staatkundige vormgeving in Nederland (II). De tijd na 1940*. Assen, 1999.

BUIJS, F.J., *Overtuiging en geweld. Vreedzame en gewelddadige acties tegen de apartheid*, Amsterdam, 1995.

BUSKES, J.J., *South Africa's apartheid policy- unacceptable*, sl, 1956.

DE BOER, S., *Van Sharpeville tot Soweto. Nederlandse Regeringsbeleid ten aanzien van apartheid, 1960-1977*. Amsterdam, 1999

DU. T SPIES, F.J.& D.H. Heydehrych, *Ad destinatum II, 1960-1982*. Pretoria, 1987.

EDELENBOS, C.(ed.), *Defence and Aid Fund, 1965-1991. In goed vertrouwen*, sl. 1991.

HENDRICKS, W.G., 'De betrekkinge tussen Nederland en Zuid Afrika, 1946-1961.' PhD.-verhandeling, Universiteit van Wes-Kaapland (UWK) 1984.

- KLEIN, G., 'Relations between the Netherlands and South Africa in the twentieth century', BA(hons) dissertation, University of Pretoria (UP), 1999.
- KUITENBROUWER, M., *De ontdekking van de Derde Wereld. Beeldvorming en beleid in Nederland, 1950-1990*. Den Haag, 1994.
- KUITENBROUWER, M., *The Netherlands and the rise of imperialism. Colonies and foreign policy, 1870-1902*. (transl. H. Beyer) Oxford, 1991.
- MEIJER, A., 'Voortrekkers of voordeeltrekkers ? Het Nederlandse beleid ten aanzien van Zuid-Afrika', Leiden, sa.
- NUIS, A. (samesteller), *Apartheid, feiten en commentaren*. Amsterdam, 1966.
- PERRY, M., *Western civilization. A brief history*. (2<sup>nd</sup> edition), Boston, 1993.
- PIJPERS, A., 'The Netherlands: The weakening pull of Atlanticism' in C. Hill (ed), *The actors in Europe's foreign policy*, London, 1996.
- POS, M., *Wie was Dr. Verwoerd?*, Utrecht, 1968.
- ROZENBERG, R., *De bloedband Den-Haag-Pretoria. Het Nederlandse Zuid-Afrikabeleid sinds 1945*. Amsterdam, 1986.
- SCHUTTE, G.J., *Nederland en de Afrikaners- Adhesie en adversie*. Den Haag, 1986.
- TERREBLANCHE, H.O., *Nederland en die Afrikaner: gesprek oor apartheid. Die paginaruil tussen Trouw en Die Burger, 1963- 1964*. Port Elizabeth, 1998.
- THOMAS, S., *The diplomacy of liberation. The foreign relations of the African National Congress since 1960*. International Library of International studies. London, 1996.
- VAN ASWEGEN, H.J., *History of South Africa to 1854*. Pretoria, 1990.
- VAN BEURDEN, J. & C. Huinder, *De Vinger op de zere plek. Solidariteit met Zuidelijk Afrika, 1961- 1996*, Amsterdam, 1996.
- VAN DEN HEUVEL, A., *Shalom and Combat. A personal struggle against racism*. (transl. A. Mackie) Geneva, 1979.
- VAN DER MEULEN, J.W., 'Nederland en de apartheid' in S. Rozemond, *Het woord is aan Nederland. Thema's van buitenlandse beleid in de jaren 1966-1983*. S'Gravenhage, 1983.
- VAN KLAVERN, M., *Nederland's aandeel in apartheid. Nieuwe feiten gegevens economische relaties Nederland-Zuid Afrika*, Den Haag, 1983.
- VAN LAKERVELD, C. (ed.), *Nederland tegen apartheid*, Amsterdam, 1994.
- VANDENBOSCH, A., *Dutch foreign policy since 1815. A study in small power politics*. The Hague, 1959.

